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Nichttechnische
Zusammenfassung
Ein wichtiger Bestandteil in vielen fo¨deralen Staaten ist ein umfangreiches Trans-
fersystem, welches insbesondere durch seine redistributive und effizienz-sichernde
Rolle gekennzeichnet ist. Insbesondere werden interregionale externe Effekte
durch ein geeignetes Schema von Kofinanzierungen in der Tradition von Pigou
korrigiert und fiskalische Disparita¨ten zwischen den einzelnen Regionen durch
ein Finanzausgleichssystem nivelliert. In einer idealen Fo¨deration, in der es
einerseits keine Beschra¨nkungen hinsichtlich der Politikinstrumente gibt, und
anderseits alle relevanten Informationen frei verfu¨gbar sind, gilt ein Transfersys-
tem in zentralstaatlicher Verantwortung als Gegenstu¨ck einer regionalstaatlichen
Bereitstellung von o¨ffentlicher Gu¨tern - ein Ausgleich von Disparita¨ten und eine
vollsta¨ndige Korrektur der Fehlanreize ist stets mo¨glich.
In der Literatur wird argumentiert, dass lokale Regierungen wegen ihrer
ra¨umlichen Na¨he zu den Problemen vor Ort regional-spezifische Umsta¨nde beson-
ders gut einscha¨tzen ko¨nnen. Hinsichtlich des Dezentralisierungstheorems wird
daher eine dezentrale Bereitstellung von o¨ffentlichen Gu¨tern ha¨ufig durch den
Informationsvorsprung der lokalen Ebene gerechtfertigt. La¨ßt sich allerdings ein
Hauptgrund fu¨r Dezentralisierung aus o¨konomischer Sicht auf das Spezialwissen
der regionalstaatlichen Entscheidungstra¨ger zuru¨ckfu¨hren, so ist es plausible,
dass dem Oberverband gewisse lokale Informationen zur Bemessung der Trans-
ferzahlungen verborgen bleiben.
9
10 NICHT TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
In einem ku¨rzlich erschienenen U¨berblicksartikel u¨ber den Stand des fiskalis-
chen Fo¨deralismus nimmt Oates (2005)1 eine fundamentale Unterscheidung zwi-
schen der sogenannten ersten Generation der Theorie des Fo¨deralismus und der
zweiten Generation vor. Kennzeichnend fu¨r die zweite Theoriegeneration ist nach
Oates die Einbeziehung asymmetrischer Informationen und polit-o¨konomischer
Aspekte. Die Modelle, die wir zur Analyse der Beziehungen zwischen Gebi-
etsko¨rperschaften in vertikal und horizontal strukturierten Fo¨derationen, ins-
besondere der Transferbeziehungen zwischen Gebietsko¨rperschaften, konzipieren,
beinhalten zumeist eine asymmetrische Informationsstruktur und geho¨ren damit
der zweiten Theoriegeneration des fiskalischen Fo¨deralismus an.
Anknu¨pfend an die zweite Generation der Literatur ist das Ziel dieser Arbeit
eine umfassende Untersuchung des optimalen Designs von anreizkompatiblen
Transfermechanismen in fo¨deralen Systemen, vor allem vor dem Hintergrund
der mo¨glichen Informationsasymmetrien zwischen den einzelnen Regierungsebe-
nen. Diese Problematik wird daru¨ber hinaus im Rahmen eines Modells mit
vielschichtigen Interdependenzen auf der Ebene nachgeordneter Gebietsko¨rper-
schaften untersucht. Zudem wollen wir die Effekte der vertikalen strategischen
Interaktionen in einer Fo¨deration in bezug auf die Anreizkompatibilita¨t von be-
absichtigten Transferzahlungen mit redistributivem Charakter betrachten.
Was den informationso¨konomischen Teil dieser Arbeit betrifft, so ko¨nnen
wir uns auf die umfassende Literatur zur Vertragstheorie, der Theorie der ver-
borgenen Handlung und der Prinzipal-Agenten Theorie stu¨tzen. Es ist wohl
nicht u¨bertrieben, wenn man, a¨hnlich wie Oates (2005), davon spricht, dass ein
Großteil der Resultate, welche die erste Theoriegeneration hervorgebracht hat,
unter informationstheoretischen Aspekten modifiziert oder gar neu geschrieben
1Oates, W. (2005) Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism, International
Tax and Public Finance, vol. 12(4), pp 349-373.
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werden muss.
Ein allgemeiner Zielkonflikt zwischen den Regionalstaaten, die jeweils dem
Wohl der ansa¨ssigen Bevo¨lkerung verpflichtet sind, ist neben einer dezentral-
isierten Datenerfassung die zweite wichtige Ursache fu¨r Fehlanreize in einem
fo¨deralen Gefu¨ge. Einerseits stehen lokale Regierungen bei der Besteuerung im
Wettbewerb um mobile Faktoren, wie zum Beispiel Kapital und Firmen. An-
dererseits kommt es zu einem Wettbewerb um Zuweisungen aus gemeinsamen
fo¨deralen Finanzto¨pfen. Damit unterscheidet sich diese Arbeit im Wesendlichen
von den u¨blichen Prinzipal-Agenten Modellen aus der Regulierungstheorie oder
des sogenannten ”Administrativen Fo¨deralismus”, wo derartige Interaktionen
nicht betrachtet werden.
Durch die informationstheoretische Sichtweise, die in dieser Arbeit vornehm-
lich eingenommenen wird, sollen neue Interpretationen und Erkla¨rungen fu¨r alt-
bekannte Fragen und Probleme des Finanzausgleichs ero¨rtert werden. Dies ist
somit gleichzeitig als eine Antwort auf die an der ersten Generation der Theorie
des Fo¨deralismus gea¨ußerte Kritik zu sehen, wonach der darin latent vorhandene,
in der Regel nicht zu befriedigende Informationsbedarf daran zweifeln la¨sst, ob
aus dieser Theorie u¨berhaupt implementierbare Mechanismen im Finanzausgle-
ich hervorgehen ko¨nnen. Gerade die Implementierbarkeit von Mechanismen ist
aber eine entscheidende Voraussetzung fu¨r deren praktische Anwendung.
Zusammenfassend la¨sst sich somit folgende Kernfrage formulieren:
In welcher Weise ko¨nnen sich lokale Regierungen einen Handlungsspielraum
sichern, um zusa¨tzliche Zuweisungen aus fo¨deralen To¨pfen zu erhalten, falls diese
in einem interregionalen Wettbewerb stehen? Wie sollten fo¨derale Transfersys-
teme gestaltet sein, damit lokale Regierungen keinen Anreiz haben unberechtigte
Anspru¨che auf lokale Zuweisungen zu erheben ohne dabei die redistributive Rolle
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zu vernachla¨ssigen?
Unter der Zielsetzung Anreizprobleme in fo¨deralen Staaten aufzudecken und
den optimalen fo¨deralen Transfermechanismus zu analysieren, teilt sich die Ar-
beit im wesentlichen in fu¨nf Kapitel auf. In Kapitel 3 bis 6 werden wir in-
nerhalb eines modell-theoretischen Rahmens Fo¨derationen analysieren, die vor
allem durch eine asymmetrische Informationsstruktur gepra¨gt sind. Im siebten
Kapitel wenden wir uns dann einer Fo¨deration mit einer vollkommenen Informa-
tionsstruktur auf horizontaler Ebene zuwenden. Die einzelnen Kapitel und ihr
Beitrag sollen im folgenden kurz zusammengefasst werden:
Im dritten Kapitel betrachten wir eine Fo¨deration, in der heterogene Re-
gionen im Wettbewerb um eine gemeinsame Steuerbasis stehen. Im Rahmen
des Modells offeriert der Oberverband ein fo¨derales Transfersystem, um Dis-
parita¨ten zwischen den Regionen auszugleichen und fiskalische Externalita¨ten
zu korrigieren. Aufgrund von Informationsassymmetrien ko¨nnen die lokalen
Regierungen einen gewissen Spielraum gewinnen, um zusa¨tzliche Transfers aus
den fo¨deralen Finanzto¨pfen zu beziehen. Insbesondere versuchen sie im Rah-
men des Steuerwettbewerbs geringe Steueraufkommen durch ho¨here fo¨derale
Zuweisungen zu substituieren. Wir entwickeln ein anreizvertra¨gliches Bayesian-
siches Transferschema, welches das Anreizproblem auf lokaler Ebene lo¨st. Als
neuen Beitrag zur Literatur zeigen wir, dass eine Separation der einzelnen In-
formationstypen im Mechanismus zu geringeren Informationskosten fu¨hrt, falls
lokale Regierungen nicht nur um Transfers, sondern auch um mobile Steuerbasis
konkurrieren. In diesem Sinne erweißt sich Steuerwettbewerb als vorteilhaft, da
im Finanzausgleich ho¨here Ausgleichsraten erzielt werden.
Falls der Oberverband einer Fo¨deration sich nicht glaubhaft zu einer fes-
ten Ausschu¨ttungsregel von Zuweisungen verpflichten kann, kommt es ha¨ufig zu
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einem Ex-Post Dilemma. Das weitreichende Anreizproblem, welches sich aus
der zeitlichen Inkonsistenz des Transferschemas ergibt, soll im vierten Kapi-
tel analysiert werden: Lokale Regierungen, die sich stets auf fo¨derale Hilfe
verlassen ko¨nnen, sind zum Beispiel geneigt weniger Vorkehrungen zu treffen,
um negative Schocks abzumildern. Allerdings la¨ßt sich das Unvermo¨gen des
Oberverbandes die Ausschu¨ttungsregeln ex ante zu definieren ha¨ufig auf eine
asymmetrische Informationsstruktur zuruckfu¨hren. Unser Anliegen ist daher
eine genaue Untersuchung der Auswirkungen des Ex-Post Problems aus infor-
mationso¨konomischer Sicht. In einem Modell mit asymmetrischer Information
und einem mehrstufigen Spiel zeigen wir, dass lokale Regierungen bei einer ho-
hen Abha¨ngigkeit von fo¨deralen Transfers nur einen eingeschra¨nkten Spielraum
bei der Gestaltung ihrer lokalen Finanzpolitik haben. Die Perspektive auf einen
vergro¨ßerten Handlungsspielraum ermo¨glicht es lokalen Regierungen ho¨here In-
formationsrenten zu beziehen. Wir zeigen, dass diese Perspektive betra¨chtliche
Anreize fu¨r eine langfristige Investitionspolitik stiften kann.
In Fo¨derationen mit einer starken interregionalen Verflechtung ist es plausi-
bel, dass die lokalen Informationstypen mit einander korrelieren - so argumen-
tieren wir im fu¨nften Kapitel. Es ist zum Beispiel denkbar, dass benachbarte
Regionen in vergleichbarer Weise mit exogenen technologischen Schocks kon-
frontiert werden. In solchen Fa¨llen kann der Oberverband durch Einfu¨hrung
eines geeigneten Transferschemas einen so genannten Maßstabswettbewerb auf
lokaler Ebene fo¨rdern. Lokale Informationstypen sind fu¨r den Oberverband un-
beobachtbar. Jedoch wird die Scha¨rfe des Informationsproblems verringert, wenn
lokale Politikgro¨ßen miteinander vergleichbar sind. Die Politik einer Nachbarre-
gion kann bei der Bewertung der Situation in einer bestimmten Region dienlich
sein. In einem zweiten Schritt zeigen wir das sich der Maßstabswettbewerb auch
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auf langfriste Informationsanreize positiv auswirken kann. Damit hat dieser
Wettbewerb auch Implikationen fu¨r das im vierten Kapitel analysierte Ex-Post
Problem.
Im sechsten Kapitel betrachten wir einen Finanzausgleich, dessen Bemes-
sungsgrundlage die Differenz der Steuerbasis in den einzelnen Regionen zu einem
Durchschnittswert ist, in Anlehnung an den kommunalen Finanzausgleich in
Deutschland beziehungsweise den RTS grants in Kanada. In der Literatur ist
bekannt, dass es bei einem Ausgleich der Steuerbasis zu einem Ru¨ckkopplungs-
effekt kommt, der zu mindest teilweise die externen Effekte des Steuerwettbe-
werbs korrigiert: Lokale Regierungen, die durch Steuerdumping zusa¨tzliche Steuer-
basis anwerben, haben gleichzeitig einen geringen Anspruch auf Zuweisungen
im Rahmen des Steuerbasisausgleichs. Falls die lokalen Regierungen jedoch
einen gewissen Handlungsspielraum bei der Steuervollstreckung haben, kann
ein solches Schema Ursprung fu¨r weitere Ineffizienzen sein. Lokale Regierun-
gen ko¨nnen versuchen durch Anpassung der Steuervollstreckungspolitik einen
Steuerwettbewerb u¨ber andere Politikvariablen zu fu¨hren. Wir entwickeln da-
her ein Baysianisches Transferschema, das diese Fehlanreize lo¨sen soll. Wir
zeigen, dass ein Teil der Informationsrenten durch ein Schema extrahiert wer-
den kann, welches die lokalen Politikmaßnahmen in zweifacher Weise verzerrt
und sich somit von den Ergebnissen der herko¨mmlichen Prinzipal-Agenten Mo-
dellen unterscheidet. Vornehmlich erweißt sich der Steuerwettbewerb in Analo-
gie zu den Ergebnissen des dritten Kapitels als vorteilhaft bei der Lo¨sung des
Informationsproblems. Diese Tatsache sollte bei der Bemessung des Ausgle-
ichstransfers beachtet werden um optimale Ru¨ckkopplungseffekte aus informa-
tionso¨konomischer Sicht zu erreichen.
Im siebten Kapitel vera¨ndern wir den einheitlichen modell-theoretischen Rah-
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men ein wenig und betrachten ein fo¨derales System, in dem zu mindest auf lokaler
Ebene die regional-spezifischen Informationen allgemein bekannt sind. Hier soll
ein Transferschema entwickelt werden, welches das Problem einer Unterbereit-
stellung von globalen o¨ffentlichen Gu¨tern auf supranationaler Ebene lo¨st. Wenn
globale o¨ffentliche Gu¨ter auf regionaler Ebene bereitgestellt werden, fehlt oft
eine globale Instanz, die ein internationales Regulierungsschema glaubhaft voll-
strecken kann. In unserem Modell betrachten wir ein Szenario, in dem die einzel-
nen Regionen u¨ber internationale Umweltpolitik verhandeln begleitet von einem
System von Seitenzahlungen zwischen den jeweiligen Regionen. Dabei werden
die Seitenzahlen durch regionale Umweltsteuern finanziert, die gleichzeitig die
externen Effekte von Umweltscha¨den korrigieren sollen. Seitenzahlungen und na-
tionale Steuern sind somit in wechselseitiger Beziehung bestimmt. Bezogen auf
die Verhandlungsebene basiert das anreizvertra¨gliche Transferschema, welches
hier Anwendung findet um eine pareto-effiziente internationale Umweltpolitik zu
erreichen, auf den Grundsa¨tzen des Coase Programms. Wir stellen in diesem
Kapitel ein sehr allgemeines Transferschema vor, das viele Anreizprobleme in
einem fo¨deralen Kontext mit interregionalen Externalita¨ten lo¨sen kann.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Transfers and Competition in Federal States
As a common feature in federal states, the central government offers a system
of grants to lower level governments. Basically, federal transfer policy involves
both a redistributive role and an externality-correcting role: local governments
do not take into account trans-boundary benefits and costs of local tax and ex-
penditure policy, so that a corrective federal transfer in the Pigouvian tradition
is necessary. Further, federal governments in most instances engage in equaliz-
ing fiscal disparities. In general the central government intends to achieve fiscal
equity, guarantee a minimum standard of public services, assure a minimum
welfare level or share interregional risks among local governments.1 In an ideal
federation with complete information and no restrictions on policy instruments,
equalizing grants are often seen as a counterpart to decentralization as fiscal
disparities are fully equalized and external effects are fully corrected, see e.g.
Boadway (2004), Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) and Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2002).
In general, the first generation of the literature on fiscal federalism has over-
looked the explicit considerations for why local public services are provided de-
centrally and centers solely on its role in insuring local governments against
region-specific shocks and correcting trans-boundary external effects. However
1see Boadway (2008) for a survey.
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one must keep in mind that the provision of local public goods has been assigned
to local governments because of their informational advantage. If one of the
main economic rationale for decentralization lies in local governments’ specific
knowledge, about regional circumstances it seems to be plausible that the central
government faces difficulties in completely checking local performance and offer-
ing appropriate transfer schemes; see Arrow (1963). Likewise, the shortcoming
of the first generation literature is that the federal government is assumed to be
omniscient when it offers a grant rule to local jurisdictions despite the aforemen-
tioned informational asymmetries.
Recently some papers have tried to close this gap in the theoretical litera-
ture examining the problem of asymmetric information in federal states and the
design of interregional grants in a formal way; see Boadway et al. (1998), Bor-
dignon et al. (1996), Raff and Wilson (1995), Lockwood (1999). In particular
this strand of literature takes into account that in the real world the central gov-
ernment typically cannot peg transfers directly on the region-specific situation as
well as on local governments’ policy measures as it has incomplete information
about local circumstances so that it must offer transfers on observable variables.
In addition to decentralized information gathering, the second important
ingredient of the incentive problems presented in this study is a conflict of ob-
jectives between local governments. Local governments in federal states use to
compete with one another for mobile resources and for grants from the common
pool of federal funds. The essential paradigm for the analysis of competitive
behavior is one where economic decision makers act at least partly in their own
interests. When engaging in competition local governments may strategically
choose different variables, such as tax rates, public expenditures, tariffs, tax en-
forcement effort.
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The problem of horizontal tax competition captures the major part of the lit-
erature on inter-regional competition. Jurisdictions raise taxes on mobile capital
to finance local public good provision. Thereby local governments are concerned
about the outflow of capital if it is taxed too much. Consequently, local govern-
ments choose inefficiently low tax rates and, hence, under-provide local public
goods. If capital is assumed to be mobile among local jurisdictions but fixed
within the borders of a federation out flown capital from a particular jurisdic-
tion is employed in neighboring regions and therefore entails positive fiscal exter-
nalities which need to be internalized, see Wilson (1986), Zodrow-Mieszkowski
(1996), Wildasin (1989).
Intrinsically, inter-jurisdictional mobility should be seen as a constraint to
the source of taxation, which can be given to the local government. Whether
tax competition is beneficial or harmful for the overall welfare crucially depends
on the framework of the model. In this study we keep the common assumption
that local decision makers are locally benevolent so that an additional constraint
on policy measures is harmful. Nevertheless, some papers have taken a different
perspective assuming that regional states are governed by Leviathans who in-
tend to maximize the size of public service facilities. If the size of the government
is excessive tax competition may be a corrective device taming Leviathans; see
Rauscher (1996, 1998) and Edward and Keen (1996). Below, we will address the
issues of the political economy approach in more detail.
Intrinsically, the competition for mobile transfers in a federal state is remi-
niscent of the Rotten Kid Theorem, which has been formulated by G. S. Becker
in his work A Treatise on the Family (1981). Basically, Becker describes a set-up
with several selfish family members as well as a benevolent family head acting
in the interest of all other family members. The theorem claims that ”... redis-
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tribution of income among family members would not affect the consumption of
any member, as long as a head continues to contribute to all.”(p.1076) In par-
ticular ”...each beneficiary, no matter how selfish maximizes the family income
for his benefactor and thereby internalizes all effects of his action on the other
beneficiaries.” (p.183)
In the framework presented by Becker family members anticipate that a
benevolent head is concerned about disparities among family members and hence
steps in to pay positive transfers. Hence, given a setting with only one normal
good as well as a fix budget constraint of the family head, any economic activity
enacted by a kid which goes along with adverse effects for her siblings reduces
her own pay-off after transfer payments so that kids internalize external effects
on the other family members. The idea of the Rotten Kid Theorem, which plays
an important role in the theory of the family can be applied to the theory of
fiscal federalism. Roughly speaking, the structure in a federal state is similar
to that of a family. Here, the federal government is concerned about overall
efficiency, while local governments act in the interest of households living in the
region. In this case it would be sufficient to pay lump-sum transfers to local gov-
ernments in order to meet both efficiency and equity goals. Local governments
would correctly anticipate that the only way to increase local welfare after central
government’s transfers payments are enacted is to increase the performance of
the whole federation. Thus, inter-regional external effects are internalized which
proves the Rotten Kid Theorem.
Before drawing an all-too positive picture from intergovernmental fiscal re-
lations in a federal state when a federal transfer scheme is in place one should
pay attention to those cases in which the Rotten Kid Theorem may go wrong.
Bergstrom (1989) points out, that rotten kids may become lazy if there is a sec-
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ond commodity in the model. In this case local governments (or kids) have some
degree of freedom to increase local welfare at the expense of the federation as a
whole. The literature in the theory of fiscal federalism has examined in detail
some incentive problems which may occur if local governments have a degree of
freedom choosing a policy that shifts some cost to the fiscal commons.
Local governments try to shift the burden of financing local public goods on
the federation as a whole, substituting higher grants-in-aid for tax revenue, see
Huber et al. (2002) and Prud’ homme (1995). In this case local governments may
have some freedom of action in order to reduce the tax effort and disburden the
private sector. Moreover in many federal settings local governments have some
latitude of discretion to recast expenditures originally dedicated to long-term
investments for short-term public consumption. In particular in the presence of
federal insurance they under-invest in the modernization of public infrastructure
and public services as the consequential costs of policy shortfalls are not fully
reflected by local governments, see Rodden (2001), Goodspeed and Haughwout
(2006), Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2007).
The theory has well understood that central government can achieve an ef-
ficient allocation in an environment with full information and no restrictions on
the set of policy instrument by offering a corrective transfer scheme. In the
context of this study an externality-correcting grant rule may be interpreted as
follows: the central government opens up a new option for local governments
to engage in common pool fishing by offering co-funding grants. Local govern-
ments may be eligible to additional co-funding grants if they change their policy
measure. At the margin the benefit receiving an additional euro from the com-
mon pool by changing local policy should offset the external effects. Sometimes
the entitlement of the transfer scheme comes along well so that the Rotten Kid
22 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Theorem is recovered: Bucovetsky and Smart (2007) as well as Ko¨thenbu¨rger
(2002) have shown that the advantage of tax competition can be neutralized
if the entitlement to benefit from tax revenue equalizing grants changes at the
margin by the same extent - this is the so called tax back effect. Otherwise, the
central government explicitly offers co-funding programs contingent on local pol-
icy measures as well as region-specific circumstances implementing the optimal
local policy.
In general the federal government cannot offer a transfer scheme which im-
plements an efficient local policy in the presence of asymmetric information. On
the one hand the central government does not know the magnitude of the ex-
ternality to define a matching rate. On the other hand it cannot observe some
of the policy measures so that local governments have an incentive to choose
an untruthful policy which may be a source of new inefficiencies. Then, local
governments have some scope to draw additional grants from the common pool
and engage in competition for federal transfers.
A challenge of this study is to visualize the competition between local gov-
ernments and detect the source of possible disruptions. Then we are able to
design an optimal transfer scheme, which recovers incentive-compatibility. For a
more profound analysis of the underlying incentive problem we lay emphasis on
the fact that the competition with specific variables may be based on different
processes and mechanisms. For example tax competition can be based on the
mobility of individuals, goods, factors or firms. Instead it can be founded on local
governments’ entitlement to benefit from grants if a change in their tax policy
makes local governments eligible for additional transfer.2 Further, local govern-
ments can reduce their tax burden by using grants instead of tax revenue while
2Likewise, Salmon (2008) has recently describe the interdependence between yardstick com-
petition and mobility based tax competition.
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at the same time they can gain a competitive advantage in the tax competition
game and attract more capital. In order to understand the incentive problem,
which may arise in federal states with a federal transfer system and mobility of
resources, we must first of all analyze in detail the underlying mechanism.
Accordingly, the study is inspired by the literature on the mechanism design
approach. At the center of the analysis we formulate an incentive-compatibility
condition in order to find transfer schemes which tackle common pool fishing.
Intrinsically, we show that the separation of efficiency and redistribution in the
full information setting presented in the first generation of the literature does not
hold in a setting with asymmetric information. The central government must of-
fer positive information rents in order to implement a truthful local policy. Here,
redistributive aims and an allocative object cannot be disentangled but must be
seen together. This calls for an integrated solution as was already claimed in the
early literature on inter-personal redistribution, see Mirless (1971) and Stiglitz
(1982).
The novel contribution of this study is that we claim that local governments
are linked through their treasuries and resource allocation: anticipating these
interdependencies the central government may attempt to benefit from the com-
petition between regional governments to relax informational constraints and
reduce the information rents which must be paid to induce a truthful local pol-
icy.
Sometimes the federal government can exploit the fact that regionally benevo-
lent jurisdictions do not internalize the informational externalities on neighboring
jurisdictions when they pursue local policy measures. In particular local govern-
ments do not take into account that their policy measures serve as a signal for
correlated types of neighboring jurisdictions. Therefore, the central government
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can learn more about local circumstances without offering information rents.
Further we consider a set of transfers which implement an optimal local policy
in an environment with complete information. At the supra-national level, there
do not exist strong institutions for coordinating the policy measures enacted on
the local level. In this case local governments can offer reciprocal side payments
to their neighbors in order to enable cooperation among local governments.
1.2 Purpose of the Study
Reality has shown that poorly designed transfer systems can have harmful con-
sequences for both federal efficiency and equity.3 These shortfalls have received
vast attention in the second generation of the literature on fiscal federalism but
it is far from being comprehensive at this moment. The purpose of this study
is to contribute to the second generation of the literature on fiscal federalism
which analyzes the federal transfer mechanism in the presence of incomplete
information and commitment devices.
Recapitulating, the basic questions of this study can be formulated as follows:
To which extent can local governments in a federal state, which compete with each
other, gain some latitude of discretion to draw some additional grants from the
common pool of federal funds. How must a federal transfer scheme be designed
that tackles common pool fishing and at the same time fulfills the allocative and
distributive objectives of the federal government?
1.3 Limits of the Study
Principally, the work is relatively analytical rather than descriptive. Little dis-
cussion about detail applied policy problems in federal states is given. There
is no detailed treatment of country-specific issues and institutional structures.
3Rodden (2001), Baretti et al. (2002) point out shortfalls of federal transfers in Germany.
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However the framework of the basic model, which is presented in this study,
is in agreement with the basic situation in many federal states. Furthermore
this study excludes empirical issues. Nevertheless in the following chapters we
are going to cite several empirical studies, which provide evidence for the basic
assumption made in the models and for the investigated incentive problems.
1.4 Outline of the Dissertation
This thesis presents five different settings in federal states with inter-regional
transfer systems. The first four chapters describe a setting with informational
asymmetries with respect to fiscal needs as well as to fiscal capacity. The last
chapter considers a transfer scheme, which is going to internalize interregional
spillover effects in a full information set-up. The different chapter and their
respective contributions are summarized hereafter.
1.4.1 Beneficial Tax Competition
In the third chapter of this study we consider a federal state with heterogenous
jurisdictions engaging in strategic tax competition. In the frame of the model the
federal government offers a federal transfer scheme in order to correct fiscal ex-
ternalities and equalize fiscal disparities. We show that local governments have
some latitude of discretion when drawing additional grants from the common
pool of federal funds if local governments are better informed about relevant
local circumstances. Especially, in a federal state with inter-regional tax com-
petition local governments may tend to substitute higher grants-in-aid for tax
revenue. We design an optimal Bayesian redistribution mechanism in order to
tackle incentive problems at the local level. As a novel contribution to the lit-
erature we show that the separation of informational types in the mechanism
entails lower informational cost if local governments do not only compete for
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federal transfers but also for tax bases. In this spirit tax competition is benefi-
cial as the federal government can offer grants with a higher contribution rate
so that disparities among local governments are equalized by a higher extent.
1.4.2 The Ex-Post Dilemma in Fiscal Federalism
We show that local governments’ incentives to provide public goods may be dis-
torted if the central government cannot offer fix grant rules ex ante. If federal
grants-in-aid get determined ex post, i.e. after local policy measures have been
chosen, local governments may influence federal transfer payments by strate-
gically choosing local policy measures. For example local governments which
rely on federal aid may tend to under-invest in precautionary long term-policy
measures running the risk of high consequential costs in the future. In the
fourth chapter we analyze this wide-spread incentive problem based on the time-
inconsistency of transfer schemes. Indeed, the central government’ s incapacity
to offer a well-defined transfer scheme ex ante is often rooted in an asymmetric
information structure predominant in the federal state. Our main concern is
therefore to analyze the consequences of the ex-post redistribution problem from
an information-based perspective. Considering a two-stage game with asymmet-
ric information we show that local governments which highly depend on federal
grants-in-aid may have a limited scope to freely enact local fiscal policy. The
local government’s perspective to enlarge the latitude of discretion for local fis-
cal policy allowing them to draw higher informational rents from the common
pool may provide considerable incentives for local precautionary investments.
Although fully insured by a federal redistribution mechanism, local governments
are at least partly residual claimant of their own policy. This provides incentives
for long-term projects reducing the likelihood of negative future shocks.
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1.4.3 Transfers and Informational Externalities
In federations with spatial interrelation, it is plausible that technology types
correlate between jurisdictions. In the fifth chapter we show that local policy
performance becomes meaningfully comparable for the central government by
implementing a yardstick competition mechanism. In this case it can reduce
local governments’ scope to draw additional grants from the common pool by
choosing an untruthful policy. The transfer received by local governments would
be a function not only of their own policy measures but also of the performance
of neighboring regions. From a game theoretically perspective, an appropriate
federal transfer mechanism generates a game in which local governments com-
pete for a bonus payment. Here, the federal government can exploit the fact
that self-interested jurisdictions do not internalize the informational external-
ities on neighboring jurisdictions when they pursue local policy measures. In
particular local governments do not take into account that their policy measures
serve as a signal for correlated types of neighboring jurisdictions. Therefore, the
central government can learn more about local circumstances without offering
information rents. In the second step we show that the yardstick competition
mechanism may provide positive incentives for local precautionary incentives
with implications for the finding of the fourth chapter.
1.4.4 Tax Base Equalizing and Incentives
Tax base equalizing grants entail a tax back effect that internalizes fiscal exter-
nalities: an inflow of mobile tax bases induced by tax dumping coincide with a
reduced entitlement to benefit from equalizing grants. Nevertheless, tax sharing
can undermine local tax incentives if jurisdictions have some latitude of dis-
cretion to enforce taxes. Unobserved by the central government, jurisdictions
choose inefficiently lax enforcement policies in order to substitute tax revenue
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for higher grants-in-aid. Here, we designed truthful transfer mechanisms equal-
izing tax base differences and equally providing optimal tax incentives. In order
to allow for separation of informational types, the second best optimal grants
include an information rent as well as a two-way distortion, which differs from
standard models.
1.4.5 Internalizing Interregional Spillovers
An effective policy scheme to overcome the suboptimal low provision levels of
global public goods is developed in this paper. By suggesting a decentralized
approach to raise environmental public good provision levels we take account
of the lack of a coercive global authority that is able to enforce efficient inter-
national environmental regulations. In our model individual regions voluntarily
commence international negotiations on public good provision, which are ac-
companied by side-payments. These side-payments are financed by means of
regional externality-correcting taxes. Side-payments and national tax rates are
designed in a mutually dependent way. The decentralized scheme we recommend
for approaching Pareto efficient Nash equilibria is based on the ideas of Coasean
negotiations and Pigouvian taxes. As it is implementable for a wide class of
Nash solutions, it is applicable to various international externality problems.
Chapter 2
Transfers and Incentives in
Fiscal Federalism
In this chapter our main concern is to justify the model-theoretical approach
which is used in the following study while giving a survey of related articles on
the theory of federal transfers. Further I will give a more detailed explanation for
why local governments may have better knowledge about region-specific circum-
stances than the federal level. Moreover we are going to describe the intuitional
arrangements of transfer systems in federal states around the word and describe
the legal basis.
2.1 Community preference model
In line with Wildasin (1989), Gramlich (1968), Wilde (1968), Oates (1972) and
many other recent contributions to the literature of fiscal federalism we consider
the simplest model of local public expenditures - the so-called community prefer-
ence model. Thereby identical households inhabit each region in the federation
so that we can boil down the model and a community can be treated as a single
household. In this case utility maximizing of the representative household would
be equivalent to the maximization of a Benthamite social welfare function. In
general this framework emerges as a good starting point for theoretical work and
it is also the foundation of many theory-based estimations. However throughout
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the analysis we always keep in mind that jurisdictions may entail heterogeneous
households in real word applications. In particular, there is a limited set of policy
measures available to governments when reallocating resources from the private
to public sector or correcting market failures. For instance raising a head tax at
the local level would solve the problem of interregional fiscal externalities. How-
ever, head taxes may be unenforceable in a democratic decision making process
in regions with income disparities because of its regressive impact, see Wilson
(1999).
2.2 The mainline theory and the new political econ-
omy
In order to investigate fiscal decentralization we consider a basic model that
Oates (2005) has called the mainline theory of fiscal federalism. As already
mentioned we assume that local governments are locally benevolent, i.e. they
maximize the welfare of local households, whereas the central government in-
tends to maximize overall federal welfare. Thereby we implicitly assume that
democratic institutions are strong and good enough to align the objectives of
local decision makers. In particular households can elect decision makers on the
local and federal level. Voters will support those politicians who maximize lo-
cal welfare and throw out of office self-interested politicians. Roughly speaking,
this view of a federal state is reminiscent of the work of Musgrave, Oates, and
Samuelson, who have modeled the government as a benevolent social planner.
The political economy approach attempts to model the behavior of govern-
ments in a more detailed way, as it is done in the standard approach, taking
into account delegation problems of politicians when the voting process is not
optimal due to informational asymmetries or shortfalls with respect to the con-
stitutional design. In particular, the new political economy approach points
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out benefits of decentralization which has not been mentioned in the literature
reminiscent of Musgrave, Oates, Samuelson. The scope for rent-seeking can be
limited if government functions are assigned to the local level. It is shown that
a Leviathan government which takes bribes, or acts in the interest of a special
interest group, can be tamed as decentralization increases the accountability
of politicians or balances policy measures though horizontal competition; see
Brennan and Buchanan (1980), Lockwood (2008), Persson and Tabellini (2000),
Besley and Coate (2003). Furthermore it tries to explain why local governments
may better match region-specific preferences of households than a central gov-
ernment.
In this study we draw a positive picture from the democratic process as-
suming that the cost of collective decision making is not too high. Although it
deals here with two opposing strands of literature, our investigation does not
necessarily stand in contrast with the new political economy approach since it
mainly focuses on incentive problems of local governments in the presence of a
federal transfer system. Similar to the new political economy approach we inves-
tigate rent-seeking behavior of local government authorities in the presence of
informational asymmetries. From the viewpoint of the federal government local
government are rent seekers who try to draw additional grants from the com-
mon pool. In this spirit, both schools of thought draw rather the same picture
whereas only the motif of rent seeking may differ.
2.3 Informational Asymmetries in Federations: The-
ory and Evidence
The literature falls short of delivering an integrated explanation of the informa-
tion problem predominant in federal states. Thus, in this section, I would like to
bring together the different aspects of the literature justifying why informational
32CHAPTER 2. TRANSFERS AND INCENTIVES IN FISCAL FEDERALISM
asymmetries may be an important problem in federal states. Hayek (1945),
Cornes and Silva (2002), and Oates (2005) have pointed out that local govern-
ments may better estimate the region-specific costs of public good provision than
the central government because they have better access to local information. It
is assumed that local government can better estimate region-specific circum-
stances and can better estimate the preferences of local households because of
their proximity to on-site problems. They assume that there is a strong rela-
tionship between the ability to gather information and the geographic location
of the administration.
What is the reason for an informational advantage of those who are nearer to
the problem? It might be plausible that local governments have special skills due
to the management of public expenditures, the provision of public facilities as
well as raising and administering tariffs or taxes. Dafflon (2008) points out that
the information advantage ”... is not ipso facto a guarantee of efficiency in the
production of the functions that are to be decentralized. To satisfy the demand,
governmental authorities cannot be simply ’local’, they have to be ’managerial’.”
What are managerial abilities? Wallis and Dollery (2002) emphasize the impor-
tance of social capital in local governments. In general local decision makers have
an important outside social network including citizens or professional groups like
business organizations. Typically in settings where social networks are in place
the cost of gathering relevant local information is reduced. Local decision makers
may get updated about the local situation by informal contact networks, charac-
terized by reciprocity and trust, as Wallis and Dollery (2002) have pronounced.
Moreover Dafflon (2008) points out the local governments may lose their
competence to provide certain local public goods in the absence of managerial
and organizational abilities. Therefore they have a strong interest to invest in
2.3. INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES IN FEDERATIONS: THEORYAND EVIDENCE 33
information gathering. The central government may have fewer incentives to ac-
quire local information and to get familiar with region-specific particularities. It
mainly uses local data to audit regional governments or to determine conditions
of entitlement for transfer payments. As local state verification is costly for the
central government it will trade off between the benefits of detecting the local
governments’ non- truthful policy choice and the cost of auditing (see Gale and
Hellwig (1989) for a formalization of the optimal audit problem). In this spirit
the central government’s ignorance of local types is rational if costs are relatively
high as Cremer et al. (1996) suggest.
There might be another aspect in the literature, which supports the fact
that local governments have important managerial capacities and hence some
informational advantage. Some papers have pronounced that decentralization of
the public services may encourage social experimentation as a way to introduce
new policies and modernize the public sector. We can treat local governments
as laboratories for new policy measures. In a favorable competitive framework
local governments invent new policy measures and adopt the best practices from
neighboring regions. Due to this evolutionary process whose main output is the
discovery of new policies, local governments may have a significant informational
advantage concerning the adoption of new specific technologies in local public
services compared to the central authority, see Vanberg and Kerber (1994), Bre-
ton (1996).
Further, it is interesting to ask if it is possible for an organization with sev-
eral decision makers, such as a regional government, to hide relevant data when
interacting with higher-level governments or with neighboring regions? In the
case of an incomplete delegation of the local governments’ personnel, privately
known information may spill over unintentionally to the central government au-
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thorities. The central government may initiate a cloak-and-dagger in order to
identify the local information at low cost. Cloak-and-dagger may be a good
tool to learn relatively simple data however it may be an unappropriate way
to solve the problem if the relevant information encompasses relatively complex
data about socioeconomic, cultural, and technological circumstances, which can-
not be learned simply. For simplicity in this study we consider a highly stylized
model, which illustrates the information asymmetries by a single parameter. In
the real word local authorities privately know about a flood of data and it is
hence an art in itself for decision makers to evaluate such data.
Moreover it should be taken into account that the incentive problem in this
study is not a delegation problem in the strict sense as it is defined in the theory
of industrial organization or the theory of procurement and regulation; see for
example Tirole (1988) and Laffont and Tirole (1993). Constitutional law in gen-
eral gives the legal foundation for the federal insurance and predetermines the
main goals of a federal transfer system. Hence, in a broader sense, the federal
government is actually delegated by the federation as a whole to redistribute
tax revenues among governments and insure regions against negative shocks. To
make the difference clear let us consider a typically I-O problem where a firm in-
tends to delegate a business service to a subcontractor. For this purpose the firm
is offering a contract to the subcontractor. Knowing the technology type of the
subcontractor, the firm can offer a contract, which fully extracts the producer’s
rent so that the incentive-compatibility constraint is binding. This simple setting
is sufficient if the firm simply observes the technology type as the subcontractor
accepts all contracts meeting the individual-rationality constraint. As already
indicated above the setting in federal states slightly differs from the simple I-O
model, as the federal government must fulfill an insurance constraint, which is
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predetermined by constitutional law. Here, the central government must attest
to verifiable data in the constitutional court if there is a dispute with the local
government. The quality of information is therefore very high and hence it is
less likely that verifiable information will spillover unintentionally to the central
authority.
2.4 Mechanism design approach in fiscal federalism
If local governments privately know exogenous parameters the central govern-
ment faces a typical adverse selection problem: Local governments act in the
interest of local households by choosing an option which maximizes local wel-
fare and ignores overall efficiency considerations. Choosing an untruthful local
policy, local governments may shift the burden of financing public services onto
the federation as a whole. In this study we use a mechanism design approach
in order to investigate the main characteristics of transfer schemes, which tackle
common pool fishing in a federal state.
The revelation principle ensures that there is no loss of generality in restrict-
ing the federal government to offer simple menus of transfer, having options for
all types of the specific type space. The direct revelation mechanism offered by
the central government can be expressed as a simple message game, in which the
federal government commits to pay a transfer and to ask for a local policy en-
acted by local governments. Both the transfer and the policy measure depend on
the information type which is reported as a message by the local government to
the central government. In particular we search for incentive-compatible direct
mechanisms i.e. for transfer schemes where truthful behavior is the best response
in the Bayesian game. The revelation principal tells us that any allocation rule
obtained by such a message game can be implemented with a truthful direct
revelation mechanism; see Gibbard (1973), Green and Laffont (1977), Myerson
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(1979). In a second step we can calculate an indirect transfer mechanism that
normally depends on observable policy measures chosen by local decision makers
such as tax rates or total tax revenue.
Due to the standard principal-agent literature it often suffices to analyze
the optimal contract for just one agent and then aggregate the problem into a
multi-agent contract. Moreover the literature on optimal redistribution schemes
is vast and dates back to the analysis of an optimal income tax system by Mirless
(1971). As a distinctive feature of this study we consider a framework in which
local governments interact with each other in many dimensions. This may have
important implications for the incentive-compatibility constraint. In particular
we show that local governments’ competition for mobile capital and some trans-
boundary spillover effects of public service provision may alter the design of the
optimal transfer mechanism. Bordignon et al. (2001) pronounce that ”... the
inefficiencies of the redistribution are potentially more devastating when it is car-
ried out at the level of the regional government rather than among individuals”.
But we will show that the interdependencies between local governments may be
also beneficial as it sometimes allows for a better selection of informational types
if policy instruments are endogenously determined.
Inman (2003) and Oates (2005) have pronounced that a simple principle-
agent approach has a limited application in the theory of fiscal federalism. If we
consider a principal (central government) delegating some service to local admin-
istrative units the framework of the model misses out that regional governments
have an electoral and fiscal autonomy. Likewise, Inman (2003) calls this strand
of literature administrative federalism as it mainly investigates a ”government by
contract” which may be relevant for regulating different administrations units
in a federal state. In contrast, the transfer mechanism, which is going to be
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analyzed in this study, should not limit the autonomies of local decision makers.
The purpose of this study is to design transfers which tackle the common pool
fishing problem predominant in federal states. Local governments can self-select
a transfer-policy bunch from a menu offered by the central government preserv-
ing local governments autonomy at any time. Indeed the well functioning of a
federal transfer system is essential in order to fulfill the principle of connectivity
of the exercises and responsibility of government functions.
2.5 The equity argument in federal states around the
world
Risk-sharing arrangements, a guarantee of a minimum living standard or the re-
duction of horizontal imbalances are often embedded in constitutional or higher
law. In general the central government intends to achieve fiscal equity, guaran-
tee a minimum standard of public services, assure a minimum welfare level or
share interregional risks among local governments, see Boadway (2008). Trans-
fer mechanisms may have different conditions of entitlement. Most commonly,
we find revenue sharing programs, equalization transfers over revenues or equal-
ization transfers over needs. The so-called La¨nderfinanzausgleich in Germany
is a revenue sharing program among provincial states. Here, a part of the tax
revenue from the value added tax collected in provincial states is shared on a
per capita basis: the entitlement to benefit from grants depends on the differ-
ence between the local per capita tax revenue and the average per capita tax
revenues of all provincial states. 1 For a more detailed description of the revenue
sharing program, see for example Huber et al. (2002). In Canada the so-called
relative tax system is in place to act as an equalizing transfer over revenues on
1Here we refer to the vertical fiscal imbalance, so that only a part of the tax competition is
shared across regional governments. The value added tax is a community tax, so that a part
of the tax revenue is devoted to the central government.
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the basis of the relative size of the local tax base, see Smart (1998). A similar
tax base-equalizing grant is in place in Germany on the level of provincial states,
which equalize disparities among municipalities (Kommunaler Finanzausgleich),
see Kuhn (1991, 1995). In South Africa the central government offers an equaliz-
ing transfer over fiscal needs for provincial states, see Brosio (1995). Similarly, in
China the central government pays federal grants to provinces, which are based
on the costs of local public good provision, see Ahmad (2004). Further in Aus-
tralia we find a transfers scheme, where the payments depend on the relative costs
of public good supply predominant in provincial states, see Ahmad and Searle
(2008). Moreover we find many risk-sharing programs in many federal states like
the federal transfer payments to the US state Louisiana after Hurricane Katrina.
In this study we refer to transfer schemes which equalize disparities over fiscal
needs and tax base equalizing grants. Moreover, we model risk-sharing programs
which should provide financial aid after a negative technological shock has taken
place.
Chapter 3
Beneficial Tax Competition1
3.1 Tax Competition and Screening Informational Types
A central message of the literature on the efficiency properties in a federal state
is that interregional competition is wasteful if local governments are assumed
to be benevolent in the Pigouvian tradition. In particular, it is assumed that
jurisdictions are locally benevolent in the sense that they act in the interests of
their own inhabitants. Jurisdictions that maximize local welfare may engage in
competition for common resources not taking into account overall federal welfare
considerations. Intrinsically, recent literature has pointed out that competition
between governments for mobile capital results in a race to the bottom and com-
petition for transfers will lead to common pool fishing.
In the introductory chapters 1 and 2 we have already exposed in detail that
local governments may estimate the region-specific costs of local public goods
provision better than the central government as local decision makers are more
familiar with region-specific circumstances. Accordingly, local governments may
choose an untruthful policy in order to gain higher grants-in-aid. That is why
the federal government cannot peg transfer payments directly on local charac-
teristics. Likewise we describe a scenario throughout this chapter in which local
governments are better informed about region-specific data than the central gov-
1This chapter has been taken from Altemeyer-Bartscher and Kuhn (2006a/2009).
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ernment is. In this case local governments have some latitude of discretion to
overfish the common pool by strategically choosing local tax policy, substituting
higher grants-in-aid for tax revenue.
As conventional wisdom it is argued that tax competition and common pool
fishing are complementary problems contributing to an even more severe one.
The reason is that local governments can reduce their tax burden by relying
on grants instead of tax revenue and gain a competitive advantage in the tax
competition game and attract more capital at the same time. However in this
chapter we contrast this insight showing that tax competition may be beneficial
as it may tame transfer competition. This is even true for locally benevolent
jurisdictions.
What is the background of transfer competition? Local governments try to
choose policy measures in order to be eligible for additional grants by mimicking
regional type with higher fiscal needs. For this reason the federal government
must offer an incentive-compatible transfer mechanism that takes informational
constraints into account in order to meet redistributive as well as allocative ob-
jectives. In the frame of the game we expect that the central government must
then offer positive information rents to induce local governments to truthfully
reveal their types. As information rents must be paid additionally where more
productive regions gain more than less productive types, fiscal disparities cannot
be fully equalized.
As a novel feature in fiscal federalism, we show that tax competition may
have an informational content providing for a better selection of informational
types. The reason for this result is the following. In regimes with tax competition
it turns out to be less attractive to jurisdictions to follow the usual strategy of
understating their true technology types. Otherwise, they would have to mimic
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a disrupted goods structure which entails a welfare loss. Therefore, the central
government is enabled to draw information from the tax competition game and
to update its Bayesian beliefs on the informational types involved. This in turn
allows for a partial resolution of the adverse selection problem. In this way, some
information rents can be extracted, resulting in a higher degree of fiscal equal-
ization because normally rich regions would earn even more information rents.
By the application of the revelation principle we are able to restrict the search
for an optimal transfer schedule to truthful direct revelation mechanisms. Such a
mechanism entails a menu of transfer payments combined with a tax policy con-
tingent on the informational types reported by local governments. In a second
step, we design an indirect transfer scheme contingent on local policy decisions as
it can be habitually found in real world applications. Accordingly, in the second
best solution, the federal government trades off its desire for the compensation of
fiscal externalities against its request for the equalization of local welfare levels.
In a sense, the outcome of the tax competition game synchronize with the
optimal Bayesian mechanism such that tax competition (besides its distortionary
impact) has a welfare enhancing effect: we make use of the fact that the inten-
sity of local tax competition crucially depends on the region-specific technology
types. In particular, less productive (below the top) local governments engage
in tax competition more intensively than more productive neighbours (at the
top). This is exactly what the second best Bayesian mechanism does: it is going
along with increasing distortions of tax incentives for regions below the top and
no distortion at the top.
With respect to related literature, first of all, we should mention a number of
seminal studies namely Oates (1972), Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), Wilson
(1986), and Wildasin (1989), in which the problem of tax competition has been
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treated, all within the frame of a complete information setting with symmet-
ric jurisdictions. Like in this chapter, Bucovetsky (1991), DePater and Myers
(1993), and Peralta and van Ypersele (2002) derive a Nash equilibrium from
asymmetric tax competition games. In both of the latter papers, regions differ
in population size while our paper regions differ in technological types. More-
over, based on best response functions which crucially depend on region-specific
types, we can derive a condition in order to sort informational types which goes
beyond the literature mentioned above.
From another point of view, tax competition emerges as beneficial in this
chapter as it limits to some extent local governments’ scope to overfish the com-
mon fund. Thus, tax competition can help in tackling a conflict between local
government interest in local welfare on the one hand and overall welfare and
efficiency on the other. In a similar way, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argue
that tax competition can limit the taxing power of Leviathan-type governments.
In regimes with tax competition, selfish behavior of local governments, e.g. the
maximization of attainable budgets, is restrained. So, Leviathan models consider
a delegation problem between selfish policy makers and voters within a region
while in this chapter the focus is on the conflict of interest between regional
governments where politicians are locally benevolent.
Besley and Smart (2002) show that tax competition can enhance welfare as
it may increase voters’ ability to detect bad incumbent politicians. Local gov-
ernments change the spending policy in a way that bad politicians are detected
with a higher probability. Different from the conventional results predominant
in Leviathan models, we learn from Besley and Smart (2002) that it is impor-
tant to take the effects of fiscal constraints on the behavior of voters as well
as politicians into account. In line with our results, the authors show that tax
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competition enables a better selection of non-observable local decision makers’
ability parameters.
This chapter should contribute also to the literature of federal redistribution
with an information economics approach such as Cornes and Silva (2002, 2003),
Bucovetsky et al. (1998), Lockwood (1999), Bordignon et al. (2001), and Huber
and Runkel (2006). Intrinsically, we learn from this strand of literature that the
transfer mechanism in a federal state widely differs from the standard principal-
agent approach as one has to take into account strategic interactions between
different levels of government as well as interactions among jurisdictions on the
same level. In this respect we show that horizontal strategic interaction of local
governments, in the form of tax competition, may allow for Bayesian updates by
a higher level government. These papers show that local governments are linked
together with each other through the mobility of capital , spillover effects, as
well as treasuries. The novel contribution of this study is that we try to give an
integral analysis of the different backgrounds of interregional competition high-
lighting the informational constraints.
There also is a link to the literature on yardstick competition which is ana-
lyzed in some recent papers such as Besley and Case (1995), Boarnet and Glazer
(2002), Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2006). Yardstick competition enables vot-
ers or a central government to compare the tax policies of a given region with
a similar neighbor. In this case, local policy is more accountable as tax policy
pursued in neighboring regions serves as a benchmark - we will get back to the
phenomenon of yardstick competition in chapter 5. The informational value of
tax competition is of a quite different nature: The central government anticipates
that local governments engage in competition for mobile resources and update
its beliefs on informational types contingent on the current policy measures.
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With respect to empirical evidence, two papers confirm the hypothesis that
local governments try to substitute higher grants-in-aid for tax revenue. Baretti
et al. (2002) perform empirical tests confirming this hypothesis in the case of
higher-level federal grants. Bu¨ttner (2006), for the case of Germany, is testing
municipalities’ tax policies and finds evidence for the aforementioned incentive
problem. In a micro-based estimation, Bergstrom et al. (1983, p.1188) find that
the costs of school education are difficult to estimate for outsiders. This forti-
fies our assumption that some cost parameters are private information and can
hardly be observed by higher level government.
The chapter outline is as follows. Section 3.2 sets out the basic model. In
section 3.3 we define the optimal transfer scheme in the full information case.
This may serve as a benchmark for the results of section 3.4, where we turn to
the case of asymmetric information. Here we analyze the optimal trade-off be-
tween efficient provision of local public goods and the extraction of information
rents depicting the benefits of tax competition. Section 3.5 concludes the results
of the chapter.
3.2 Model and Problem
3.2.1 Local government policy
We consider a federation composed of a federal government and a large number of
local jurisdictions, indexed by 푖 = {1, 2, ..., 푛}. Each jurisdiction is endowed with
an inelastic supply of one unit of a fixed factor, hereafter referred to as labor.
The total capital stock in the federation 퐾¯ is exogenously given and capital is
perfectly mobile across jurisdictions, so that capital in each jurisdiction earns the
same net return 푟. The production technology exhibits constant returns to scale
and is represented by a homogeneous production function. The output expressed
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in intensive-form is 푓(푘푖), (푓푘(푘푖) > 0, 푓푘푘(푘푖) < 0, 푓푘푘푘(푘푖) > 0)
2 when 푘푖 units
of capital and one unit of labor are employed. In order to finance the provision
of local public goods each local jurisdiction can raise a unit tax, denoted by 푡푖,
on capital employed in jurisdiction 푖. Preferences of a representative household
in region 푖 are characterized by the following quasi-linear utility function
푈푖 ≡ 푈푖(푥푖, 푧푖) = 푧푖 + 푉푖(푥푖), (3.1)
where 푥푖 denotes private goods consumption and 푧푖 denotes public goods con-
sumption. A local jurisdiction’s objective is to maximize the utility of the rep-
resentative household.
The price for private goods is set equal to unity and the cost of public goods
supply is given by 1휃푖 . Jurisdictions face different provision costs because of
region-specific technological characteristics. We define a profile of technological
types 휃 = {휃1, 휃2, ..., 휃푛} = {휃푖, 휃−푖}. Types are independently drawn from a
commonly known joint distribution on ×푛푖=1[휃퐿, 휃퐻 ] with 휃퐻 > 휃퐿 > 1, 휃푖 >
1/푝(휃푖), with a cumulative distribution function 푃 (휃푖), and a density function
푝(휃푖) > 0 on [휃퐿, 휃퐻 ]. Further, the monotonous hazard rate condition is fulfilled,
i.e. it applies that 1−푃 (휃푖)푝(휃푖) is non-decreasing in 휃푖.
We assume that the federal government is able to observe neither technolog-
ical characteristics 휃푖 nor the amount of public goods provision at local level. In
general, local governments may better estimate region specific cost types than a
central government as local governments are more acquainted with on-site prob-
lems, see e.g. Oates (2005), and Bordignon et al. (2001). Moreover, the central
government cannot usually ascertain the purpose of local governments’ expendi-
tures. Referring to the German federal equalizing system, Rodden (2001) points
2We assume that marginal productivity is a convex function of the capital employed in a
jurisdiction 푖. Laussel and Le Breton (1998) show that this is a sufficient condition for the
existence of a unique pure Nash equilibrium in the tax competition game, which is derived in
the following section.
46 CHAPTER 3. BENEFICIAL TAX COMPETITION
out that it is relatively easy to re-label expenditures designed for another pur-
pose. For the sake of clarity, we consider an economy in which one local public
good is provided by each jurisdiction. But, in real world economies in which
local governments provide a variety of different public goods, it is difficult to
detect the exact purpose of public expenditures. It is, for example, difficult to
quantify ”school education” if local governments can re-label expenditures for
other purposes. Observing only tax rates 푡푖, the federal government cannot learn
anything about local technology types.
Factor markets are perfectly competitive and production factors are thus
priced at their marginal productivity:
푓푘(푘푖) = 푟 + 푡푖 and (3.2)
푓(푘푖)− 푘푖푓푘(푘푖) = 푤푖, (3.3)
where 푟 + 푡푖 defines the user cost of capital with interest rate 푟. The price
for the fixed factor in region 푖 is given by 푤푖. The representative households’
total income is composed of wage income and capital income. We assume that
the representative household in a region owns an equal share of capital 퐾¯푛 = 푘¯
and is spending the whole income on private good consumption, such that 푥푖 =
푓(푘푖) − (푟 + 푡푖)푘푖 + 푟푘¯. The local government’s budget constraint is given by
푡푖푘푖 + 푠푖 =
푧푖
휃푖
, where 푠푖 is a federal transfer received by jurisdiction 푖. The factor
demand in jurisdiction 푖 is given by the inverse of the marginal product of capital
푓푘(푟 + 푡푖)
−1 ≡ 푘푖(푟 + 푡푖) with 푘′푖(푟 + 푡푖) ≡ ∂푘푖(푟+푡푖)∂(푟+푡푖) = 1푓푘푘(푘푖) .
At the Walrasian equilibrium, factor prices adjust to clear markets, i.e.∑푛
푖=1 푘푖 = 퐾¯. Therefore, a change in the unit tax on capital 푡푖 implies a change
in the net return of capital by
∂푟
∂푡푖
= − 푘
′
푖(푟 + 푡푖)∑푛
푗=1 푘
′
푗(푟 + 푡푗)
< 03. (3.4)
3As the federal capital stock is exogenously given and the capital market is cleared, it applies
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Furthermore, from equation (3.4) it follows that
∂푘푖
∂푡푖
=
1
푓푘푘(푘푖)
(
1 +
∂푟
∂푡푖
)
< 0 and
∂푘푗
∂푡푖
=
1
푓푘푘(푘푗)
∂푟
∂푡푖
> 0. (3.5)
Expectedly, increasing 푡푖 some capital flows out of jurisdiction 푖 and is employed
in other regions.
3.2.2 Central government policy
A minimum welfare level denoted by 푈0 is guaranteed to each jurisdiction by
constitutional law. In the frame of this model the welfare guarantee 푈0 is exoge-
nously given. We assume that for this purpose the central government can offer
grants-in-aid 푠푖, not necessarily positive, to local governments before local tax
policies are set. The objective of the federal government is to choose a transfer
mechanism that minimizes total transfer payments necessary to concede 푈0 to
any jurisdiction. To describe a meaningful setting we assume that the central
government should provide the opportunity that local governments can achieve
the welfare level 푈0. Therefore the insurance constraint is here met if local gov-
ernments may attain the welfare level 푈0 by enacting an appropriate local policy
within a budget period. Moreover, the minimization problem can be interpreted
as a dual problem to the maximization of the welfare guarantee subject to the
funds given. Formally, the federal government’s policy can be expressed by the
following minimization problem:
min
푡1,...,푡푛,푠1,...,푠푛
푛∑
푖=1
푠푖 (3.6)
s.t. 휃푖 (푘푖푡푖 + 푠푖) + 푉푖(푓(푘푖)− (푟 + 푡푖)푘푖 + 푟푘¯) ≥ 푈0. for all i. (3.7)
Naturally, the optimal transfer mechanism will crucially depend on the in-
formation structure given, in particular on whether 휃푖 is common knowledge or
not.
that 푑퐾¯
푑푡푖
= 0 and hence 푘′푖 +
∑푛
푗=1 푘
′
푗
∂푟
∂푡푖
= 0. Further we assume that capital holders can get
rid of their capital at no cost, so that ∂푟
∂푡푖
≥ −1.
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3.2.3 The timing of the game
We model a multi-stage game in fiscal federalism with strategic tax competi-
tion among local governments at the second stage and the design of incentive-
compatible federal transfer schemes at the first stage. The timing of the game is
as follows:
∙ At stage 0 local jurisdictions learn their types 휃푖휖[휃퐿, 휃퐻 ].
∙ At stage 1 the federal government offers a transfer scheme contingent on
local tax policies.
∙ At stage 2 the tax competition game takes place and local governments
strategically choose a tax rate on capital.
∙ At stage 3 local jurisdictions receive the grants-in-aid.
3.3 Full Information Policy
In this section as a benchmark, we would like to analyze central government
policy in the case of full information if technology parameters 휃푖 are common
knowledge and tax policy 푡푖 is observable. In this case, the federal government
can implement an optimal local tax policy by an appropriate two-part transfer.
In line with Wellisch (2000) and Wildasin (1989), fiscal externalities can be
fully corrected by a Pigouvian subsidy, whereas fiscal disparities among local
jurisdictions can be fully equalized by a lump-sum grant.
Before we turn to the design of optimal grants-in aid offered by the federal
government, we investigate the behavior of local governments. At stage 2, tax
competition generates the following normal form game:
Γ = {푁, (푆푖)푖휖푁 , (푈푖)푖휖푁},
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where 푁 = {1, 2, ..., 푛} is the set of jurisdictions and 푆푖 = 푡푖휖ℜ+ the set of tax
strategies of 푖. The third element is the sequence of local government pay-offs,
which we have defined in equation (3.1).
A number of 푛 jurisdictions is competing for mobile capital by a strategic
tax policy decision. Local jurisdictions are aware of the federal transfer scheme,
which has been offered by the federal government at the previous stage 1. As
usual the federal government is taken to correctly anticipate local jurisdictions’
decisions in their competition for mobile capital. Assuming Nash strategies, a
jurisdiction 푖 pursues a local welfare maximizing tax policy 푡푖, given the tax
policy of any of its neighbors 푡−푖. We define the best response function of 푖,
given its specific technology:
퐵푅푖(푡−푖, 휃푖) = arg max 휃푖 (푘푖푡푖 + 푠푖) + 푉푖(푓(푘푖)− (푟 + 푡푖)푘푖 + 푟푘¯)
which entails the following first order condition:
휃푖
(
푘푖 + 푡푖
∂푘푖
∂푡푖
+
∂푠푖
∂푡푖
)
+ 푉푥(푥푖)
(
∂푟
∂푡푖
(
푘¯ − 푘푖
)− 푘푖) = 0 for all i.
or equivalently:
1 =
푀퐶퐹푖(푡푖, 푡−푖)
휃푖
(3.8)
At the optimal level of public good supply, the marginal willingness to pay for
푧푖 of a representative household is set equal to the economic cost of taxation
in terms of private good consumption. The LHS in equation (3.8) signifies the
marginal benefit of public good provision 푧푖, which is equal to unity here. The
RHS denotes the household’s contribution to finance the costs of an additional
unit of public goods, hereafter referred to as the marginal cost of public funding
(푀퐶퐹푖), weighed by the productivity parameter 휃푖. The marginal cost of public
funding adds up to:
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푀퐶퐹푖(푡푖, 푡−푖) =
푉푥(푥푖)
(
∂푟
∂푡푖
(
푘푖 − 푘¯
)
+ 푘푖
)
(푘푖 + 푡푖
∂푘푖
∂푡푖
+ ∂푠푖∂푡푖 )
(3.9)
Obviously, a local government takes into account the opportunity cost of
a lower private goods consumption coinciding with a tax increase. It further
internalizes the negative impact of an exodus of the mobile tax base on both
private and public good consumption. Moreover, it anticipates the marginal
effect of its tax policy on the federal transfer payment ∂푠푖∂푡푖 . However, regionally
benevolent jurisdictions only consider fiscal effects that impacts local welfare.
External effects induced by a tax policy change on other jurisdictions are not
internalized as is demonstrated below.
Concavity of local welfare functions implies that the best response functions
are single-valued and the 푛 equations with 푛 unknowns yield a unique Nash equi-
librium: 푡푖휖퐵푅푖(푡−푖, 휃푖) for all 푖휖푁 . Due to the negligence of fiscal externalities
the Nash equilibrium in the tax competition game involves an inefficient local
tax policy in the form of tax-dumping and therefore calls for federal correction.
In physical terms, a jurisdiction of type 휃푖 can transform one unit of a private
good into 휃푖 units of a public good. Consequently, the marginal economic cost
of taxation in terms of private good consumption, denoted by 푀퐶퐹푖휃푖 is less
important for regions with a high efficiency parameter. Thus, they have a higher
willingness to tax capital than less efficient neighbors.
Lemma 1 In the Nash Equilibrium high-type (low-type) regions have a high
(low) willingness to tax capital.
휃푖 > 휃
′
푖 =⇒ 퐵푅푖(푡−푖, 휃푖) > 퐵푅푖(푡−푖, 휃′푖) for all i.
Proof see Appendix
Let’s now turn to the federal government’s problem. At stage 1 the federal
government anticipates that jurisdictions will engage in tax competition at stage
3.3. FULL INFORMATION POLICY 51
2. It offers a transfer scheme minimizing cumulative transfer payments to meet
welfare guarantee 푈0 as well as to restore overall efficiency. Using equations (3.6)
in (3.7), yields the following optimization problem.
(푡∗1, ..., 푡
∗
푛) = arg min
푛∑
푖=1
{푈0 − 푉 (푥푖)− 푧푖}. (3.10)
s.t. (3.2) and (3.3)
Intuitively, the federal government minimizes the gap between guaranteed welfare
and the actual performed local welfare. The gap is negative if a local government
is a net contributor to the federal transfer system. The first order conditions of
the minimization problem are:
휃푖
(
푘푖 + 푡
∗
푖
∂푘푖
∂푡푖
)
+ 푉푥(푥푖)
(
∂푟
∂푡푖
(푘¯ − 푘푖)− 푘푖
)
+∑
푗 ∕=푖
(
푉푥(푥푗)
∂푟
∂푡푖
(푘¯ − 푘푗) + 휃푗푡∗푗
∂푘푗
∂푡푖
)
= 0, for all 푖.
(3.11)
or equivalently:
1 =
푆푀퐶퐹푖(푡
∗
푖 , 푡
∗
−푖)
휃푖
, for all i, (3.12)
where the RHS denotes the social marginal cost of public funding (푆푀퐶퐹푖) in
terms of private good consumption in region 푖. The social marginal cost of public
funding includes the positive external effects of a tax exodus from region 푖 to its
neighbors. The latter term in equation (3.11) expresses the total sum of exter-
nal effects across all neighboring jurisdictions, which reduces the true economic
cost of taxation. Hence, in the absence of central government intervention, the
perceived marginal cost of public funding (푀퐶퐹푖) exceeds its social marginal
cost (푆푀퐶퐹푖). Consequently, local governments raise inefficiently low taxes on
mobile capital and therefore under-provide local public goods.
The central government can internalize the positive marginal effects of a cap-
ital outflow on neighboring jurisdictions by offering a Pigouvian subsidy 푏푖(휃푖)푡푖
to each jurisdiction i. In line with Dalby (1996) efficiency supporting matching
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rates must satisfy
푏푖(휃푖) =
1
휃푖
∑
푗 ∕=푖
(
푉푥(푥푗)
∂푟
∂푡푖
(푘¯ − 푘푗) + 휃푗푡∗푗
∂푘푗
∂푡푖
)
. (3.13)
The extent to which local governments engage in tax dumping crucially depends
on the region-specific technology parameter. Basically, tax competition is a se-
vere problem for local governments, which prefer a high public good supply due
to their technology type while a tax cut leads to a relatively low reduction of
public good supply in regions with low technology types. Consequently, low-
type regions tend to engage in tax competition more intensively than high-type
regions. The optimal transfer, which restates overall efficiency must meet this
concern so that externality-correcting matching rates must be a decreasing func-
tion of the technology type.
Lemma 2 The matching rate 푏푖(휃푖), which fully internalizes the external effects
of tax competition, is a monotonously decreasing function in 휃푖.
Proof see Appendix
In addition to the matching component, a lump-sum component 푎푖 = 푈
0 −
푈푖(푡
∗
푖 , 푡−푖, 휃푖)−푏푖푡∗푖 must be paid to guarantee a welfare level of 푈0. Put together,
the central government offers a transfer scheme of the form:
푆(푡푖) = 푎푖 + 푏푖(휃푖)푡푖.
Proposition 1 In the full information case, the federal government offers a
transfer scheme such that local jurisdictions are fully insured at the level 푈0 = 푈푖
for all i, and the external effects of tax competition are fully corrected.
Finally, it should be noted that in the frame of the model, the optimal allocation
of capital and the optimal mix of public and private goods supply may differ
from the first best optimal solution, as decision makers have only a limited
set of instruments available, which is a tax on mobile capital raised by local
governments and a transfer paid by the federal government. Further, the capital
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supplied by local households 푘¯ is exogenously given. As we abstract from inter-
personal income redistribution, it is impossible to choose the level of private
good supply in one region independently of the private good supply in other
regions. Hence, the modified Samuelson condition depicts a trades off between
an optimal allocation of consumption goods (optimal mix of private and public
goods in each region) and production inputs (optimal allocation of capital in the
federation); see Wildasin (1989) and DePater and Myers (1992).
3.4 Incentive-Compatible Transfer Schemes
Turning to the case of an asymmetric information structure, we assume that cen-
tral government can verify neither the technology types nor the locally supplied
amount of public goods, but can only observe the tax policy 푡푖. Thus local gov-
ernments strategically choose an untruthful tax policy in order to take advantage
of this in two respects. On the one hand, the substitution of higher grants-in-aid
for tax revenue involves a positive revenue effect through a higher private good
consumption. On the other hand, a local government may gain a competitive
advantage over its rival neighbors in the tax competition game.
Given such a scenario, in the following we show how central government can
provide incentives for an optimal local tax policy and equally can guarantee
the reservation welfare level 푈0. By the revelation principle, we may restrict
our search for the best federal policy to direct transfer mechanisms. The direct
revelation mechanism entails a menu of transfer payments combined with a tax
policy contingent on the informational types 휃푖 reported by local governments.
In a second step, we design an indirect transfer scheme contingent on local policy
decisions, which is better applicable in real world examples. However first of all
we describe the background of interregional transfer competition by the following
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simple message game:
Γˆ = {푁, (푡푖(휃푖, 휃−푖))푖휖푁 , (푠푖(휃푖, 휃−푖))푖휖푁 ,×푛푖=1[휃퐿, 휃퐻 ]}.
To minimize expected total transfer payments, the federal level chooses a
transfer scheme that provides optimal incentives for local tax effort and at the
same time guarantees a minimum welfare level 푈0.
min
푡1,...,푡푛,푠1,...푠푛
푛∑
푖=1
퐸휃[푠푖(휃푖, 휃−푖)] s.t.
퐸휃−푖 [푉 (푓(푘푖)−(푟+푡푖(휃푖, 휃−푖))푘푖+푟푘¯)+휃푖 (푘푖푡푖(휃푖, 휃−푖) + 푠푖(휃푖, 휃−푖)) ∣휃푖] ≥ 푈0, ∀푖
(3.14)
퐸휃−푖 [푉 (푓(푘푖)− (푟 + 푡푖(휃푖, 휃−푖))푘푖 + 푟푘¯) + 휃푖 (푘푖푡푖(휃푖, 휃−푖) + 푠푖(휃푖, 휃−푖)) ∣휃푖] ≥
퐸휃−푖 [푉 (푓(푘푖)− (푟 + 푡푖(휃˜푖, 휃−푖))푘푖 + 푟푘¯) + 휃푖(푘푖푡푖(휃˜푖, 휃−푖) + 푠푖(휃˜푖, 휃−푖))∣휃푖], ∀푖, 휃˜푖.
(3.15)
Equation (3.14) ensures that the expected welfare of any jurisdiction cannot fall
short of 푈0. To be accurate we take into account that local governments cannot
observe costs types of neighboring regions. Hence, they will themselves form
beliefs on the competitive behavior contingent neighboring information types
휃−푖. Therefore each jurisdictions choose 푡푖 to maximize the conditional expected
value of local welfare.4 Additionally, we have to consider the Bayesian incentive-
compatibility constraints (3.15) ensuring that truth-telling for all i and all 휃푖
is a Bayesian equilibrium of the direct transfer mechanism proposed by central
government: given jurisdiction i ’s belief with respect to the technology types of
neighboring regions, it can never be profitable for i to mispresent its type, which
means strategy 휃˜푖 ∕= 휃푖 is never profitable. By the following theorem, we can
further reduce the problem:
4Here the central government provides opportunities for local governments to attain 푈0,
if they correctly anticipate tax policy decisions of their neighbors. With a large number of
jurisdictions and by the weak law of large numbers the current vector of policies would not
differ by a high extent from local governments’ rational expectations.
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Theorem 1 Incentive compatible transfers that guarantee at least 푈0 to each
jurisdiction are:
푠(휃푖, 휃−푖) =
1
휃푖
퐸휃−푖 [푈
0 − 푉 (푓(푘푖)− (푟 + 푡푖(휃푖, 휃−푖))푘푖 + 푟푘¯)−
휃푖 (푘푖푡푖(휃푖, 휃−푖)) +
∫ 휃푖
휃퐿
푘푖푡푖(휃푖, 휃−푖)푑휃0푖 ∣휃푖].
(3.16)
Proof see Appendix
To give an interpretation, it should be recalled that local governments strate-
gically cut tax rates by mimicking a less efficient type to be entitled to higher
grants-in-aid. The increase in the transfer payment exceeds the welfare loss in-
duced by the tax cut. Hence, the surplus gained by mispresenting data must
be outweighed by an additional information rent. The last term on the RHS
of equation (3.16) depicts the respective information rent provided to local gov-
ernments. Therefore, in the incomplete information case the contribution rate
of the redistribution system is lower and disparities are not fully equalized. In
particular, it is lower if a positive information rent is paid to efficient regions.
Let us consider the tax scheme incorporated in the direct mechanism. The
federal government implements a schedule of tax rates 푡(휃푖, 휃−푖) that minimizes
expected total transfer payments. By using equation (3.16), the expected total
transfer payments are given by:
푛∑
푖=1
퐸휃푖
1
휃푖
[푈0 − 푉 (푓(푘푖)− (푟 + 푡푖(휃푖, 휃−푖))푘푖 + 푟푘¯)
− 휃푖 (푘푖푡푖(휃푖, 휃−푖)) +
∫ 휃푖
휃퐿
푘푖푡푖(휃푖, 휃−푖)푑휃0푖 ].
(3.17)
As the monotonous hazard rate condition is fulfilled, the decision function 푡푖(휃푖)
is monotonously increasing in 휃푖. Integration by parts of (3.17) yields the central
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government’s minimization problem:
(
푡ˆ1, ..., 푡ˆ푛
)
= arg min
푛∑
푖=1
∫ 휃퐻
휃퐿
⋅ ⋅ ⋅
∫ 휃퐻
휃퐿
[푉 (푓(푘푖)− (푟 + 푡푖(휃푖, 휃−푖))푘푖 + 푟푘¯)
+ 휃푖 (푘푖푡푖(휃푖, 휃−푖))− 1− 푃 (휃푖)
푝(휃푖)
푘푖푡푖(휃푖, 휃−푖)][
푛∏
푖=1
푝(휃푖)]푑휃푛 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 푑휃1
(3.18)
The first order conditions read:(
휃푖 − 1− 푃 (휃푖)
푝(휃푖)
)(
푘푖 +
∂푘푖
∂푡푖
푡ˆ푖
)
+ 푉푥(푥푖)
(
∂푟
∂푡푖
(푘¯ − 푘푖)− 푘푖
)
+
∑
푗 ∕=푖
(
푉푥(푥푗)
∂푟
∂푡푖
(푘¯ − 푘푗) +
(
휃푗 − 1− 푃 (휃푗)
푝(휃푗)
)
푡ˆ푗
∂푘푗
∂푡푖
)
= 0 for all i.
(3.19)
equivalently we can write:
1 =
푉푀퐶퐹푖(푡ˆ푖, 푡ˆ−푖)
휃푖
, for all i, (3.20)
where the denominator on the RHS signifies the virtual marginal cost of public
funding (푉푀퐶푖), which includes the marginal informational cost
1−푃 (휃푖)
푝(휃푖)
(
푘푖 +
∂푘푖
∂푡푖
)
5
going along with federal redistribution. For all types 휃푖 < 휃퐻 , the hazard func-
tion has a positive value so that the 푉푀퐶퐹푖 exceeds the 푆푀퐶퐹푖 . In Appendix
9.3, we show that there is always an interior solution. Thus, we can state:
Proposition 2 In a second-best optimal tax policy setting, the external effects
of tax competition are not fully corrected for all types 휃푖 apart from the highest
possible type 휃퐻 .
The intuition behind this result is as follows: A high-type region which wants
to draw additional transfers from the common pool must emulate the tax policy
of low-type regions. This, however, involves an inappropriate structure of pri-
vate and public goods provision, which is even more severe in regimes with tax
competition. As we may recall from Lemma 2, low-type regions engage in tax-
dumping much more intensively than high types. Thus, the welfare loss incurred
5The interpretation of the monotone hazard rate function is as follows: Consider the set of
1−푃 (휃푖) jurisdictions in the federation, which can provide public goods at least as efficiently as
a 휃푖-jurisdiction. The conditional probability that a jurisdiction of this set has similar provision
cost to the 휃푖-jurisdiction, i.e. has a type on [휃푖, 휃푖 + 푑휃푖], is given by
푝(휃푖)
1−푃 (휃푖) . With higher 휃푖
it becomes more probable that jurisdictions of this set have similar cost as the 휃푖-jurisdiction.
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through the emulation of the tax-dumping strategies of low-type jurisdictions in
tax-competition games is indeed higher than in its absence. Therefore we can
state:
Corollary 1 Mispresenting informational cost types becomes less attractive in
regimes with local tax competition.
Anticipating tax competition, the central government can update its Bayesian
beliefs with respect to informational types. This enables the federal government
to extract some information rents and hence reduce total transfer payments by
offering lower matching rates. Consequently, local governments must contribute
to the federal redistribution system if they receive lower information rents.
Hence, by allowing for some tax competition, there is a trade-off between the
scope for federal redistribution and allocative efficiency. In order to depict the
second best optimal transfer policy, we rewrite the implementation scheme as
a strictly increasing and convex function of observable local policy decision 푡푖.
Assuming that the central government can observe total expenditure levels, we
can re-specify the transfer in terms of total expenditures if this would relate more
closely to legal regulations in some federal states. Thereby we can reproduce the
menu of transfers composed of a lump-sum grant and a matching grant.6
푆푖(푡푖) = 푎ˆ푖 +
(
푏ˆ푖(푡푖)− 1− 푃 (휃푖)
푝(휃푖)
(
∂푘푖
∂푡ˆ푖
푡ˆ푖 + 푘푖
))
푡푖, (3.21)
where 푏ˆ푖 is the matching rate that corrects for fiscal externalities in region 푖,
given that all neighbors enact a second best optimal tax policy.
푏ˆ푖(휃푖) =
1
휃푖
∑
푗 ∕=푖
(
푉푥(푥푗)
∂푟
∂푡푖
(푘¯ − 푘푗) +
(
휃푗 − 1− 푃 (휃푗)
푝(휃푗)
)
푡ˆ푗
∂푘푗
∂푡푖
)
Firstly, the transfer scheme guarantees a minimum welfare and concedes a
positive information rent to induce truth-telling by offering a lump-sum pay-
6An elaborate description of indirect incentive scheme for government contracts is given by
Reichelstein (1992).
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ment. Adding the inverted function 휃 = 휃∗(푡) (vector 푡 and 휃) to the incentive-
compatibility and the insurance constraint, the lump-sum payment yields
푎ˆ푖 = 푈
0 − 푈(휃∗(푡)) +
∫ 휃푖
휃퐿
휃∗(푡)푘푖푑휃0푖 − 푏ˆ푖푡ˆ푖.
Secondly, the transfer scheme regulates tax policy 푡푖 by a matching component
depicted by the term in parentheses on the RHS of equation (3.21). The dif-
ference between the marginal external effects and marginal informational cost
of fiscal policy expresses the optimal trade-off where, at the margin, the welfare
gain of increased rent extraction and its welfare loss induced by tax competition
are balanced.
It is worth investigating the nature of external effects in more detail. By
Lemma 2, we know that the marginal external effects of tax competition are a
decreasing function in the technology type 휃푖. Likewise, the marginal informa-
tional costs weighed by the hazard rate 1−푃 (휃푖)푝(휃푖) are a decreasing function in 휃푖.
The extent to which the central government must still offer a system of match-
ing rates crucially depends on the elasticity of the tax base, as well as on the
distribution of informational types which are exogenously given.7
3.5 Second-Best Optimal Tax Autonomy
Basically, interregional competition in a federal system is bad when local decision
makers are good. Regionally benevolent local governments act in the interests
of their residents and neglect overall efficiency considerations. Therefore, juris-
dictions try to attract capital from neighboring regions and shift the burden of
financing local public good supply onto the federation as a whole. As an im-
portant result in this chapter, we show that tax competition limits the latitude
of discretion to draw additional grants from federal funds. Heterogeneous ju-
7The marginal value of 푏푖 and marginal information costs are determined by the elasticity
of the tax base.
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risdictions react differently in regimes with tax competition, so that the central
government can update its beliefs with respect to the local information types.
Hence, a more compensatory redistribution scheme can be implemented, reduc-
ing fiscal disparities to a greater extent. Thus, we point out a new reason for
why local tax competition may improve overall federal welfare.
Due to the second best world represented in the model of this chapter it might
be even worth to discuss the assignment of fiscal sovereignty to decentralized
governments. If local governments have the power to tax some mobile factors
this might be welfare enhancing as we have learned. From the information-
based perspective the optimal fiscal constitution of the federal state may assign
the power to tax to local governments in an appropriate way to advocate tax
competition which approximates the second best optimal solution. Kuhn (1995)
and Wilson and Janeba (2005) have put a similar problem up to discussion
showing that horizontal tax competition might be beneficial in federations with
vertical fiscal external effects, i.e. if more than one government raise taxes on
a particular tax base. In this case the race-to-the bottom of horizontal tax
competition may countervail the negative vertical tax externalities.
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Chapter 4
The Ex-Post Dilemma in
Fiscal Federalism1
4.1 The Ex-Post Dilemma and Informational Asym-
metries
We have already demonstrated that allocative and redistributive disruptions can
be fully resolved if the central government can credibly commit ex-ante to a
well-defined system of grants composed of lump-sum payments and a scheme of
matching rates. In game theory terms the central government acts as a Stackel-
berg leader offering transfer payments to local governments which then in turn
must adapt their policy to the federal grant rule. However, sometimes the cen-
tral government is not able to credibly commit to a fixed grant rule, but transfer
payments get determined ex-post only, i.e. after local governments have chosen
their policy. There are many reasons given in the literature and discussed in
detail below for why this might be the case. For instance, the federal govern-
ment might want to step in after a regional breakdown because of interregional
spillovers, political competition, and a welfare guarantee, which all may give rise
to ex-post transfers.
In this chapter we stress that the ex-post problem is often rooted in an asym-
metric information structure between different government levels in a federal
1This chapter has been taken from Altemeyer-Bartscher and Kuhn (2009).
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state. In general, the local level may be better informed about local character-
istics and it might be hard for the federal government to observe the quality
of precautionary measures enacted by local jurisdictions in order to reduce the
likelihood of future shocks. Likewise the main economic rationale for why the
responsibility of precautions investment policy is assigned to the local level lies
in the local governments’ informational advantage. Further it is the central gov-
ernment’s inability to observe local policy measures which may explain why it is
so difficult in practice to precisely predefine grant rules contingent on local needs
and policy measures. If informational asymmetries are an ultimate cause of the
ex-post problem in a federal setting, it should be taken anyhow into account
that the underlying information set may have a substantial impact on the local
incentives structure of related policy fields. Adopting a rather positive theory
view, our main focus in this chapter is to analyze the nature of the ex-post re-
distribution problem from an information-based perspective.
A common feature of all kinds of ex-post transfer payments is that they may
provoke the so-called Good Samaritan Problem, introduced by Buchanan (1975).
In this approach incentives for the efficient provision of local public goods for
consumption as well as for long-term investment get distorted in the presence of
federal insurance. Local governments may want to take much higher risks than
usual in choosing their long-term policies because the consequences of negative
shocks are not fully reflected in their budgets. They are induced to under-invest
in precautionary policy measures like the modernization of public infrastruc-
ture and public services running the risk of high consequential costs for public
goods provision in the future. In general, local governments may try to choose
their policy measures strategically to pre-determine federal transfer payments in
their favor. In this context the Good Samaritan Problem can be interpreted as
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a failure if the Rotten Kid Theorem. In the frame of the dynamic game local
governments provide public policy in two different periods an hence have some
degree of freedom to shift a part of the burden on the federation as a whole.2
Principally, the literature points out three reasons for the central govern-
ment’s incapacity to commit to a strict transfer rule ex-ante: Wildasin (1997)
shows that in the absence of a welfare guarantee under constitutional law the
central government’s pre-commitment to a fixed transfer rule would not be cred-
ible if a regional breakdown may go along with adverse interregional spill-over
effects. Persson and Tabellini (1992) as well as Goodspeed and Haughwout
(2006) argue from a public choice perspective that a central government max-
imizing expected votes tends to step in to support jurisdictions after negative
shocks. Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2007) mentions that in various federal states like Ger-
many, Switzerland, Canada and South-Africa equal opportunities or an equal
living standard across regions are warranted by constitutional law. Therefore
the federal government, as in this chapter, is obliged to equalize disparities if
local governments face high fiscal needs ex-post.
Commitment to federal insurance does not coercively rule out that the fed-
eral government offers co-funding programs within a budget period to provide
optimal incentives for long term policy. What should be offered are conditional
grants contingent on investment levels in each budget period. In order to meet
overall efficiency and resolve the Good Samaritan Problem it is important that
insurance-payments are given only up to an amount guarantees the desired wel-
fare level. However, in practice federal corrective policy is often found inefficient
because of informational asymmetries between the local and the federal level. If
some policy measures are non-observable to the federal government, local gov-
2For a more detailed exposition of the incentive problem see Bergstrom (1989) and Weibull
and Lindbeck (1988)
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ernments can easily recast expenditures labeled as investment for other purposes
as recent literature has shown.
Rodden (2001) for example points out that the central government can hardly
ascertain the purpose of expenditures, because it may be relatively easy to relabel
public spending for consumption goods into investment expenditures. Obviously,
the true cost of the public good supply must be unknown to the central govern-
ment, because otherwise it would easily be possible for the central government
to compute the share of expenditures used for certain purposes.
However we have already demonstrated in chapter 3 that in this setting lo-
cal governments are apt to substitute grants-in-aid for higher tax revenue by
choosing an untruthful policy. The first problem is one of moral hazard as an
endogenous policy measure (local investment) is unknown to the central govern-
ment. The latter problem is one of adverse selection rooted in unobservable data
on local technology types. Both problems are even intertwined in our approach
since technology types heavily depend on long-term investment as we will see.
To capture the main features of ex-post redistribution schemes we consider
a federal state consisting of a central government and several local jurisdictions.
Local public goods are provided by local governments which basically choose two
types of policy measures: On the one hand, a long-term policy measure like in-
vestment in local infrastructure and modernization of public services which may
positively effect the efficiency and the welfare of the region in future periods, on
the other hand, short-term public consumption effective within a budget period.
Thereby, local governments face a typical investment problem trading off public
consumption today and investment in long-term public projects preparing the
region for the future. As indicated we describe a framework in which transfers
cannot be offered contingent on the investment level or the technology types
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as this data is considered unobservable by the central government. Further, any
kind of bonus payments rewarding good performance are ruled out since the cen-
tral government is considered as not being able to commit to bonus payments for
long-term investment programs such as flood protection or infrastructure main-
tenance since they may become effective only after several years or even decades.
In order to understand the nature of the ex-post problem we must determine
the expected benefits of long-term policy measures in the presence of a transfer
scheme paid after local policy has been enacted. In line with the forgoing chap-
ter we show that the central government cannot fully equalize fiscal disparities
because of information constraints. We learn that a high dependency on federal
aid limits the latitude of discretion for local governments in other policy fields
if the federation is characterized by informational asymmetry. It will become
obvious that efficient regions, which take precautions against negative shocks,
will have more options for discretionary local policy measures and can gain a
discretionary budget.
Local governments’ prospects to gain a discretionary budget in future peri-
ods may thus provide large-scale incentives for investment in long-term projects.
As a result, in a dynamic context, local governments partially become residual
claimants of their local policies if less progressive transfers are expected so that
the Good Samaritan Problem is partly alleviated. From this viewpoint long-term
policy can be considered as an investment in higher expected information rents.
Therefore this chapter shows that despite the reliance on federal aid,local gov-
ernments still have strong incentives to pursue a sound long-term policy because
it can protect against a full dependence on federal aid.
To which extend may well-prepared regions gain a higher actionability? This
depends on the quality of transfer scheme offered by the central government to
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tackle the information problem. In this chapter we are going to design the sec-
ond best optimal transfer scheme. From the positive view of our study it may
evaluate the upper bound of the scope for federal redistribution systems: the
revelation principle tells us that there is no other class of mechanism with which
the central government can achieve a more equational transfer scheme. In this
spirit the second best optimal solution can be interpreted as a conservative esti-
mation of the ex post problem in federal states.
Referring to the rebuilding of New Orleans after hurricane Katrina, Becker
(2005), Glaeser (2005) and Goodspeed and Haughwout (2006) point out that
local governments’ decisions would be optimal if they would have to fully bear
the social cost of their respective policies in the case of natural disasters. A
similar dynamic incentive problem can arise, if local governments make long-
term decisions like investment in maintenance of infra-structure as well as in the
modernization of public services which affects the wellbeing of the federation
beyond the budget-period, see Wurzel (1998). Studying the soft budget problem
inter alia Kornai et al. (2003), and Wildasin (1997) point out that the central
government’s incentive to bail out a region arises ex post, if the local government
cannot fulfill its duties because of a distressed budget.
Persson and Tabellini (1992) analyze the incentive problem of risk sharing
programs in federal states. Local governments have to decide on social security
insurance and public investment affecting the expected well being of the region in
the future. Different to our chapter they study risk-sharing arrangements among
collective bodies elected by a median voter. They consider institutional settings
with a different division of responsibilities between the two government levels
and various implications for the commitment devices for the elected bodies. In-
trinsically, local governments’ incentives to engage in long-term policy depend on
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the commitment devices of the elected bodies with respect to federal insurance.
In a bail-out framework Kaiser (2008) argues that the dependency on federal
transfer payments may constrain local governments in other policy fields. Kaiser
notices that bail outs in a federation are linked to additional obligations and re-
quirements for the respective jurisdiction. Saving goals and prescribed tax rates
reduce the actionability of local governments after a bail-out and hence make
common pool fishing less attractive.
The ex-post transfer payments considered in this chapter however differ sig-
nificantly from ones leading to the common bail out problem. The bail out
literature, e.g. Wildasin (1997) and Goodspeed (2002), generally describe a sin-
gle rescue after a financial breakdown triggered by an unresponsive fiscal policy
while we in contrast consider a transfer system for equalizing disparities in ev-
ery budget period. Further we highlight that in many federal settings the only
reason why not all parameters of the grants scheme can be predefined is hidden
action in tandem with hidden information.
Intrinsically, the literature has shown that there is no veritable solution for
the ex-post problem in federal states. On the one hand it proposes to reduce
insurance benefit from federal transfer system so that a lower amount of fiscal
commons is at stake. Accordingly Wildasin (2006, 2009) proposes local rainy
day funds so that a part of the federal insurance system may be sourced out in
the area of authority of local governments. On the other hand the literature
considers specific institutional arrangements allowing the federal government to
credibly threat with sanctions local governments with policy shortfalls. Kaiser
(2008) points out that bailouts become less attractive for local governments if
federal aid is accompanied by scrutiny reducing the policy makers’ capacity. In
this chapter we argue that the informational asymmetries are both a primary
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cause for why transfers are not well-defined ex ante and and the reason for why
local governments may still gain rents in the presences of federal insurance.
With respect to empirical studies two papers confirm the hypothesis that lo-
cal governments try to substitute higher grants-in-aid for tax revenue. Baretti et
al. (2002) perform empirical tests confirming this hypothesis in case of higher-
level federal grants. Bu¨ttner (2006) tests the municipalities’ tax policies and
finds evidence for the aforementioned incentive problem. Seitz and Kempkes
(2006) pronounce that local governments’ disincentives to invest in long-term
policy may be an important problem. According to their estimations for the
year 2006 East German provincial governments on average deviate 40 per cent
of the grants originally dedicated to infrastructure catching up to public con-
sumption.
The outline of chapter 4 is as follows: In section 4.2 we describe the basic
model. As a benchmark solution we study an optimal ex-ante transfer in section
4.3. In section 4.4 we analyze the incentive problem going along with ex post
redistribution and propose an incentive compatible transfer scheme. Section 4.5
concludes.
4.2 Model and Problem
4.2.1 The local government’s policy
We consider a federation composed of a central government and a large number
of local jurisdictions, indexed by 푖 = {1, 2, ..., 푛}. Different to chapter 3 we now
consider local governments, which chooses two different types of policy measures:
a short-term policy measure 푧푖 and a long-term policy measure 푦푖. The short-
term policy can be interpreted as expenditures for public consumption with a
one-period horizon. In contrast, the long-term policy refers to investment in the
modernization of public services and infrastructure with a positive impact on
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efficiency and the wellbeing of the region beyond the current budget period.
For simplicity, the unit cost of long-term investment 푦푖 is normalized to one
for all 푖, while the supply of 푧푖 entails marginal costs equal to 휃푖 which may
differ across regions. The cost parameters 휃푖 are independently drawn from a
commonly known joint distribution on ×푛푖=1[휃퐿, 휃퐻 ] with 휃퐻 > 휃퐿 > 1, with a
cumulative distribution function 푃 (휃푖∣푦푖), and a density function 푝(휃푖∣푦푖) > 0 on
[휃퐿, 휃퐻 ] and 휃퐿 > 푝(휃퐿∣푦푖).
In line with Persson and Tabellini (1992) we assume that public investment
like the maintenance of infrastructure and the modernization of public services
increases local productivity and reduces the expected costs of public good pro-
vision 푧푖 in the future, i.e.
∂푃 (휃푖∣푦푖)
∂푦푖
< 0, ∂
2푃 (휃푖∣푦푖)
∂푦2푖
> 0 (first order stochastic
dominance). Further, the monotonous hazard rate condition is fulfilled, i.e. it
applies that 1−푃 (휃푖∣푦푖)푝(휃푖∣푦푖) is non-decreasing in 휃푖.
In accordance with chapter 3 each jurisdiction is endowed with one unit
of labor, supplied inelastically. The total capital stock in the federation 퐾¯ is
exogenously given and capital is perfectly mobile across jurisdictions, so that
capital in each jurisdiction earns the same net return 푟. Further we consider
the same CES-production technology with output 푓(푘푖), when 푘푖 units of capital
and one unit of labor are employed. Moreover we define the local governments’
budget constraint as:
푡푖푘푖 + 푠푖 = 푧푖/휃푖 + 푦푖. (4.1)
The LHS of equation (4.1) is the revenue side including tax revenue of a unit tax
on capital (which is the only tax local governments can raise) and a federal trans-
fer 푠푖, while the RHS depicts local government’s public expenditures composed
of local public good supply 푧푖 and public investment 푦푖. As investment decisions
are enacted in past periods the investment level 푦푖 should be interpreted in terms
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of pro rata temporis.3
Factor markets are taken to be perfectly competitive and the production
factors are therefore valued at their marginal value product:
푓푘(푘푖) = 푟 + 푡푖 and (4.2)
푓(푘푖)− 푘푖푓푘(푘푖) = 푤푖, (4.3)
where 푟 + 푡푖 gives the user cost of capital and 푤푖 is the price for the fixed
factor in region 푖. In line with chapter 3 capital is perfectly mobile within the
borders of the federation, factor prices adjust to clear markets at the Walrasian
equilibrium, so that the following condition hold: ∂푟∂푡푖 = −
푘′푖(푟+푡푖)∑푛
푗=1 푘
′
푗(푟+푡푗)
< 0,
∂푘푖
∂푡푖
= 1푓푘푘(푘푖)
(
1 + ∂푟∂푡푖
)
< 0, and
∂푘푗
∂푡푖
= 1푓푘푘(푘푗)
∂푟
∂푡푖
> 0.
The representative households’ total income is composed of wage income and
capital income. Representative households spend their whole net income on
private good consumption 푥푖 given by
푥푖 = 푓(푘푖)− (푟 + 푡푖)푘푖 + 푟푘¯, (4.4)
where we assume that households in each region own an equal share of capital
퐾¯
푛 = 푘¯.
Local jurisdictions are regionally benevolent choosing the capital tax rate as
well as the mix of public goods in order to maximize the utility of the repre-
sentative household. Preferences of a representative household in region 푖 are
characterized by the following quasi-linear utility function
푈푖 ≡ 푈푖(푥푖, 푧푖) = 푧푖 + 푉푖(푥푖). (4.5)
In line with chapter 3 we assume that a minimum welfare level in each juris-
diction denoted by 푈0 is guaranteed by constitutional law. Using local govern-
3Investment payments are assessed in proportion to the time range of the investment horizon.
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ments’ budget constraint (4.1) we can write the insurance constraint as follows:
휃푖 (푘푖푡푖 + 푠푖 − 푦푖) + 푉푖(푥푖) ≥ 푈0 (4.6)
The central government must choose a transfer payment 푠푖 in order to fulfill the
insurance constraint for any region. Again we consider only transfers addressed
to jurisdictions, so that inter-personal redistribution programs are ruled out.
4.2.2 The timing of the game
We slightly modify the timing of model in the previous chapter introducing a
constitutional level at stage 0 and a investment level at stage 1. Then the timing
of the game is as follows:
∙ At stage 0 a minimum local welfare level 푈0 is guaranteed by constitutional
law.
∙ At stage 1 local governments decide on long-term investment policies 푦푖.
∙ At stage 2 nature draws cost types 휃푖 from a distribution of types 푃 (휃푖∣푦푖)
which crucially depends on public investments 푦푖.
∙ At stage 3 the federal government offers a transfer scheme 푠푖.
∙ At stage 4 local governments pursue tax policies 푡푖.
∙ At stage 5 all parameters of the grant rule are determined and grants are
paid to local governments.
4.2.3 The central government’s policy
We assume that the central government intends to minimize funds affordable
to fulfill the insurance constraint. Accordingly, it offers a system of grants that
provides for optimal incentives with respect to local tax policies 푡푖, so that we
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can state the following minimization problem:
min
푡1,...,푡푛,푠1,...,푠푛
푛∑
푖=1
퐸휃푖 [푠푖(휃푖)] . (4.7)
s.t. (4.1), (4.4), and (4.6) for all i.
In particular, the central government minimizes the expected value of total
transfer payments which is consistent with the devolution in the parliament
where the federal budget is adopted by future prospects. Besides, by the weak
law of large numbers the expected value is converging to the effective payments
in case of a federation with many jurisdictions.
4.3 Ex-Ante Transfers
First of all we investigate an ideal federation without any restrictions on the
information structure, serving as a benchmark solution. This will help to un-
derstand the ex-post redistribution problem in federal states which is going to
be analyzed in section four. Accordingly, the central government can act as a
Stackelberg leader committing to offer a well-defined transfer scheme, which may
depend on the technology type 휃푖 as well as on local policy measures 푡푖 and 푦푖.
Most importantly the transfer scheme must meet the insurance constraint
given by equation (4.6). In the frame of this model the insurance constraint
should be understood as an requirement of the central government to provide
equal opportunities for all regions. Therefore, it is sufficient that local gov-
ernments may attain a minimum welfare level 푈0 by enacting an appropriate
local policy. This includes that compensatory payments necessary to meet the
insurance constraint may be offset against matching grants.
In an ideal federation the central government can offer a transfer scheme
푠(휃푖, 푡푖, 푦푖) contingent on all relevant parameters 휃푖, 푡푖, and 푦푖. Employing back-
ward induction we initially analyze local governments’ tax policy at stage 4
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followed by an investigation into local investment policy pursued at stage 2. For
the sake of clarity we consider all stages of the game although we have already
become acquainted with the technique of the tax competition game in the pre-
vious chapter. After policy 푦푖 has been chosen and nature has drawn the cost
types, local jurisdictions compete for mobile capital, which generates the a tax
competition game. We define the best response function of 푖 given its specific
technology:
퐵푅푖(푡−푖) = 푡˜푖(푡−푖) = arg max
푡푖
푧푖 + 푉푖(푥푖)
s.t. (4.1) and (4.4),
which entails the following first order condition:
휃푖
(
푘푖 + 푡˜푖
∂푘푖
∂푡푖
+
∂푠푖
∂푡푖
)
+ 푉푥(푥푖)
(
∂푟
∂푡푖
(
푘¯ − 푘푖
)− 푘푖) = 0 for all i. (4.8)
Regionally benevolent jurisdictions only recognize fiscal effects that impact their
own welfare ignoring the positive fiscal effects on neighboring jurisdictions and
raise inefficiently low tax rates. In line with the standard tax competition lit-
erature the central government must offer a system of matching grants with
matching rates 푏푖(푡푖) equal to the marginal external effects of tax competition.
As the insurance constraint is binding in the optimum we can express the central
government’s minimization problem as follows:
(푡∗1, ..., 푡
∗
푛) = arg min
푛∑
푖=1
[푈0 − 푉 (푥푖) + 푧푖]
s.t. (4.1) and (4.4), for all i.
The first order condition is given by:
휃푖
(
푘푖 + 푡
∗
푖
∂푘푖
∂푡푖
)
+ 푉푥(푥푖)
(
∂푟
∂푡푖
(푘¯ − 푘푖)− 푘푖
)
+∑
푗 ∕=푖
(
푉푥(푥푗)
∂푟
∂푡푖
(푘¯ − 푘푗) + 휃푗푡∗푗
∂푘푗
∂푡푖
)
= 0, for all 푖.
(4.9)
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The last term on the LHS of (4.9) depicts the marginal external effects of
tax competition, which are not taken into account by local policy-makers. Com-
paring the decentralized solution (4.8) to the first best optimal solution it will
become obvious that local public goods are under-provided. Hence, the matching
rate 푏푖(푡푖) =
∂푠푖
∂푡푖
which implements an efficient tax rate 푡∗푖 can be decomposed by
adding up equations (4.8) and (4.9) such that:
푏푖(푡푖) =
1
휃푖
∑
푗 ∕=푖
(
푉푥(푥푗)
∂푟
∂푡푖
(푘¯ − 푘푗) + 휃푗푡∗푗
∂푘푗
∂푡푖
)
.
Next we will consider long term policies on the local level. At stage 1 lo-
cal governments choose an investment level 푦푖 that maximizes the conditional
expected value of local welfare.
푦˜푖 = arg max퐸휃푖 [푉 (푥푖) + 푧푖∣푦푖]. (4.10)
s.t. (4.1) and (4.4).
The following first order condition depicts the trade-off in the optimal investment
decision:
1 = −
∫ 휃퐻
휃퐿
(
푡∗푖 푘푖 + 푠푖 + 휃푖
∂푠푖
∂휃푖
)
푃푦푖(휃푖∣푦˜푖)푑휃푖 +
∂푠푖
∂푦푖
, for all i , (4.11)
where 푡∗푖 is the equilibrium tax rate of jurisdiction 푖 played in the subsequent
game at stage 4 if an externality-correcting grant system is in place. The LHS of
equation (4.11) signifies the marginal cost of the long-term policy which is equal
to unity. The first term on the RHS denotes the expected marginal benefit of
the investment policy. With a well prepared infrastructure expressed by a high
amount of 푦푖 the cost of public good supply is expected to be low so that the
local government can provide a relatively high amount of public good for one
euro. The latter term on the RHS [∂푠푖∂푦푖 ] represents the direct marginal impact of
policy 푦푖 on the transfer policy.
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Assuming that the central government has full commitment devices it may
offer an appropriate system of co-funding grants at stage 0 to restate efficiency.
Likewise the transfers scheme should implement local investment levels 푦∗푖 which
minimize total transfer payments:
푦∗푖 = arg max
푛∑
푖=1
퐸휃푖 [푈
0 − 푉 (푥푖)− 푧푖]
s.t. (4.1) and (4.4), for all i.
The first order condition reads:
1 = −
∫ 휃퐻
휃퐿
푡∗푖 푘푖푃푦푖(휃푖∣푦∗푖 )푑휃푖 for all i , (4.12)
By the first order condition (4.12) co-funding 푙푖(푦
∗
푖 ) should be equal to the
marginal benefit of public investment which is reflected in the expected pro-
ductivity gain in public good provision, i.e.
∂푠푖
∂푦푖
= 푙푖(푦
∗
푖 ) = −
∫ 휃퐻
휃퐿
(
휃푖
∂푠푖
∂휃푖
+ 푠푖
)
푃푦푖(휃푖∣푦∗푖 )푑휃푖.
Indeed, if the central government fully insures local governments against tech-
nological shocks a typical ex-post transfer problem arises. As disparities among
local governments are evened out, any cost benefit in a fortunate event would
result in a higher net contribution to the common pool of federal funds whereas
cost disadvantages would be compensated at the awkward case. In particular, the
marginal impact of the redistributive transfers scheme on investment incentives
[휃푖
∂푠푖
∂휃푖
+ 푠푖] countervails the positive effect of the technological advantage [푡푖푘푖].
Thus, a local welfare maximizing local government cannot derive any advantage
from its investment policy:
∫ 휃퐻
휃퐿
푡˜푖푘푖푃푦푖(휃푖∣푦푖)푑휃푖 − 1 =
∫ 휃퐻
휃퐿
(
푠푖 + 휃푖
∂푠푖
∂휃푖
)
푃푦푖(휃푖∣푦˜푖)푑휃푖
Therefore, in the absence of co-funding programs, i.e. ∂푠푖∂푦푖 = 0, local governments
have no incentives to invest any positive level 푦푖 for long-term projects.
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For the analysis in section 4.4 it is helpful to highlight that by equation (4.12)
the benefit of investment policy moreover depends on the tax revenue raised by
a local government at stage 4. If local governments expect a small public sector
in future periods because of tax competition, they will invest less in long-term
policies 푦푖. In this respect it is important to again note that the federation
must compensate for any tax-dumping strategies on the local level the kind of
matching rates we have described above. We can therefore state:
Proposition 3 Higher tax incentives go along with a higher provision of short-
term public consumption and higher investment.
Proof see Appendix
We have shown that local governments underprovide public goods in a twofold
way: They under-provide public goods as a well-known result of the tax com-
petition literature and postpone costly long-term investments into the future.
Moreover, the decentralized provision of public goods may lead to fiscal dis-
parities if local public good provision entails heterogenous costs. The central
government can restore an efficient allocation of public good provision and in-
vestment as well as fully equalize disparities by offering a system of ex-ante
transfers which make jurisdictions residual claimants of their own policies. How-
ever, ex-ante transfers require strong assumptions on commitment devices and
on the information structure. In the following section we will discuss to which
degree a central government can provide optimal incentives for local policy if the
federal policy instruments are restricted and some parameters of the grant rule
cannot be predetermined.
4.4 Ex-Post Transfer Schemes
In this section we consider a more realistic framework by assuming an infor-
mation structure with two-dimensional asymmetric information. Firstly, local
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governments may better estimate region specific cost types 휃푖 than the central
government does due to their close relation to on-site problems. Secondly, the
central government may not be able to observe the purpose of expenditures, i.e.
the mix of locally supplied public goods 푧푖 and investment projects 푦푖.
Hence, the central government does not have any means to offer a well-
defined transfer scheme ex-ante as the investment policy 푦푖 is non-contractible
and transfers cannot be paid contingent on local fiscal needs. Therefore, local
governments may have some latitude of discretion with respect to local fiscal
policies and investment policies. On the one hand, they may recast expenditures
for other purposes and thus draw more co-funding grants than appropriate. On
the other hand, they may strategically mispresent or hide relevant data in order
to substitute higher transfer payments for their own tax revenue.
Although long-term policies carried out at stage 1 are non-verifiable, the
central government can form beliefs 푃 (휃푖∣푦푖) on technology types 휃푖 depending
on 푦푖. As the distribution of cost types is assumed to be common knowledge, it
correctly anticipates the pure strategy equilibrium 푦푖 = 푦ˆ for all i.
4.4.1 Tax incentives
In order to minimize total transfer payments the central government should offer
an transfer scheme contingent on observable tax policy 푡푖 which provides optimal
local tax incentives. By the revelation principle we can restrict our search for the
best federal transfer scheme to direct transfer mechanisms contingent on types
휃푖,
Γˆ = {푁, (푡푖(휃푖, 휃−푖))푖휖푁 , (푠푖(휃푖, 휃−푖))푖휖푁 ,×푛푖=1[휃퐿, 휃퐻 ]},
such that truth-telling by all local governments is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium,
where the reservation utility 푈0 is guaranteed and external effects of tax com-
78 CHAPTER 4. THE EX-POST DILEMMA IN FISCAL FEDERALISM
petition are optimally corrected.4
The minimization problem of the central government is as follows:
min
푡1,...,푡푛,푠1,...,푠푛
퐸휃[푠푖(휃푖, 휃−푖)∣휃푖, 푦ˆ]
s.t. 퐸휃−푖 [푉 (푥푖(푡푖(휃푖, 휃−푖))) + 푧푖(푡푖(휃푖, 휃−푖)), 푠푖(휃푖, 휃−푖))∣휃푖, 푦ˆ] ≥ 푈0 (4.13)
퐸휃−푖 [푉 (푥푖(푡푖(휃푖, 휃−푖))) + 푧푖(푡푖(휃푖, 휃−푖)), 푠푖(휃푖, 휃−푖))∣휃푖, 푦ˆ] ≥
퐸휃−푖 [푉 (푥푖(푡푖(휃˜푖, 휃−푖))) + 푧푖(푡푖(휃˜푖, 휃−푖)), 푠푖(휃˜푖, 휃−푖))∣휃˜푖, 푦ˆ] ∀푖, 휃˜푖.
(4.14)
Equation (4.13) ensures that every jurisdiction enjoys at least an expected welfare
of 푈0. Additionally, we have to consider the Bayesian incentive-compatibility
constraints (4.14) providing for a truthful revelation of types. Given jurisdiction
i ’s belief with respect to the types of neighboring regions it is never profitable for
i to mispresent types which is denoted by 휃˜푖 ∕= 휃푖. In other words, truth-telling
for all i and all 휃푖 is a Bayesian equilibrium in the direct transfer mechanism.
Incentive compatible transfers that guarantee at least 푈0 to each jurisdiction
are:
푠(휃푖, 휃−푖) =
1
휃푖
퐸휃−푖 [푈
0 − 푉 (푓(푘푖)− (푟 + 푡푖(휃푖, 휃−푖))푘푖 + 푟푘¯)−
휃푖 (푘푖푡푖(휃푖, 휃−푖)− 푦푖) +
∫ 휃푖
휃퐿
푘푖푡푖(휃푖, 휃−푖)푑휃0푖 ∣휃푖, 푦ˆ]
(4.15)
To prevent local governments from understating their true types the central gov-
ernment must transfer information rents in addition to the insurance payments
necessary to concede 푈0. The last term on the RHS of equation (4.15) depicts
the information rent. Therefore, in the incomplete information case the central
government’s redistribution policy calls for lower contribution rates by efficient
regions.
Lemma 3 Local governments can gain a positive information rent which is a
decreasing function of types 휃푖.
4In Appendix 8.2 we show that the single-crossing property is fulfilled.
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This result will have important implications for the degree to which fiscal
externalities are corrected through the system of transfers. By using equation
(4.15) the federal government’s objective function now reads as follows:
(푡ˆ1, ..., 푡ˆ푛) = arg min
푛∑
푖=1
퐸휃푖 [푈
0 − 푉 (푥푖(푡푖(휃푖, 휃−푖))− 휃푖 (푘푖푡푖(휃푖, 휃−푖)− 푦ˆ푖) +
∫ 휃푖
휃퐿
푘푖푡푖(휃푖, 휃−푖)푑휃0푖 ∣푦ˆ].
(4.16)
The first order conditions read:(
휃푖 − 1− 푃 (휃푖∣푦ˆ)
푝(휃푖∣푦ˆ)
)(
푘푖 +
∂푘푖
∂푡푖
푡ˆ푖
)
+ 푉푥(푥푖)
(
∂푟
∂푡푖
(푘¯ − 푘푖)− 푘푖
)
∑
푗 ∕=푖
(
푉푥(푥푗)
∂푟
∂푡푖
(푘¯ − 푘푗) +
(
휃푗 − 1− 푃 (휃푗 ∣푦ˆ)
푝(휃푗 ∣푦ˆ)
)
푡ˆ푗
∂푘푗
∂푡푖
)
= 0 for all i.
(4.17)
We find that the schedule of tax rates is distorted downward, because the
hazard rate 1−푃 (휃푖∣푦ˆ)푝(휃푖∣푦ˆ) is positive. Consequently, the external effects of tax com-
petition are only partially internalized through the optimal incentive-compatible
grant. Thus, in a second best tax policy setting external effects of tax competi-
tion are not fully corrected for all types 휃푖 apart from the highest possible type
휃퐻 .
The trade-off between equity and efficiency has been exposed in detail in
chapter 3. As we might recall the rent which local governments may gain by
mispresenting data is a decreasing function of the tax rate. This in turn en-
ables the central government to extract some information rents which is welfare
enhancing. Since distorted tax incentives involve an inappropriate structure of
private and public goods it is less attractive to local governments to mispresent
their types. Therefore the central government faces a real trade-off between al-
locative efficiency and fiscal equity. Overall, the central government offers an
incentive scheme to local governments, where at the margin the welfare gain of
increased rent extraction and the welfare loss of an incomplete internalization
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of fiscal externalities are balanced. We will see in the next subsection how it can
be utilized to give a novel resolution to the ex-post -problem, which is at the
heart of our study.
4.4.2 Incentives for long-term policy
In this subsection we analyze local governments’ incentives to pursue a long-term
investment policy in the presence of incentive-compatible grants-in-aid.
At stage 1 local governments choose a long-term policy in order to maximize
expected local welfare. They correctly anticipate that the central government
can do no better than by offering an incentive-compatible transfer mechanism
at stage 3. The optimal Bayesian mechanism derived above is gives the best
response the central government has to tackle local governments’ opportunistic
behavior. From the revelation principle we know that any other transfer scheme
would enhance local governments’ opportunity to draw additional grants from
the common pool. Hence, the results derived above can be interpreted as a
conservative estimation of local governments’ latitude of discretion. At least
local governments can expect an information rent given by equation (4.15).
The local governments’ objective function is:
푦ˆ푖 arg max퐸휃푖 [푉 (푥푖(푡푖(휃푖, 휃−푖))) + 푧푖(푡푖(휃푖, 휃−푖), 푠푖(휃푖, 휃−푖)))∣푦푖] (4.18)
s.t. (4.1) and (4.4),
where 푠(휃푖, 휃−푖) denotes the incentive-compatible transfer (4.15) and 푡푖(휃푖, 휃−푖)
gives the incentive compatible tax rate. Local governments know that the central
government correctly anticipates the policy 푦ˆ. The first order condition reads:
1 = −
∫ 휃퐻
휃퐿
푡ˆ푖푘푖푃푦푖(휃푖∣푦ˆ푖)푑휃푖. (4.19)
Taking into account that the second best optimal tax rate is always distorted
downward, i.e. 푡∗푖 > 푡ˆ푖, we can state the following proposition:
4.5. RECAPITULATING THE EFFECTS OF EX-POST TRANSFERS 81
Proposition 4 In an incomplete information set-up local governments invest
an inefficiently low amount in long-term public projects.
In an environment with incomplete information local governments anticipate
that optimal transfer schemes equalize fiscal disparities only partially and correct
fiscal externalities only incompletely. Hence, federal transfer mechanisms affect
local governments’ incentives to pursue a long-term policy in two ways.
Firstly, distorted tax incentives go along with both a lower supply of pub-
lic goods and less investment in long-term projects, because local governments
expect lower tax revenues in the tax competition game to follow. As a conse-
quence, the federation is faced with an inefficiently low public sector as well as
a dynamically suboptimal local policy.
Secondly, the ex-post redistribution problem which here takes the form of the
Good Samaritan Problem is mitigated as grants entail a positive information rent
and therefore lack progression. Then local governments are to some extent resid-
ual claimant of urban policy decisions. As a positive by-product of incomplete
redistribution the Good Samaritan Problem is alleviated and local governments
have higher incentives for long-term policy. Those regions which modernize pub-
lic services in due time are likely to dispose of efficient technologies and gain
from information rents. Therefore the widespread commitment problem of the
central government which insures jurisdictions against local shocks is attenuated
in a federation with an incentive-compatible grant scheme. Here, the scope for
federal redistribution is limited, so that local governments are encouraged to
invest in long term projects on their own initiative.
4.5 Recapitulating the Effects of Ex-Post Transfers
In the frame of a multi-stage game with incomplete information we character-
ize incentive-compatible transfer mechanisms that provide for fiscal equalization
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among local jurisdictions and equally resolve the problem of adverse selection
provoking tax dumping. The second best optimal transfer scheme trades-off full
equalization of disparities among regions against allocative efficiency. By the
informational constraints, the scope for federal redistribution in this model is
endogenized and the progressive impact of the transfer scheme is limited. This
has important implications for a sustainable policy on the local level. We show
to which extent the ex-post-redistribution Problem is mitigated through incen-
tives for local policy in a setting with a second best optimal Bayesian transfer
mechanism.
As an extension of the chapter it would be worth to explaining the high di-
vergence of public investment on the local level, see Rodden (2001), who delivers
evidence for the German provincial states. Due to Rodden’s observation some
regions pursue a conservative investment policy, while others tend to bear high
risks. In the stylized model of this chapter a priori all regions are identical
at stage 0, i.e. before the initial investment policy is enacted. Considering a
more realistic framework of the model in which local governments in medias res
may have different starting positions and hence different beliefs with respect to
the likelihood of future technological shocks may explain why local governments
respond differently to federal ex-post grants.
Chapter 5
Transfers and Informational
Externalities
5.1 Interregional Interaction and Expectation
In chapter 3 and 4 we demonstrated that local governments embedded in a fed-
eral setting do not act in isolation but interact with neighboring regions. In
particular we showed that local governments may compete for mobile resources
as well as for transfer from the common pool. A basic message at this juncture is
that incentive problem on the local level appears in a different light if we take into
account that local governments interact with one another. We learned that tax
competition may be beneficial in order to select informational types. Further, it
seems to be plausible that local governments have higher incentives to invest in
precautionary long-term projects if this opens up for local governments a higher
capacity to compete for fiscal commons in the future. In this chapter we point
out a third reason for why interregional interaction may affect the local incentive
problem in federal states analyzing to which extent policy measures chosen by
comparable neighboring regions may serve as a signal for unobservable regional
circumstances.
In federations with spatial interrelation, it is plausible that technology types
correlate between jurisdictions. We show that local policy performance becomes
meaningfully comparable for the central government by implementing a yardstick
83
84CHAPTER 5. TRANSFERS AND INFORMATIONAL EXTERNALITIES
competition mechanism. In this case it can reduce local governments’ scope to
additional grants from the common pool by choosing an untruthful policy. The
transfer received by local governments would be a function not only of their
own policy measures but also of the performance of neighboring regions. From
the view of game theory, an appropriate federal transfer mechanism generates a
game in which local governments compete for a bonus payment. Here, the federal
government can exploit the fact that self-interested jurisdictions do not internal-
ize the informational externalities on neighboring jurisdictions when they pursue
local policy measures. In particular local governments do not take into account
that their policy measures serve as a signal for correlated types of neighboring
jurisdictions. Therefore, the central government can learn more about local cir-
cumstances without offering information rents. In the second step we show that
the yardstick competition mechanism may provide positive incentives for local
precautionary incentives with implications for the findings in the fourth chapter.
How should a federal transfer system be designed in order to overcome these
agency problems if local information types correlate across regions? In this chap-
ter, we address this question and design an optimal Bayesian transfer mechanism
offered by the central government that provides optimal incentives for local pol-
icy and equalizes disparities across jurisdictions. As an important consideration
we highlight the positive effects of yardstick competition between interrelated
jurisdictions on the federal redistribution policy. The basic problem to be de-
scribed is for example in line with the specific environment of local equalizing in
the German La¨nder.
Similar to the latter two chapters, we consider a federal system composed of
a central government and several local jurisdictions. Jurisdictions face heteroge-
nous technological shocks and differ in their ability to provide public goods. We
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assume that jurisdictions are more familiar with region-specific incidents and,
thus, have superior information concerning local provision technologies. Fur-
thermore, in line with the fourth chapter local governments may improve their
provision technology through public services innovation, which decreases the ex-
pected cost of public good provision, so that the differences across jurisdictions
are endogenous. Different to the setting in chapter three we consider a federal
state in which local governments may raise undistortive taxes on land rents.
Therefore in the frame of this model the interregional competitive behavior is
restricted to common pool fishing.
In order to investigate the informational gains of yardstick competition we
consider a federation with the same two-dimensional incentive problem in as in
chapter: the first dimension is a problem of adverse selection. Transfer payments
offered by the central government must be tailored to the current local cost pa-
rameters. The cost parameters are, however, overstated by local governments in
order to receive higher grants-in-aid. The second dimension has its seeds in the
central government’s lack of commitment. Local governments may influence the
cost of local public good provision by innovation measures in the public sector.
They can rely on federal aid, because this is guaranteed by constitutional law.
Consequently, they will exert insufficient effort in preventing high provision cost
through public service innovation.
Likewise, the central government should offer transfer schemes that provide
optimal incentives for local governments’ policy. Maximizing the size of the fed-
eral cake the central government could afford an optimal redistribution policy
with a balanced federal budget. With respect to the innovation policy, local
governments anticipate that the transfer mechanism entails positive information
rents. As we have demonstrated in detail in the previous chapter, more efficient
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local technology types can draw higher rents from the common pool. Local in-
novation policy can therefore be considered as an investment in higher expected
information rents.
In federations with spatial interrelation, it is plausible that technology types
correlate between jurisdictions. If local policy performance becomes meaning-
fully comparable for the central government, it can alleviate agency problems
by implementing a yardstick competition mechanism. The transfer received by
local governments would be a function not only of their own policy measures but
also of the performance of neighboring regions. From the perspective of game
theory speaking, an appropriate federal transfer mechanism generates a game in
which local governments compete for a bonus payment. Here, the federal gov-
ernment can exploit the fact that self-interested jurisdictions do not internalize
the informational externalities on neighboring jurisdictions when they pursue
local policy measures. In particular local governments do not take into account
that their policy measures serve as a signal for correlated types of neighboring
jurisdictions. Therefore, the central government can learn more about local cir-
cumstances without offering information rents.
Whenever the central government is able to make use of a yardstick com-
petition mechanism, it can extract some information rents. Therefore it can
afford to provide more high-powered incentives for public good provision. As a
byproduct of yardstick competition local governments innovate public services
more intensively. Yardstick competition filters out information about techno-
logical circumstances which commonly concern all regions. Hence, in order to
gather a higher informational advantage through region-specific parameters lo-
cal governments innovate public services more intensively. With a more efficient
local policy the federal cake augments and the central government can afford a
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more generous redistribution policy.
Beside the seminal paper of Persson and Tabellini (1996) the ex-post invest-
ment problem is an important theme in industrial organization literature. Laffont
and Tirole (1993) have added investment to a principal-agent model, in a similar
set-up. The positive effect of yardstick competition on local governments’ incen-
tives in a non-commitment set-up to prevent shocks in a principal-agent model
was firstly shown by Dalen (1998).
Recently, some papers have focused on analyzing the effects of yardstick com-
petition in federations. Besley and Case (1995) have developed a model of the
political economy of tax setting where voters make comparisons between juris-
dictions to overcome agency problems. They provide empirical evidence for the
yardstick competition effect by using U.S. data. A similar set-up is presented by
Bordignon et al. (2003) with Italian data, and by Fiva and Rattso (2005) with
Norwegian data. In these papers, yardstick competition serves as an instrument
to make the actions of local incumbent politicians more accountable to voters.
Two papers consider yardstick competition with federal grants. Boarnet and
Glazer (2002) provide empirical evidence that voters regard US federal grants
as a signal for the competence of local governments. In contrast Kotsogiannis
and Schwager (2006) show that equalizing grants can also reduce political ac-
countability. As grants reduce disparities across regions, the policy of incumbent
politicians is less comparable for voters.
As a distinctive feature to the existing literature this chapter deals with ap-
propriate federal transfer schemes that support yardstick competition between
local governments. Apparently, the central government can compare local policy
in the same way as voters can. Therefore, this chapter should be a contribution
to the existing literature, extending the analysis of yardstick competition. Basi-
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cally, the process of yardstick competition which we are going to analyze in this
chapter is in the same spirit as the one demonstrated in the existing literature:
local performance is compared in order to update beliefs of local types. The
underlying incentive scheme in Besley and Case (1995), Bordignon et al. (2003),
Fiva and Rattso (2005) are a voting process in an political economy setting while
we consider redistributive federal grants. The following questions are affiliates
with the problem under examination: What are the characteristics of transfers
that induce local government to compete for a yardstick? To which extent can
the central government enlarge its federal redistribution program by implement-
ing a yardstick competition mechanism?
The chapter outline is as follows. The second section sets out the basic model
and defines the socially optimal local policy as a reference for later results. As
a further benchmark we propose an incentive-compatible transfer that tackles
adverse selection in section 5.3. Then, we revise this transfer scheme by imple-
menting a yardstick competition mechanism which exploits correlation between
informational types in section 5.4. Yardstick competition emerges as a valuable
instrument to increase the scope for federal redistribution. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 The Basic Model
Consider a federation consisting of a central government and 푛 jurisdictions
with equal land endowment, indexed by 푖 = 1, ..., 푛. In the federal state mobile
firms produce a private numeraire good with the same constant return-to-scale
production technology 퐹 ≡ 퐹 (푙), where l is the amount of land used by a firm.
In equilibrium, the market clearing price for land is 휌 = 퐹푙 and there is an equal
number of firms in each jurisdiction, which we normalize to one. The indwellers
of 푖 owning the land endowment in 푖 are characterized by their quasi-linear utility
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functions 푈푖 ≡ 푈(푥푖, 푧푖) = 푥푖 + 푉 (푧푖) + ℎ푖 (with ∂푉∂푧푖 > 0 and ∂
2푉
∂푧2푖
< 0), where 푥푖
is the consumption level of a private nume´raire good and 푧푖, ℎ푖 denote the supply
of two local public goods. In the provision of 푧푖 and ℎ푖, there are no spill-over
effects on neighboring regions 푗.
Local jurisdictions raise a non-distortive tax on land rents 푇푖 to finance local
policy measures: They provide the local public good 푧푖 and further undertake
innovations in their local public services 푦푖. With a balanced budget it applies
that 푇푖 + 휏푖 =
푧푖
훽푖
+ 푦푖 + ℎ푖, where 휏푖 is a federal transfer received by 푖. The
first term on the right side denotes expenditures for supply of 푧푖. Here, 훽푖휖[1, 2]
is a region-specific cost parameter privately known by 푖. From an outside view,
the probability that the cost parameter for public good provision will be less or
equal to 훽푖 given that the local government has undertaken innovation policy
푦푖, is defined 푃푟표푏(훽 ≤ 훽푖∣푦푖) = 푃 (훽푖∣푦푖). The density function is defined by
푝(훽푖∣푦푖). We assume that investment in public service innovation 푦푖 reduces the
danger that the provision of public goods entails high cost, so that ∂푃 (훽푖∣푦푖)∂푦푖 < 0,
∂2푃 (훽푖∣푦푖)
∂푦2푖
> 0 holds. Besides, the probability distribution fulfills the monotone
hazard rate property ∂∂훽푖
(
1−푃 (훽푖∣푦푖)
푝(훽푖∣푦푖)
)
≤ 0. Moreover, we assume that the central
government cannot distinguish between expenditures for innovation measures 푦푖
and for public good consumption ℎ푖, so that local innovation policies are non-
verifiable for the central government. The private budget constraint is defined
by 푥푖 = 휌푙−푇푖 or equivalent 푥푖 = 퐹 (푙)− 푧푖훽푖 −푦푖−ℎ푖+휏푖 as we consider a constant
return-to-scale technology. Local welfare maximizing local governments decide
on expenditures for public good provision and public service innovation, which
are financed via a land rent tax.
Welfare differs among jurisdictions as the provision of public goods entails
heterogenous cost. According to constitutional law of the federal state a min-
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imum welfare level is guaranteed in each jurisdiction denoted by 푈0. In this
section we consider a central government policy which slightly differs from that
exposed in section 3 and 4. Yet the central government should concede the high-
est affordable welfare guarantee in each jurisdiction by offering grants-in-aid 휏푖,
not being necessarily positive, to the local governments to meet:
퐹 (푙)− 푧푖
훽푖
− 푦푖 + 푉 (푧푖) + 휏푖(훽푖) ≥ 푈0. (5.1)
The welfare guarantee issued by the central government is affordable if expected
total transfer payments meet the federal budget constraint, which is normalized
to zero:
푛퐸훽푖 [휏푖(훽푖)] ≤ 0. (5.2)
Evidently, it deals with the dual problem of the central government optimization
investigated in chapter 3 and 4. In this model, we assume that the budget
constraint must only be met by an expected value. It is common practice that
the government budget will be adopted by future prospects. Further, if this
model is a short-cut of a multi-period game, the central government can inter-
temporally balance its budget, provided that equation (5.2) holds.
The timing of the game is as follows:
∙ At 푡0 local jurisdictions choose their innovation policy 푦푖.
∙ At 푡1 nature draws 훽푖, which is learned by local jurisdictions.
∙ At 푡2 the central government offers a transfer scheme.
∙ At 푡3 local jurisdictions choose tax rates and determine (푧푖, ℎ푖).
The innovation measures enacted at 푡0 can be interpreted as long term invest-
ments to improve public services. Local governments know the conditional dis-
tribution of types and choose an innovation measure 푦푖. Further they are aware
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of the central government’s policy objective to maximize 푈0. At 푡1 local gov-
ernments learn types 훽푖, drawn by nature. The central government offers a
transfer mechanism at 푡2 to guarantee a maximal affordable 푈
0 and to give an
optimal incentive for public good provision. Local governments provide public
goods (푧푖, ℎ푖) at 푡3. The welfare guarantee is a basic principle in federations,
but parameters in federal redistribution systems can easily be changed by the
central government in every period. In Germany for example an equal living
standard is irreversibly guaranteed by the constitution of the La¨nder and the
German Grundgesetz. However, the La¨nder can change parameters of local re-
distribution programs 1. We assume that the central government cannot commit
to any bonus payments in order to give higher incentives for innovation at 푡0.
The central government can solely provide incentives for an optimal local policy
by an adequate transfer scheme. Equation (5.1) and (5.2) together yields:
퐸훽푖 [퐹 (푙)−
푧푖
훽푖
− 푦푖 + 푉 (푧푖)] ≥ 푈0 (5.3)
By equation (5.3), the guaranteed welfare 푈0 cannot exceed the expected local
net welfare. In line with standard results in the literature, the highest afford-
able welfare guarantee 푈0 requires a local provision and innovation policy that
maximizes the size of the cake (z∗,y∗).
The first-best optimal local public good supply is defined by
푧∗푖 (훽푖) arg max퐹 (푙)− 푦∗푖 +
∫ 2
1
푉 (푧푖(훽푖))− 푧푖(훽푖)
훽푖
푝(훽푖∣푦∗푖 )푑훽푖,
given that jurisdictions have chosen 푦∗푖 in 푡1. The first order condition fulfills the
Samuelson condition for local public good provision , i.e.
푀푅푆푥푧(푧
∗
푖 (훽푖)) = 푉푧(푧
∗
푖 (훽푖)) =
1
훽푖
= 푀푅푇푥푧(훽푖) for all i,
1A legal basis is given by Sa¨chsischer Landtag (2003): Gesetz zur A¨nderung von Gesetzen
des kommunalen Finanzausgleichs. See also Watt and Hobson (2000) and Fehr (2001).
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so that the marginal valuation of the public good in terms of the private good
is equal to the marginal rate of transformation.2
The first-best optimal innovation policy 푦∗ is defined by
푦∗푖 휖 arg max퐹 (푙)− 푦푖 +
∫ 2
1
푉 (푧∗푖 (훽푖))−
푧∗푖 (훽푖)
훽푖
푝(훽푖∣푦푖)푑훽푖, 3
given that jurisdictions will chose 푧∗ in 푡0. By the first order condition the
expected positive marginal effects of the innovation policy on the size of the cake
are equal to the marginal cost, which is given by
−
∫ 2
1
푧∗푖 (훽푖)
훽2푖
푃푦푖(훽푖∣푦∗푖 )푑훽 = 1. for all i.
5.3 Equalizing Grants in a Non-Correlated World
Let us turn to the case where local technology parameters are private information
of the jurisdictions and expenditure on ℎ푖 and 푦푖 is non-verifiable
4. In this case
the central government faces two important incentive problems on the local level.
A transfer scheme that equalizes welfare on the local level has to be tailored
to the current cost parameter. High cost types have more fiscal needs and should
therefore receive higher grants-in aid. However, local welfare maximizing juris-
dictions overstate their true types in order to receive higher grants-in-aid. Then
they spend the excess on the non-verifiable public good ℎ푖.
Public service innovation reduces the expected cost of local public good pro-
vision. However, if jurisdictions rely at 푡0 on the federal welfare guarantee in-
centives for costly innovation then measures diminish.
In order to design the optimal transfer scheme, the federal level needs to
take into account the informational constraints. By the revelation principle, the
2With a marginal rate of transformation which is a decreasing function in 훽푖, the so-called
sorting condition is fulfilled.
3Integration by parts yields 퐹 (푙)−푦푖+
∫ 2
1
푉 (푧∗푖 )푝(훽푖∣푦푖)푑훽푖− 푧
∗
푖
훽푖
푃 (훽푖∣푦)∣21−
∫ 2
1
푧푖
훽2푖
푃 (훽푖∣푦푖)푑훽푖.
4Rodden (2001) has pointed out that the central government may find it hard to ascertain
the purpose of expenditures as it ”is not difficult to recast a variety of expenditure as investment
outlays”.
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central government can restrict its search for the optimal transfer mechanism to
a direct revelation mechanism. In particular we consider a Bayesian incentive
compatible transfer scheme that implements an optimal local provision policy in
dominant strategies, which is formally expressed by
Γ = {푁, (푧푖(훽푖, 훽−푖))푖휖푁 , (휏푖(훽푖, 훽−푖))푖휖푁}.
We see two important arguments to consider dominant strategy implementa-
tion. Firstly, the central government can afford the same 푈0 guarantee with a
dominant strategy implementation as a Bayesian strategy implementation in the
contract specific environment of this model. This proof is provided in Appendix
9.7. Secondly, the extended transfer mechanism including yardstick competition
in chapter 4 can be analyzed more straightforwardly with a dominant strategy
implementation.
The central government chooses a transfer scheme that includes a local policy
in order to maximize the welfare guarantee 푈0:
max
{푧푖(⋅),휏푖(⋅)}
푈0
s.t. 퐹 (푙) + 휏푖(훽푖, 훽−푖)− 푧푖(훽푖, 훽−푖)
훽푖
− 푦ˆ + 푉 (푧푖(훽)) ≥ 푈0 (5.4)
퐸훽푖∣푦ˆ[휏푖(훽)] ≤ 0 (5.5)
푉 (푧푖(훽))− 푧푖(훽)
훽푖
+ 휏푖(훽) ≥ 푉 (푧푖(훽˜))− 푧푖(훽˜)
훽푖
+ 휏푖(훽˜) for all i . (5.6)
By equation (5.4), a minimum welfare level 푈0 is guaranteed in each jurisdiction
푖. Equation (5.5) gives the domain of affordable redistribution policies. The
expected total transfer payments do not exceed the federal budget. As the
expected effectiveness of public service innovation is common knowledge the
central government correctly anticipates the pure strategy equilibrium 푦푖 = 푦ˆ
for all i. This gives rise to the cumulated distribution function 푃 (훽푖∣푦ˆ) and
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innovation cost 푦ˆ. The optimal local governments’ innovation strategies are
going to be analyzed in detail in the next subsection. Further, the incentive-
compatibility constraint (5.6) ensures that mispresenting types, denoted by 훽˜푖
different to 훽푖, is never profitable and dominated by truth-telling. Before we
solve the central government’s maximization problem we characterize a transfer
scheme which is truthful and guarantees 푈0. This reduces the problem to just
one unconstrained maximization of the following objective function:
Proposition 5 Incentive compatible transfers that guarantee at least 푈0 to each
jurisdiction are:
휏푖(훽) = 푈
0 − 퐹 (푙) + 푦ˆ + 푧푖(훽)
훽푖
− 푉 (푧푖(훽)) +
∫ 훽푖
1
푧푖(푏)
푏2푖
푑푏푖. (5.7)
Proof see Appendix
To prevent local governments from understating their true types, the central gov-
ernment must transfer information rents additional to the compensatory transfer
payments necessary to concede 푈0. The first five terms on the right-hand side of
equation (5.7) depict the compensatory payments and the last term represents
the information rent. The scope for federal redistribution is smaller than in the
first-best optimal case as in the incomplete information case, the central govern-
ment must offer positive information rents. To make this clear, we add up the
budget constraint (5.5) and the incentive compatibility constraint (5.7), which
yields the scope for federal redistribution in the incomplete information case:
퐸훽푖∣푦ˆ
[
퐹 (푙)− 푧푖(훽)
훽푖
− 푦ˆ푖 + 푉 (푧푖(훽))−
∫ 훽푖
1
푧푖(푏)
푏2푖
푑푏푖
]
≥ 푈0. (5.8)
The central government chooses a schedule of public good provision 푧푖(훽) that
maximizes the affordable welfare guarantee 푈0 or in other words maximizes
the scope for federal redistribution. Integration by parts yields the following
maximization problem:
max
푧푖
∫ 2
1
(
푉 (푧푖(훽))− 푧푖(훽)
(
1
훽푖
+
1− 푃 (훽푖∣푦ˆ)
푝(훽푖∣푦ˆ)
1
훽2푖
))
푝(훽푖∣푦ˆ)푑훽푖.
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The first order condition is:
푀푅푆푥푧(푧ˆ푖(훽)) = 푀푅푇푥푧(훽푖) +
1− 푃 (훽푖∣푦ˆ)
푝(훽푖∣푦ˆ)
1
훽2푖
for all i. (5.9)
Note that the second term on the right-hand side in equation (5.9) is positive
for all 훽푖 < 2 and for 훽푖 = 2 . Consequently, we can state:
Proposition 6 The second best optimal federal grant-in-aid in an incomplete
information set-up entails a schedule of public good supply that is distorted down-
ward for all 훽푖 < 2 .
The central government faces a trade-off between maximizing the size of the cake
and minimizing information rents. At the optimum which is expressed by the first
order condition (5.9), the expected marginal effects on the information rents must
be equal to the marginal effects on size of the cake. Here, the allocative objective
to maximize the size of the cake interferes with the redistributive objective, as a
high schedule of public good supply entails high informational cost.
5.3.1 The innovation policy
In line with Persson and Tabellini (1992) and the model of chapter 4 we assume
that local governments can innovate public services at 푡0, which reduces the ex-
pected cost for public good provision. Do local governments, which are insured
by a federal welfare guarantee, innovate public services efficiently? To answer
this question we investigate the local innovation policy in the remainder of this
section: In equilibrium jurisdictions correctly anticipate an incentive-compatible
transfer mechanism offered by the central government at 푡2, as given in equa-
tion (5.7). Jurisdictions, especially expect a positive information rent offered
by the central government. This rent increases with the technology parameter
훽푖. Public service innovation reduces expected provision cost and, at the same
time, increases expected information rents. Local governments choose innovation
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policies to maximize the expected local welfare:
퐸훽푖∣푦푖
[
푈0 +
∫ 훽푖
1
푧ˆ푖(푏)
푏2푖
푑푏푖
]
− 푦푖.
Integration by parts yields the following maximization problem:
푦ˆ푖 = arg max−
∫ 2
1
푧ˆ푖(훽)
훽2푖
푃 (훽푖∣푦푖)푑훽푖 − 푦푖.
The first order condition is:
−
∫ 2
1
푧ˆ푖(훽푖)
훽2푖
푃푦(훽푖∣푦ˆ푖)푑훽푖 = 1.
At the optimum, jurisdictions face a trade-off between the positive marginal
effects on expected information rents and the marginal cost of public service in-
novation. All jurisdictions rely on 푈0 and pursue an innovation policy 푦푖 = 푦ˆ, in
order to increase expected information rents. However, they do not internalize
the positive effects on the whole size of the cake. Furthermore, local governments
anticipate that the central government distorts towards a lower public good sup-
ply in the second best optimal transfer mechanism to appropriate information
rents.5 Therefore, the individual rational innovation policy on the local level is
lower than the first best optimal policy 푦∗푖 , which we have defined in section 2.
Proposition 7 Jurisdictions invest less in public service innovation if they an-
ticipate that the central government provides less high-powered incentives for local
public good supply.
Proof see Appendix
Local decision-makers just enact innovation measures, if this positively affects
the prospect of higher local welfare. The positive information rents for local gov-
ernments that add up on compensating payments forbid the central government
to offer complete redistribution to jurisdictions. As the central government is
5Remember that by assumption the central government cannot commit to a higher sched-
ule of public good supply which would entail higher expected information rents and higher
innovation incentives.
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unable to commit itself to bonus payments for local jurisdictions, it is just the
lack of insurance that gives incentives to local governments for innovation.
5.4 Equalizing Grants with Yardstick Competition
In accordance with chapter 3 and 4, we have analyzed in the previous section
a set-up in which costs to provide public goods are specific parameters of juris-
dictions independent of their neighbors. However, in a federation with spatial
interaction, it is plausible that some circumstances affect the entirety of jurisdic-
tions’ technology types. The local level in a federal state may face a general bad
or good condition, so that there is a tendency towards low or high technology
types. We show that the central government can exploit the correlation between
informational types to bridge its informational gap at no cost. Because of the
correlation between types, the public good supply chosen by a local government
i serves as a signal for neighbors’ local types. Therefore, by its policy choice,
a local welfare maximizing jurisdiction inflicts informational externalities onto
its neighbors. The externalities consist of a reduction in neighbors’ rents as the
central government can update its beliefs.
To investigate the central government’s redistribution policy with correlated
types, we redefine the local technology parameter for the remainder of this chap-
ter. Two factors affect the cost of providing local public goods: a region-specific
factor and a common factor. The first factor is specific to a particular juris-
diction and the latter summarizes all circumstances having an impact on the
whole federation. We define the technology parameter by 훽푖 = 휉 + 휖푖, where 휉
signifies the common regional shock and 휖푖 signifies the region-specific shock in
jurisdictions i. 휉 may take one value of a set {1, 32} with probability {푣, 1 − 푣}.
휖푖 is drawn from a continuum of types on [0,
1
2 ] with a cumulative distribution
function 퐺(휖푖) and a density function 푔(휖푖) > 0 on [0,
1
2 ]. In analogy to section
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3, public sector innovation reduces the expected cost of public good provision so
that 퐺푦 < 0 and 퐺푦푦 > 0 (first order stochastic dominance) hold. Hence, the
cumulative distribution function is:
푃 (훽푖∣푦푖) =
⎧⎨⎩
푣퐺(훽푖 − 1∣푦푖)) 훽푖 ≤ 32
푣 + (1− 푣)퐺(훽푖 − 32 ∣푦푖) 훽푖 > 32
(5.10)
The central government knows that the federation is either in a good or bad
condition. In the first case, local types take a value on [1, 32 ] and in the latter
case on (32 , 2]. To exploit the jurisdictions’ informational externalities caused
by the correlation between types, the central government can offer a yardstick
competition mechanism:
In 푡2, the central government offers two incentive-compatible transfer schemes
Γ푘. The version 푘 of the transfer mechanism for jurisdiction 푖 solely depends on
the neighbors’ messages 훽−푖. Hence, by its message jurisdiction i cannot influence
the version of the transfer mechanism in force:
Γ푘 = {푁, (푧푘푖(훽푖, 훽−푖))푖휖푁 , (휏푘푖(훽푖, 훽−푖))푖휖푁} with 푘 = 1, 2.
Jurisdiction i plays
⎧⎨⎩
Γ2 if sup{훽−푖}휖(23 , 2]
Γ1 otherwise.
(5.11)
This mechanism disposes Γ2 to jurisdiction i, if one neighbor reports a type higher
than 32 , otherwise Γ1. It generates a game under complete information (the local
government commonly know the factor 휉) allowing the central government to
learn the factor 휉 without offering information rents.
The type k of the game Γ푘, played by jurisdiction i solely depends on the
vector of neighbors’ messages 훽−푖. The local government i thus cannot influence
k. By definition both transfer mechanisms are incentive-compatible, i.e. juris-
diction i cannot be better off by misrepresenting its type. It reveals the true
type, irrespective of the game version k. Further, the truthful revelation of the
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technology parameter by jurisdiction i has an impact on the game version of
its neighbors j. In the Nash equilibrium all jurisdictions truthfully report their
types and play the same game version k, contingent on the common factor 휉.
Then the transfer scheme depicts a function with a jump at 훽푖 =
1
2 .
By means of the yardstick competition mechanism the central government can
filter out some private information at no cost. Thus, the range of possible local
informational types is halved from [1, 2] to [1, 32 ] or (
3
2 , 2]. Thereby the central
government can tailor transfer schemes more accurately to the current local
situation. With a smaller range of possible types local governments have a limited
scope to mispresent types and a smaller information rent has to be bestowed in
order to achieve truth-telling. The central government’s maximization problem
is now a two-part problem: determining the schedule of public good supply for
the good and bad common factor, respectively:
max
푧
∫ 3
2
1
(
푉 (푧푖(훽))− 푧푖(훽)
(
1
훽푖
− 1−퐺(훽푖 − 1∣
ˆˆ푦)
푔(훽푖 − 1∣ˆˆ푦)
1
훽2푖
))
푔(훽푖 − 1∣ˆˆ푦)푑훽푖
max
푧
∫ 2
3
2
(
푉 (푧푖(훽))− 푧푖(훽)
(
1
훽푖
− 1−퐺(훽푖 −
3
2 ∣ˆˆ푦)
푔(훽푖 − 32 ∣ˆˆ푦)
1
훽2푖
))
푔(훽푖 − 3
2
∣푦ˆ)푑훽푖
The first order conditions are:
푀푅푆푥푧( ˆˆ푧푖(훽)) = 푀푅푇푥푧(훽푖) +
1−퐺(훽푖 − 1∣ˆˆ푦)
푔(훽푖 − 1∣ˆˆ푦)
1
훽2푖
for 휉 = 1. (5.12)
푀푅푆푥푧(푧ˆ푖(훽)) = 푀푅푇푥푧(훽푖) +
1−퐺(훽푖 − 32 ∣ˆˆ푦)
푔(훽푖 − 32 ∣ˆˆ푦)
1
훽2푖
for 휉 =
3
2
. (5.13)
The two first order conditions (5.12) and (5.13) express the trade-off between
extracting information rents and efficiently providing public goods. A distortion
of public good supply of a jurisdiction i with type 훽푖 affects the information
rents of those local governments with a type on the interval [훽푖,
3
2 ], if 휉 = 1 and
on the interval [훽푖, 2], if 휉 =
3
2 . In the federation with 휉 = 1, the distortion of the
schedule of public good provision affects the rents of a smaller set of jurisdictions
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compared to the transfer mechanism in section 3. As the rent extraction effect of
distorting public good supply is smaller, the central government chooses a trans-
fer scheme which entails higher public good provision. This fact is established
by the the following proposition.
Proposition 8 For given beliefs about the local innovation policy the central
government offers a transfer scheme with:
∙ the same schedule of public good supply as in the case with independent
local types, if 휉 = 32 .
∙ a less distorted schedule of public good supply, if 휉 = 1.
Proof see Appendix
We have shown in the previous section, that jurisdictions innovate public ser-
vices in order to maximize the expected information rents. Jurisdictions antici-
pate that a rational federal government in the regime with yardstick competition
will offer transfer mechanism with a different schedule of local public good sup-
ply. What is the impact of a yardstick competition mechanism on jurisdictions’
innovation incentives? If the central government filters out the common compo-
nents and updates its beliefs the trade-off between rent extraction and efficiency
shifts towards a more high-powered schedule of local public good supply. This
means that the marginal effect on information rents, as captured by the term∫ 2
1
푧푖(훽)
훽2푖
푃 (훽푖∣푦푖)푑훽푖 is positive, and as a consequence, 푦푖 increases.
Proposition 9 In federations with yardstick competition, jurisdictions have higher
incentives to innovate local public services.
Proof see Appendix
Most importantly the size of the cake depends on local governments’ poli-
cies pursued in order to supply local public goods and innovate public services.
Furthermore, information rents limit the scope for federal redistribution pol-
icy. In the federation with yardstick competition the federal government can
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filter out some information about the common component. A priori, the fed-
eral government expects to pay lower information rents to local governments.
Moreover, with proposition 8 and 9, the local governments provide public goods
more efficiently and take innovation measures more efficiently. The expected lo-
cal performance will be therefore higher in a regime with yardstick competition.
To conclude the analysis of the achievement of yardstick competition mechanism
for federal redistribution we can state:
Proposition 10 In federations with yardstick competition the scope for federal
redistribution is higher: a higher welfare guarantee can be afforded.
5.5 Yardsticks and Transfers
In this chapter, we have highlighted the advantages of yardstick competition for
federal redistribution policy. A yardstick competition mechanism that makes
local performance meaningfully comparable, disables local governments from
shifting the burden of local policy onto the federation as a whole. The opti-
mal transfer mechanism with yardstick competition entails lower information
rents and provides higher incentives for local public good provision and higher
incentives for local public service innovation. We have suggested that for the
analysis of federal equalizing grants it might be reasonable to keep track of a
possible correlation between local information types.
The definitions of the common and region-specific factors implies that we con-
sider a moderate correlation between types. If the weight of the region-specific
factor is too big, the central government cannot take considerable advantage of
yardstick competition. Conversely, a big weight on the common factor is advan-
tageous to filter out some information through yardstick competition. Indeed,
this would be the case of a federation with homogenous jurisdictions that does
not call for federal redistribution.
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We have restricted ourselves to direct transfer mechanisms with yardstick
competition, i.e. a message game in which jurisdictions directly announce their
technological types. By the revelation principle we can convert each direct mech-
anism into an indirect transfer mechanism with a matching grant contingent on
local public good supply. Similar to the transfer scheme developed in chapter 3
we may develop a class of indirect transfer mechanisms to compare this incentive-
compatible transfer scheme with existing transfer schemes, e.g. Canadian, Ger-
man or Swiss grants. Thus, this general yardstick competition mechanism can
be a guideline for further analysis.
Recently, in many federal states a better comparability of local public policy
measure is coming up to discussion. For example the Gemeindepru¨fungsanstalt-
GPA, an agency for municipal audit of the Land North Rhine-Westphalia has
introduced an index to evaluate public service innovation. The best practice pro-
gram can be accompanied by a transfer scheme which makes correlated municipal
policy more accountable.
Chapter 6
Tax Base Equalizing and
Incentives
6.1 Competition for Tax Base Equalizing Grants
In the analysis of the foregoing chapters it has become obvious that interre-
gional competition with specific variables may be based on different processes
and mechanisms. We have demonstrated that competition between local gov-
ernments can be based different variables, e.g. on mobility of individuals, goods,
factors or firms and on transfer from a federal common pool. Moreover they may
engage in competition for the same background by choosing different variables.
In chapter 3 we have shown that local governments can reduce tax rates in order
to attract mobile resources from other regions or to draw additional grants from
the common pool. Further in the dynamic context of chapter 4 local govern-
ments may postpone long-term investment projects into the future anticipating
that they are eligible for financial assistance in the case of high consequential
cost.
Hereafter we would like to investigate the typology of the underlying mech-
anism and the optimal design of transfer schemes in a different environment. In
particular we are going to consider tax base equalizing grants, which are an in-
tegral part of the federal transfer system in Germany and Canada. In Germany
on the municipal level and in Canada on the level of provinces regions with a
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below-average tax base are net recipients and those with an above-average one
are net contributors to the federal redistribution system.
As a distinctive feature Bucovetsky and Smart (2005) and Ko¨thenbu¨rger
(2002) point out that tax base equalizing grants correct for the external effect of
fiscal competition. If jurisdictions attract mobile tax bases, a tax cut will lead
to an inflow of tax base from neighboring regions, however it equally reduces
the governments’ entitlement to benefit from tax base equalizing. Hence, the
tax back effects that go along with tax sharing restores efficiency: the incentive
effects of competition for transfers may neutralize the external effects of tax com-
petition for mobile tax bases. In terms of G. Becker’ s Rotten Kid Theorem we
can argue that local governments would correctly anticipate that the only way
to increase the regional budget after central government’s tax sharing programs
are enacted is to broaden the overall federal tax base.
It is well understood that Rotten Kids may go wrong if local governments
privately know some relevant information, so that transfers cannot be precisely
tailored to the local situation. Likewise, tax base equalizing may undermine local
tax incentives and is a source of inefficient local tax policy itself. In this chapter
we consider a setting in which local governments themselves are responsible for
administrating and enforcing taxes so that they have some power of discretion
to interpret tax law, to audit taxes, and to accord indirect subvention to firms.
Decentralized tax enforcement is a typical feature in many federal states. In
particular this can be justified by the informational advantage of local tax au-
thorities which can detect tax evasion more easily because of their proximity
to the tax payer. Typically, the central government cannot observe and verify
enforcement policy enacted by local authorities. In this case local governments
local governments have a second policy variable in their hands choosing lax en-
6.1. COMPETITION FOR TAX BASE EQUALIZING GRANTS 105
forcement activities in order to reduce the tax burden of firms in the region. A
loss of tax revenue, however, is compensated by higher grants-in-aid offered by
the central government.
The central government cannot aggregate the factor demands in different
local industries to estimate the tax base. The tax base (e.g. the employment
of capital in the region) can only be estimated if the tax revenue, as well as
the effective tax rate, are known. The reason for an asymmetric information
structure in the game is complexity. Bordignon et al. (2001) point out that
these informational constraints are likely to arise in many real world situations
in federal states. Further, local governments typically have better information
about true market values of real estate and other investments in the region. Lo-
cal governments can better evaluate the real efficiency of regional production
facilities because of their proximity to on-site problems. Moreover, the central
government cannot observe the relatively complex administrative procedures of
tax enforcement.
With decentralized tax authorities, local governments have an additional tax
instrument in their hands to engage in tax dumping. Hence, what we expect
is that the efficiency consequences of tax base equalizing may differ from recent
literature by Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) and Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2002), which dis-
plays a positive tax raising effect of tax base equalizing. The general problem
of local governments cutting effective taxes via lower enforcement activities is
widely discussed in the literature. Specifically, Cremer and Gahvari (2000), and
Sto¨whase and Traxler (2005) point out that local governments cut effective taxes
via lower tax auditing. Lenk et al. (1998) show that some provincial states in
Germany exert too little effort for tax audits and Wurzel (1999) points out that
the average time between company tax audits in some German provincial states
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lasts up to several decades. Lax enforcement activities caused by decentralized
tax enforcement is also pointed out by OECD (2006) in its survey of Germany.
In this paper we broaden the tax competition game as displayed by Bucov-
etsky and Smart (2006) and introduce a second local tax instrument, namely
enforcement activities. In order to reduce fiscal disparities, the central govern-
ment offers tax base equalizing grants. In the full information case, serving as
a reference solution for further analysis, all relevant parameters are common
knowledge so that the federal government can observe the effective tax rate as
well as the tax base. The tax back effect provides optimal incentives for tax
policy as well as enforcement policy in agreement with Bucovetsky and Smart
(2006). In a federation with decentralized tax authorities and an appropriate
system of tax base equalizing grants, taxes are optimally enforced by the local
level. In a second step, we consider an incomplete information case. In contrast
to Bucovetsky and Smart (2006), the central government cannot observe enforce-
ment activities as well as the size of the tax base. Here, the central government
faces an adverse selection problem as local governments mispresent local fiscal
power in order to justify a low tax revenue, i.e. they choose a lax enforcement
policy in order to cut effective taxes and, hence, reduce the tax burden of local
firms.
How should a system of tax base equalizing grants be designed in order
to overcome the problem of adverse selection? Here we design an incentive-
compatible transfer mechanism that equalizes regional tax bases and equally
overcomes the adverse selection problem. In accordance with the foregoing chap-
ters of this study transfer payments entail a positive information rent, so that
it is not advantageous for local governments to deviate from the efficient en-
forcement policy. The second best optimal transfer scheme trades off efficient
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incentives for local enforcement policy and full equalization of fiscal externalities.
This transfer may be optimal to distort incentives for enforcement activities in
the following two ways: the system of grants provides high incentives for regions
with small tax bases and vice-versa low tax incentives for regions with a big tax
base.
In a second step we are going to derive an in direct transfer rule contingent
on observable tax revenues. The central government intends to implement the
second best optimal solution with the aforementioned two-way distortion. Like-
wise, it anticipates the local government try to attract both mobile tax bases
from neighboring regions and additional grants from the common pool. Further
it rationalizes that local government may engage in tax competition by choosing
related strategic variables like enforcement activities.
With respect to the applied fiscal policy this study shows that a rather com-
plex incentive-compatible transfer rule can be implemented by a simple tax base
equalizing grants with different contributions rates for different region-specific
types. Further, in theoretic terms we try to give new insights how interregional
competition may take place depicting a mechanism with different backgrounds
and different strategic variables. In the model we consider local enforcement
activities as a second variable with which local governments can circumvent the
incentive scheme. In broader sense we can also include into the set of local gov-
ernments’ strategic policy instruments subventions for firms and the provision of
specific inputs.
Like in our paper, Lockwood (1999) investigates a transfer scheme that simul-
taneously protects against shocks of provision costs, local income, and valuation
of the public goods and corrects for externalities. The externalities considered in
this paper result from spillover effects of public goods provision across local gov-
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ernments within the federation. Lockwood finds that the form of the optimizing
grant differs from the standard Pigouvian subsidy in the full information case
and points out a trade-off between rent-extraction and efficiency for different
shocks. In line with Lookwood (1999), we deliver another example of a two-
way distortion of tax incentives by a federal redistribution system. Technically,
speaking it is the same effect which drive the result to a two-way distortion. it
is hoped that we throw light on the background of the underlying competitive
mechanism. With respect to empirical studies, two papers confirm the hypothe-
sis that local governments try to substitute tax revenue for higher grants-in-aid.
Baretti et al. (2002) performed empirical tests confirming this hypothesis for
higher-level federal grants.
6.2 Model and Problem
6.2.1 Basic model
We consider a federation composed of a federal government and a large number
of local jurisdictions, indexed by 푖 = {1, 2, ..., 푛}. Local public good supply
is financed by a unit tax on capital employment with a uniform tax rate 휏
in all regions. We assume that the tax is collected and administered by local
governments through local tax authorities who may enact tax audits and related
enforcement activities in order to limit tax evasion. Typically relatively high
tax revenues 푇푖 may be achieved if local tax authorities exert a high effort to
enforce taxes. For simplicity we depict the positive impact of local enforcement
activities 휌푖 on the tax revenue by the following linear relationship:
휏휌푖푘푖 = 푇푖,
where 푘푖 is the capital tax base administered by region 푖. The parameter 휌푖
depicts the part of the tax revenue which is rightfully declared and assessed.
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Assuming that local governments can freely choose the intensity of audits and
tax enforcement the parameter 휌푖 can take a value in [0, 1]. If the value of the
parameter 휌푖 is lower than one the statuary tax rate 휏 differs from the effective tax
rate, 푡푖 = 휏휌푖. Enforcing taxes is assumed to be costless. Despite a federal-wide
tax on capital with a uniform tax rate in the whole federation, local governments
may engage in inter-jurisdictional tax competition, if they have some latitude of
discretion to cut the effective tax burden by adjusting enforcement activities.
In the following we describe an environment in which local governments have
incentives to attract mobile tax bases from neighboring regions that is similar to
the frame of the model in the third chapter. We assume that each jurisdiction
is endowed with an inelastic supply of one unit of a fixed factor labor. The total
capital stock in the federation 퐾¯ is exogenously given and capital is perfectly
mobile across jurisdictions, so that capital in each jurisdiction earns the same
net return 푟. Jurisdictions intend to maximize local welfare characterized by the
following quasi-linear utility function:
푈푖(푥푖, 푧푖) = 푉푖(푧푖) + 푥푖, (6.1)
where 푥푖 is the private good supply and 푧푖 is local public good provision. Pref-
erence are identical in all households of the federation.
Output is produced by local firms in each region. The aggregate CES-
production function is expressed in intensive-form and crucially depends on the
state of technology in the region as follows: 푓(푘푖, 푎푖), where 푘푖 denotes the labor-
capital ratio and 푎푖 is a technology parameter that expresses the efficiency of
local industries. In line with Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) we consider a local
production technology with the following specific functional form:
푓(푘푖, 푎푖) = 푓(푘푖/푎푖)
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and
푛∑
푖=1
푎푖 = 푛.
The parameter 푎푖 may take a high value 푎퐻 or a low value 푎퐿. Markets are
perfectly competitive and the production factors are therefore priced at their
marginal productivity as follows: 푓푘(푘푖, 푎푖) = 휙푖 and 푓(푘푖, 푎푖)−푘푖푓푘(푘푖, 푎푖) = 푤푖,
where 휙푖 = 푟 + 푡푖 defines the user cost of capital consisting of interest payments
and effective burden of unit capital cost. The price for the fixed factor in region
푖 is 푤푖.
We assume that region-specific types are private information to local juris-
dictions and local firms. Local governments can better estimate the value of
capital on the local level and the efficiency of local production technologies due
to the proximity of on-site problems. From an outside view, types are inde-
pendently drawn from a commonly known distribution 푃푟표푏(푎푖 = 푎퐻) = 푝 and
푃푟표푏(푎푖 = 푎퐿) = 1− 푝 respectively.
In line with chapter 3 and 4 factor prices adjust to clear markets, i.e.
∑푛
푖=1 푘푖 =
퐾¯. As the federal capital stock is exogenously given it follows from market clear-
ing that 푘′푖 +
∑푛
푗=1 푘
′
푗
∂푟
∂푡푖
= 0 with 푘′푖(휙푖) =
1
푓푘푘(푘푖)
. Therefore, a change in the
effective tax burden 푡푖 implies a change of the net return of capital by
∂푟
∂푡푖
= − 푘
′
푖(푟 + 푡푖)∑푛
푗=1 푘
′
푗(푟 + 푡푗)
< 0. (6.2)
Furthermore, some capital flows out of a region and is employed in neighboring
regions.
∂푘푖
∂푡푖
=
1
푎푖푓푘푘(푘푖)
(
1 +
∂푟
∂푡푖
)
< 0 and
∂푘푗
∂푡푖
=
1
푎푗푓푘푘(푘푗)
∂푟
∂푡푖
> 0. (6.3)
For the sake of clarity and without loss of generality for analysis of the optimal
transfer scheme we assume that the elasticity of the the tax base is identical in
each region, although the absolute factor demand may certainly differ in the
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case of heterogenous 푎푖.
1 According to the specific functional form assume in
this chapter capital demand is given by:
푘푖(휙푖) = 푎푖푓
−1
푘 (휙푖) , with
푛∑
푖=1
푎푖 = 푛.
Hence given identical user costs of capital 휙 the tax base elasticity for region
푗 and 푖 is identical:
∂푘푖
∂휙푖
휙푖
푘푖
=
∂푘푖
∂휙푗
휙푗
푘푗
=
1
푓푘푘
The factor demand as well as production output crucially depend on the region-
specific technology parameter 푎푖: Regions with a high production parameter
have a high output, a high capital demand, and consequently a high capital tax
base.
Households’ total income is composed of wage income and capital income
and is spent for private good consumption 푥푖:
푥푖 = 푤푖 + 푟푘¯, (6.4)
where 퐾¯푛 = 푘¯ is an identical share of capital held by each household. The local
government’s budget for local public good supply
푧푖 = 푡푖푘푖 + 푠푖 (6.5)
is composed of the capital tax revenue and a federal transfer 푠푖, not necessarily
positive.
6.2.2 Federal government objective
A widespread phenomenon in many federal states such as Germany is that fiscal
disparities across regions are fully equalized by a system of federal transfers
in order to guarantee an equal provision of public goods. There may be two
reasons for why the insurance constraint is exogenously given. First, an equal
1In the general case we assume that f is a monotonously decreasing function of a.
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living standard is warranted by constitutional law, so that the fiscal disparities
are to be equalized, and, secondly, in Germany fiscal relations between the local
and federal level are coordinated in the so-called Financial Planning Council.
In this Council, full tax sharing between the local governments can be regarded
as a consensus found between the ministers of Finance of the provinces and the
federal level. In the frame of this model, the following insurance constraint can
be introduced:
푧¯ = 푧퐿 = 푧퐻 , (6.6)
so that each jurisdiction disposes of an equal supply of public goods.
6.2.3 First best optimal tax policy
The first-best optimal effective tax burden 푡푖 = 휏푖 ⋅ 휌푖 which maximizes overall
federal welfare is given as follows:
max
푡푖
푛∑
푖=1
푉푖(푧¯) + 푥푖, with 푧¯ =
1
푛
푛∑
푖=1
푡푖푘푖
The first order conditions are:
푘푖 −
푛∑
푖=1
∂푟
∂푡푖
(푘¯ − 푘푖) = 푉푧(푧¯)
⎧⎨⎩푘푖 +
푛∑
푖=푗
푡푖
∂푘푗
∂푡푖
⎫⎬⎭ ∀푖. (6.7)
Taking into account that households have identical preferences in the whole
federation, i.e. that 푉 푖푧 (푧¯) = 푉
푗
푧 (푧¯) = 푉푧(푧¯) holds and that there is a uniform
tax base elasticity across regions the first order condition simplifies to
푉푖(푧푖) = 푀푅푆(푥푖) = 1. (6.8)
From equation (6.8) we can derive that the optimal tax rate is uniform across
regions; 푡푖 = 푡푗 = 푡.
6.2.4 Uncoordinated policy
If local governments can freely choose local enforcement activities local gov-
ernments play a tax competition game by strategically choosing related policy
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instruments. In a federal state with no government intervention, all regions fear
the flowing out of mobile capital and exert inefficiently low enforcement activi-
ties in order to reduce the user cost of capital 휙푖. Similar to the framework in
the third chapter local governments are in a prisoners’ dilemma as it would be
beneficial for all regions to raise higher effective taxes. Nonetheless, unilateral
deviations from the equilibrium policy through the increases of tax rates is never
beneficial as it results in an important loss of local tax base.
De facto local governments try to attract capital by strategically choosing
local enforcement activities, however, for notational simplicity, we depict a game
in which local governments choose the effective tax burden 푡푖. Then the compe-
tition for mobile tax base can be displayed by the following normal form game
with similar structure as in chapter 3 and 4, however with an set of strategies
containing effective tax burdens:
Γ = ⟨푁, (푡푖)푖휖푁 , (푈푖)푖휖푁 ⟩,
where 푁 = {1, 2, ..., 푛} is the set of jurisdictions and 푡푖 = (휏 ⋅ 휌푖)휖ℜ+ the set of
strategies of 푖. Assuming Nash strategies jurisdiction 푖 pursues a local welfare
maximizing tax policy 푡푖, given the tax policy of its neighbors 푡푖. The 푛 jurisdic-
tions in the federation compete for mobile capital 푘푖(휙푖) by a strategic tax policy
decision. Given its region-specific technology, the local governments optimally
respond to the tax policy decisions of the other regions. This is depicted by the
best response function of 푖:
퐵푅푖(푡−푖) = arg max
푡푖
푉푖 (푧푖) + 푥푖 for all i .
s.t. 푘푖푡푖 = 푧푖
푤푖 + 푟푘¯ = 푥푖
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The system of first order conditions yields:
푉푧(푧푖)
(
푘푖 + 푡푖
∂푘푖
∂푡푖
)
= 푘푖 +
∂푟
∂푡푖
(
푘푖 − 푘¯
)
. (6.9)
The local government under-provides public goods with respect to the Samuel-
son condition as jurisdictions ignore the positive external effects of a tax policy
change on other regions. Therefore, they raise inefficiently low tax rates and
under-provide public goods.
6.3 Full information policy:
In this section we assume that all relevant parameters are public information.
The central government can offer grants-in-aid 푠푖, not necessarily positive, to
the local governments before local tax policies are set. Thereby, the central
government acts as a Stackelberg leader offering a transfer scheme at stage 1
before local governments choose their tax policy at stage 2. In order to meet
the equalization constraint (6.6), the central government must fully adjust fiscal
disparities. Hence local governments’ budget after federal transfers payments
are enacted amounts to
푝푡퐻푘퐻 + (1− 푝)푡퐿푘퐿 = 푧¯.
Full equalization can be achieved by a system of tax base equalizing grants that
close the gap between the current tax bases of regions and the average per capita
tax base in the federation:
푠푖 = 푇¯ − 푇푖 =
(
푘¯ − 푘푖
) 푝푡퐻푘퐻 + (1− 푝)푡퐿푘퐿
푝푘퐻 + (1− 푝)푘퐿 ,
where 푡¯ = 푝푡퐻푘퐻+(1−푝)푡퐿푘퐿푝푘퐻+(1−푝)푘퐿 is the average tax rate in the federation and 푇¯ = 푡¯ ⋅ 푘¯
is the respective average tax revenue.
We can show that a simple equalizing grant can correct for fiscal externali-
ties. By cutting effective taxes, local governments can attract a mobile tax base
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that mitigates the loss of lower tax rates. However, with tax base equalizing,
there is a countervailing effect correcting the external effects of tax competition.
Additional tax revenue attracted by low tax rates proportionally reduces the en-
titlement for equalizing grants. Consequently, fiscal externalities are internalized
by tax base equalizing.
Proposition 11 The federal government can fully equalize fiscal disparities and
equally provide first best optimal tax incentives.
Proof: In agreement with Bucovetsky and Smart (2002), the marginal effect of
a tax policy change on the equalizing grant internalizes fiscal externalities. The
marginal equalizing grant outweighs the following marginal capital outflow:
∂푠푖
∂푡푖
=
∑
푗 푘푗
(
푘푖 +
∑
푗
∂푘푗
∂푡푖
푡푗
)
−∑푗 ∂푘푗∂푡푗 ∑푗 푡푗푘푗∑
푗 푘
2
푗
(푘¯ − 푘푖)− ∂푘푖
∂푡푖
푡¯ (6.10)
By equation (6.6), local governments dispose of the same budget and provide an
identical amount of public goods, i.e. 푉푧(푡퐿푘퐿 + 푠퐿) = 푉푧(푡퐻푘퐻 + 푠퐻) holds.
Furthermore, local governments raise uniform taxes as the elasticity of the factor
demand with respect to prices is identical in each region. Hence, equation (8)
may be simplified to
∂푠푖
∂푡푖
=
∂푟
∂푡푖
(
푘¯ − 푘푖
)− ∂푘푖
∂푡푖
푡¯.
q.e.d.
In a full information case, the central government can fully equalize tax
base differences and equally corrects for external effect of tax competition. By
increasing the tax rate, a part of the mobile tax base flows out of the regions.
However, it equally induces an increase of equalizing grants. This countervailing
effect reduces fiscal externalities. Hence, the first best optimal tax policy can
be restored by equalizing grants. As a second effect, independent of the direct
tax base effect, tax base equalizing internalizes pecuniary externalities. Capital
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exporting regions prefer lower tax rates more than their capital neighbors do.
The increase of interest rates caused by a tax cut would be beneficial for tax
exporting regions. This effect will also be internalized, as the average tax rate
푡¯ adjusted in the appropriate way. In summary, the tax back effect depicted by
equation (8) fully corrects fiscal externalities and public goods are supplied with
respect to the Samuelson condition.
푉푖(푧푖) = 푀푅푆(푥푖) = 1
6.4 Tax Base Equalizing with Adverse Selection
In this section we turn to a federal state with an asymmetric information struc-
ture. In particular, we assume that the central government cannot observe local
tax bases. The central government can neither estimate the capital employment
of firms via the technology parameter 푎푖 nor evaluate effort exerted by local tax
authorities to enforce taxes.2 All in all, the central government only has knowl-
edge about the tax revenue and can form beliefs with respect to the technology
types as the distribution over 푎푖 is public information. As local governments can
peruse a low enforcement policy, the tax revenue does not necessarily reflect the
true fiscal power of the region.
The timing of the game is now as follows: At stage 0, local governments
privately learn their information types 푎푖. From an outside view types are drawn
by nature from the commonly known distribution of types. In analogy to section
6.3 the central government offers a transfer scheme at stage 1. Different from
the game in section 6.3, the central government is now ignorant of local types 푎푖.
At stage 2, local governments choose their tax enforcement policy. However, in
the incomplete information environment, they have incentives to mispresent the
2The central government cannot estimate the capital tax base by using data of local wage
income as it would be possible in this simple model. In a more complex economy with different
wage rates and several influencing factors on the wage rate this is not possible any more.
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size of the tax base in order to substitute tax revenue for higher grants-in-aid.
As fiscal disparities are fully equalized local governments can only affect
private good consumption by manipulating enforcement activities. Indeed, in the
set up of our model a higher effective tax burden goes along with lower private
good consumption in the respective region. Therefore we can derive that high-
type regions have an incentive to reduce effective tax rates by mispresenting the
true size of the tax base. On the contrary, low type regions have no incentives
to increase the local tax burden by mimicking high type regions. Therefore
low type regions have no latitude of discretion to exploit the common pool by
mispresenting privately known local data.
Local governments with a high type may cut effective tax rates e.g. by
lowering enforcement activities until they dispose of the same tax revenue as less
efficient neighbors. We define the tax revenue of efficient local governments that
mimic a low type as 푘˜푖퐻 푡˜푖퐻 , with
푎퐻푓
−1
푘
(
푟 + 푡˜퐻
)
푡˜퐻 = 푎퐿푓
−1
푘 (푟 + 푡퐿) 푡퐿 ⇐⇒ 푡˜퐻 푘˜퐻 = 푘퐿푡퐿. (6.11)
If the central government intends to provide optimal incentives for tax en-
forcement on the local level, it must take into account the informational con-
straints. We design an incentive-compatible transfer scheme so that local gov-
ernments refrain from substituting tax revenue for higher grants-in-aid.
Γˆ = ⟨푁, (푡푖(푎푖, 푎−푖))푖휖푁 , (푠푖(푎푖, 푎−푖))푖휖푁 ,×푛푖=1{푎퐿, 푎퐻}⟩.
In particular, it should not be profitable by high-type regions to choose an un-
truthful enforcement policy, so that the following incentive-compatibility con-
straint must be fulfilled:
푉푖 (푡퐻푘퐻 + 푠퐻) + 푥퐻 ≥ 푉푖 (푡퐿푘퐿 + 푠퐿) + 푥˜퐻 . (6.12)
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Adding up equation (6.12) and the insurance constraint (6.6) it becomes
obvious that the the incentive-compatibility constraint holds if the the private
good consumption for high types cannot be increased by an untruthful policy, i.e.
the value must of 푥˜퐻 must exceed the value of 푥퐻 . Thus, the central government
pays additional grants to high-type regions supporting their private sector and
increasing private good consumption:
푙푖(푡푖) = 푛푝 (푥˜퐻(푡푖)− 푥퐻(푡푖)) .
The information rent 푙푖 mitigates the scope for federal redistribution so that the
budget of local governments after tax base equalizing is lower than in the full
information case derived in section 3:
푧¯ = 푝푡퐻푘퐻 + (1− 푝)푡퐿푘퐿 − 푝[푥˜퐻 − 푥퐻 ] (6.13)
The optimal transfer system should provide optimal tax incentives as well
as minimize informational costs 푙푖. The welfare-maximizing equalizing grant is
defined by:
(푡ˆ1, ..., 푡ˆ푛) = arg max
푛∑
푖=1
푉푖(푧¯) + 푥푖, with (6.14)
푧¯ =
1
푛
(
푛∑
푖=1
푡푖푘푖 − 푙푖(푡푖)
)
The first order conditions are:
푘푖 −
푛∑
푖=1
∂푟
∂푡푖
(푘¯ − 푘푖) = 푉푧(푧¯)
⎧⎨⎩푘푖 +
푛∑
푖=푗
푡ˆ푖
∂푘푗
∂푡푖
− ∂푙푖(⋅)
∂푡푖
⎫⎬⎭ ∀푖. (6.15)
In the full information case no information rents are payed so that a uniform
tax rate is raised in high and low type regions as it is depicted in equation (6.8).
However in federations with asymmetric information the federal government may
distort incentives for enforcement policy away from the first best if a change of
the effective tax burden may have an impact on informational rents. In the
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following we depict the marginal effect of an increase of the effective tax burden
on the information rent 푙푖 for high type and low type regions respectively:
∂푙푖
∂푡퐻
=
{
푘퐻 +
∂푟
∂푡퐻
(푘¯ − 푘퐻)
}
(6.16)
∂푙푖
∂푡퐿
=
푑푡˜퐻
푑푡퐿
{
푘퐿 +
∂푟
∂푡퐿
(푘¯ − 푘퐿)
}
, (6.17)
The central government must concede an information rent to high type re-
gions which must be at least as high as the surplus of private income 푥˜퐻 − 푥퐻
in the case of enforcement dumping. Indeed, informational costs can be reduced
if the difference between 푥˜퐻 and 푥퐻 is relatively small.
Providing more high-powered incentives for local enforcement activities in
high type regions leads to an increase of private good consumption in regions
which enact a truthful policy 푥퐻 and hence reduce informational cost. Further we
can derive an indirect impact of low types’ enforcement policies on the incentive
scheme of high types: if low type regions dispose of a relatively high tax revenue,
high type regions’ latitude to engage in enforcement dumping is reduced. By
equation (6.11) hight type regions can cut effective tax rates until condition
푡퐿푘퐿 = 푡˜퐻 푘˜퐻 holds, so that 푡˜퐻 will increase if 푡퐿 is augmented.
Thereby, one has to take into account two effects: Primarily, there is a real
trade-off between equity and efficiency, so that the federal government can reduce
informational costs by distorting incentives for enforcement activities so that
tax rates differ across high type and low type regions. As a consequences of
tax differences the central government must take into account the pecuniary
externalities, which we have already derived in the third chapter.
Overall, the federal government gives incentives for a local tax policy, where
at the margin the welfare gain of increased rent extraction and the welfare loss
of an incomplete internalization of fiscal externalities are balanced. Concavity of
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the welfare function ensures that it is always profitable to distort tax incentives
in two ways because it results in a more efficient mix of private and public goods.
Proposition 12 In a second best tax policy setting optimal grants provide ineffi-
ciently high tax incentives in high type regions and in efficiently low tax incentives
in low type regions.
Let us consider a transfer scheme depending on the local tax revenue. In line with
the full information policy the central government offers a tax base equalizing
program that equalizes the gap between below average and above average:
푆푖(푡푖) = 푚푖 + 푙푖 + 푏푖(푇¯ − 푇푖),
where 푙푖 are lump-sum grants offered to local governments in the form of a
subvention for the private sector in the region i. A second lump-sum payment
푚푖 = 1− 푏푖
(
푇¯ − 푇ˆ푖
)
,
is necessary to meet the full insurance constraint, where 푇ˆ푖 is the second best op-
timal tax revenue. The degree of revenue sharing 푏푖 is derived by decomposition
of equations (6.15) to (6.17).
Therefore, the weight 푏푖 is lower than one for high types and higher than
one for low types so that tax bases differences are either partially equalized or
over-compensated, respectively. The central government can extract a part of
informational rents by offering a system of grants that under-compensate tax
base differences for high types and under-compensate differences for low types.
Partly equalized tax base differences in high type regions go along with a small
tax back effect. Accordingly, the tax burden for the private sector is lower than
in the first best case because of the incomplete internalization of externalities.
Over-compensating tax differences in the low type regions provides high tax
incentives.
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Proposition 13 In the second best policy, the central government offers a sys-
tem of grants that entails a low tax back effect for high types by partially equal-
izing. In contrast, grants for low types over-compensate tax base disparities and
therefore go along with an important tax back effect.
6.5 Incentive Effects of Tax Base Equalizing
In many federal states the central government pays grants to reduce fiscal dis-
parities among local jurisdictions in a federal state. We have shown in agreement
with Bucovetky and Smart (2006) that tax base equalizing grants entail a tax
raising effect on the local level. In the full information case a tax back effect
of tax base equalizing internalizes fiscal externalities and ensures efficient tax
incentives on the local level.
In section 6.4, we have turned to a contact-specific environment with asym-
metric information. Local governments’ enforcement activities are unobservable
by the central government. Moreover, the central government can hardly ascer-
tain if local governments dispose of a high or low capital tax base. Therefore,
local governments may have incentives to choose an excessively lax enforcement
policy in order to lower the tax burden for local firms. A decline of tax rev-
enue can be substituted by higher equalizing grants. Consequently, tax base
equalizing with asymmetric information can be a source of inefficiencies itself.
In order to tackle the adverse selection problem, the central government can
offer truthful transfer mechanisms that provide optimal incentives for local tax
policy as well as enforcement policy. Moreover, the differences between local
tax bases are balanced by tax base equalizing. In order to achieve incentive-
compatibility, the central government must offer a positive information rent to
local governments which mitigates the scope for federal redistribution.
We have shown that the central government can reduce informational cost by
offering a transfer scheme with a two way distortion differing from the solutions
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presented in the foregoing chapters. The reason for the incongruity of this result
with the optimal transfer scheme derived in chapter 3 lies in the specific assump-
tions with respect to the insurance constraint. In this chapter we have assumed
that public good supply is fully equalized so that local governments try to ma-
nipulate enforcement activities in order to augment private good consumption.
Besides, we have shown in the analysis that it emerges to be welfare enhancing
to distort as well high types away from the first best. In contrary in chapter
3 and 4 we have consider a setting where the central government compensates
differences in local welfare. We have demonstrated that in this context no infor-
mational rent can be extracted if the central government implements higher tax
rate in 휃퐻 -type regions.
Chapter 7
Internalizing Interregional
Spillovers1
7.1 Schemes to Combat Transboundary Spill Overs
Together with tax competition interjurisdictional externalities of spillovers of lo-
cal governments’ provision of public goods are probably the main concerns raised
by interregional competition. As a stylized feature in many federal settings the
policy enacted by a particular local government is not completely localized. How-
ever, if constituents of other jurisdictions cannot be excluded from local public
good supply provided in a particular region a spillover problem arises. In con-
trast to the tax competition game explored in chapter 3 and 4 we here consider
a setting where the marginal cost of public funding are correctly internalized but
the local marginal benefits of public good provision do not reflect overall welfare
considerations.
Likewise the theory of fiscal federalism has well understood, that local pub-
lic goods may be supplied inefficiently if local government act in the interest of
their constituents not taking into account positive interregional externalities; see
Oates (1972). Wellisch (2000) has pointed out that matching grants from the
central government can be used to correct misguided local governments’ incen-
tives. Nevertheless in the latter four chapters we have demonstrated that an
1This chapter has been taken from Altemeyer-Bartscher, Ru¨bbelke and Sheshinski (2009).
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appropriate system of matching grants ask for full information and considerably
strong commitment devices in the hands of the central authority.
In this chapter we are going to consider a federal system in the absence of a
central authority that may enforce environmental regulations on the local level.
In this case voluntary interregional agreements are considered to be most capa-
ble of generating a more efficient provision of local public goods and services.
Deviant from the foregoing chapters we now consider a setting with full infor-
mation. A good example of use for this specific setting characterized by interre-
gional spillovers and a lack of a strong central authority may be trans-boundary
environmental damages on an international scale. In particular the threats of
the climate change have become a main issue on the political agenda of many
countries. As a matter of course any policy which mitigates global warming can
be interpreted as a global public good characterized by non-rivalness and non-
excludability.
One of the most prominent examples of international environmental agree-
ments is the Kyoto Protocol which contains rules for climate protection by using
a quantity based approach. In recent political discussions this approach gives
reasons for fierce disputes about the best way to combat global warming. This
holds even more since the Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012 and a new international
regulation - a post-Kyoto mechanism - has to be found.
Nordhaus (2006) proposed an price-based international incentive scheme to
internalize transboundary environmental external effects. This may serve as a
proper successor of the quantity approach of the Kyoto type. Nordhaus (2006,
p. 32) has pointed out: ”This is essentially a dynamic Pigovian pollution tax for
a global public good”. Due to the reduction of greenhouse gases an international
externality correcting tax scheme, which does not impose any restrictions on
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international emission is considered to have several significant advantages over
the Kyoto mechanism. Nordhaus highlights that this scheme could also contain
side-payments in order to motivate countries to participate.2 In this spirit we
are going to investigate a price-influencing scheme and show how local govern-
ments or countries could negotiate the design of an international Pigouvian tax
scheme in a decentralized way. Evidently, decentralized bargaining is necessary
in regime in which no taxing power is assigned to a central global authority.
In particular we suggest schemes that allow for reciprocal interregional side-
payments contingent on the level of the environmental tax rates implemented
in the transfer-receiving opponent country. For simplicity we focus on a world
consisting of two regions which enter into mutual negotiations. We investigate
whether our scheme could Pareto-improve the outcome in global environmental
protection or even generate a Pareto-efficient result.
In line with Ru¨bbelke and Sheshinski (2005) we analyze the effects of taxes
and transfers on the level of externalities. However, our analysis differs signif-
icantly from their investigation, since ours deals with reciprocal global exter-
nalities while their analysis considers asymmetric unilateral international exter-
nalities with limited geographical impact. The asymmetry they consider is an
element which is in some sense equivalent to the desire to redistribute in Sheshin-
ski (2004). In Sheshinski’s analysis the tax on the externality-generating good
contains a uniform component (efficiency factor) and a component that varies
across households and reflects an income redistribution objective (redistributive
factor). In contrast to Sheshinski (2004), the asymmetry in the model suggested
by Ru¨bbelke and Sheshinski (2005) just results from an asymmetric distribution
of pollution. In analyzing the asymmetric international regional problem they
2”Additionally, poor countries might receive transfers to encourage early participation”,
Nordhaus (2006, p. 32).
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combine the ideas of Coase (1960) and Pigou (1932) of solving externality prob-
lems. In our investigation of global environmental problems we revive this idea
of combining the ideas of Coase (1960) and Pigou (1932).
An important advantage of the mechanism is that there is no need for a cen-
tral authority to regulate environmental policy. In practice there is in general a
low willingness of regional governments to give away power to a central author-
ity; see Falkinger, Hackl and Pruckner (1996). Furthermore, a simple scheme
of mutual side-payments is easy enough to be understood by local authorities.
In particular, it emerges to be difficult in real word applications to determine
a baseline against which countries set their environmental policy. Nordhaus
(2006) points out that especially quantity limits are troublesome because of dif-
ferent economic growth and heterogeneous technological circumstances across
regions. However, in this chapter the baseline of environmental policy is sim-
ply the individual rational environmental tax raised by regional decision makers.
Local governments’ eco-tax policy is evaluated relative to its baseline, so that
the opponent does only pay transfers for the internalization of transboundary
externalities.
In particular in our analysis we formulate an incentive-compatibility con-
straint which must been met in order to assure that local governments commit
themselves to cooperate with neighboring regions. Thereby we propose a mech-
anism which in line with Guttman (1978, 1987), Danziger and Schnytzer (1991)
as well as Guttman and Schnytzer (1992) neither postulates any property right
on pollution nor requires any negations prior to the game played. Many solutions
to the free-rider problem call for coercion in order to internalize transboundary
external effects. Here, local governments are free to raise eco-taxes so that the
take-it-or-leave-it offer must meet the aforementioned individual rationality con-
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straint. As a distinctive feature of this chapter to the existing literature we con-
sider economies in which the efficient allocation of private goods is implemented
by an eco-tax. The eco-tax revenue is then used to finance the side-payments to
correct for transboundary externalities which stem from the neighboring country.
Hence, the suggested policy generates a double environmental dividend. Firstly,
the regional eco-tax internalizes transboundary external effects by correcting rel-
ative prices on a regional scale. Secondly the tax revenue of the eco-tax can be
used to finance side-payment to achieve stable interregional agreement in the
neighboring country. We show that local governments overcome the free-rider
problem by means of the tax-transfer scheme - a first-best optimum can be set
up.
With respect to the literature, several contributors have analyzed the inter-
nalization of reciprocal externalities by means of a transfer mechanism. Oates
(1972) as well as Wellisch (2000) examines the problem of reciprocal externali-
ties in the provision of local public goods arising in a federal state. He analyzes
the design of federal grants which achieve an efficient allocation in the federa-
tion. Buchholz and Konrad (1995) investigate the impact of strategic transfers
on the private provision of public goods. Yet, the transfers they regard are
of an unconditional type. Barrett (1995) suggests collecting funds from indus-
trialized countries in order to finance greenhouse gas abatement in developing
countries. Therefore, the funds are transferred in a conditional way. Barrett
(1995) recommends to collect these funds by means of a matching scheme - like
the one suggested by Guttman (1978, 1987), because this scheme reduces the
industrialized countries’ incentives to take a free ride. Gersbach and Winkler
(2007) propose a global refunding scheme to internalize international environ-
mental spillovers. Similar to our paper they design an international tax scheme
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that may at least partly self-finance side-payments to achieve stable agreements.
Different to our paper however they consider a short-cut abatement model in
accordance with Falk and Mendelsohn (1993) focusing on dynamic stability of
the scheme. Of course the results crucially depend on the information struc-
ture predominant in the game. In a setting with a global environmental facility
scheme John and Ru¨bbelke (2007) have pronounced, that local governments may
have incentives to mispresent their propensity to protect the global environment
in order to receive higher grants in aid. In this case we face a similar problem of
adverse selection as it is exposed in chapter 3 to 6.
Although the analysis of stable environmental coalitions is an important one,
our analysis does not consider coalition formation. Instead we regard countries
non-cooperatively choosing their environmental protection levels by comparing
their marginal effective cost and benefits of environmental protection.
In this chapter we proceed as follows: In Section 7.2 we suggest a tax-transfer
scheme to overcome inefficiencies and we present the features of our model. Sec-
tion 7.3 is dedicated to the special case of a one-sided spillover. In Section 7.4
we extend the analysis to the case of reciprocal externalities. Finally, Section 7.5
concludes.
7.2 The Basic Model
7.2.1 Transboundary Pollution Spillovers
In this chapter we consider a setting with two regions indexed by (푖 = 1, 2)
which both sustain losses from interregional environmental damages. Different
to the foregoing chapters there is no central government with the power to in-
tervene in the case of local policy shortfalls. In jurisdiction 푖 a representative
household consumes a private good which amounts to 푥푖. The production of 푥푖
accompanies environmental damages. Further, the household consumes a clean
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private good of the amount 푦푖 which is not associated with an externality. It is
assumed that households behave competitively, i.e., they ignore their own effect
on total pollution. Furthermore, they take the other agents’ pollution levels as
given. The total environmental externalities perceived in jurisdiction 푖 amount to
휙 = (푋1, 푋2), where 푋1 represents the total amount of the pollution-generating
private good consumption in jurisdiction 1 and 푋2 is the respective consumption
in jurisdiction 2. An eco-tax in the shape of an excise tax is levied which burdens
the consumption of the polluting commodity.3
7.2.2 The Individual Household’s Maximization Problem
The maximization problem of a representative household in jurisdiction i can be
expressed as follows:
max
푥푖,푦푖
푢푖(푥푖, 푦푖, 휙) (7.1)
푠.푡. (푝+ 푡푖)푥푖 + 푦푖 = 푚푖 + 휏푖 − 휎푖,
where 푚1 denotes the level of the representative household’s income, 푡푖 denotes
the excise tax rate, 휏푖 = 푡푖푥푖 stands for the tax funds raised from the represen-
tative household and 휎푖 is the amount of tax funds 푖 redistributed to others,
such that 휏푖 − 휎푖 is the amount of tax funds which the representative household
gets back from its government. It is assumed that the households are naive, i.e.,
they do not consider the effects of their behavior on 휏푖 and 휎푖. This is plausible
because the impact of a single household on the rest of the world is negligible.
We obtain the following first-order conditions:
∂푢푖
∂푥푖
(푥푖, 푦푖, 휙)− 휆(푝+ 푡푖) = 0, (7.2)
∂푢푖
∂푦푖
(푥푖, 푦푖, 휙)− 휆 = 0, (7.3)
3”In the case of reciprocal consumption externalities, the common interpretation of the
Pigouvian principle calls for taxes on the externality-creating commodities” (Green and Sheshin-
ski (1976: 798)).
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푝푥푖 + 푦푖 −푚푖 + 휎푖 = 0. (7.4)
7.2.3 Take-it-or-leave-it Offer
Regional welfare maximizing decision makers in jurisdiction i do not take into
account negative external effects they exert on neighbouring jurisdiction j (푗 =
1, 2 and 푗 ∕= 푖) and hence raise inefficiently low eco-taxes on the consumption
of the dirty good 푥1. One method of coordinating environmental policy among
regions to overcome inefficiently high transnational externality production is the
implementation of a system of international side-payments. We assume that each
jurisdiction can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Jurisdiction 푖, for example, could
offer (푆푗 , 푡푗) , i.e. jurisdiction 푖 offers a transfer payment 푆푗 which is channeled
to jurisdiction j in order to induce this jurisdiction to raise its eco-tax rate 푡푗 to
a certain level desired by i. Jurisdiction j can either accept or reject the offer.
We assume that both countries can make binding commitments with respect to
their transfer payment and eco-tax levels. Local governments simultaneously
offer take-it-or-leave-it contracts. In doing so, each jurisdiction anticipates the
subject matter (푆푘, 푡푘) , with 푘 = 푖, 푗, of the contract offered by the opponent.
7.2.4 The First-best Policy
As a reference we examine the maximization problem of a social planner who
maximizes global welfare, i.e. the sum of both countries’ welfare. We suppose
that a jurisdiction’s welfare level is equal to the sum of the welfare levels enjoyed
by the individual households located in the respective jurisdiction:
max
푋1,푋2
푊 = 푈1(푋1, 휙) + 푈2(푋2, 휙)
푠.푡. 푝(푋1 +푋2) + 푌1 + 푌2 = 푀,
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where 푀 = 푀1 + 푀2 denotes the sum of national income 푀1 in jurisdiction 1
and of national income 푀2 in jurisdiction 2. The first order conditions writes:
∂푈1
∂푋1
+
∂푈1
∂휙
∂휙
∂푋1
+
∂푈2
∂휙
∂휙
∂푋1
= 푝휆, (7.5)
∂푈2
∂푋2
+
∂푈2
∂휙
∂휙
∂푋2
+
∂푈1
∂휙
∂휙
∂푋2
= 푝휆, (7.6)
where the third terms on the LHS of (7.5) and (7.6) respectively denote the
marginal external effects of pollution. From equations (7.5) and (7.6) as well as
equation (7.7) we obtain the Pareto-efficient tax rates:
푡푓푏1 =
∂푈1
∂푋1
휆
− 푝 = −
∂푈1
∂휙
∂휙
∂푋1
+ ∂푈2∂휙
∂휙
∂푋1
휆
, (7.7)
푡푓푏2 =
∂푈2
∂푋2
휆
− 푝 = −
∂푈2
∂휙
∂휙
∂푋2
+ ∂푈1∂휙
∂휙
∂푋2
휆
. (7.8)
The first-best optimal eco-tax policy (푡푓푏1 , 푡
푓푏
2 ) fully internalizes pollution ex-
ternalities.
7.3 Unilateral Externalities
In this section we consider the special case of a one-sided pollution spillover-effect
from jurisdiction 2 to jurisdiction 1. We assume that pollution is produced in
both countries but it only affects welfare in jurisdiction 1, i.e. for 휙(푋1, 푋2) > 0
with 푋1, 푋2 > 0 it follows
∂푈1
∂휙 < 0 and
∂푈2
∂휙 = 0 . One can think of the
case that jurisdiction 2 can easily adapt to the adverse effects of the global
warming problem, while it will cause an important loss in jurisdiction 1. Schelling
(1992: 4-7), for example, pointed out that climate change would entail higher
costs in countries with an important agriculture sector, while industrial states
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are less vulnerable to global warming.4 Thus, jurisdiction 2, which does not
internalize consumption externalities in jurisdiction 1, has no incentives to raise
a positive eco-tax on the consumption of good 푋2. However, jurisdiction 1 raises
taxes which fully internalize the adverse effects of consumption as there are no
transboundary spillover-effects.
7.3.1 The Relationship between Taxes and Transfers
The government of jurisdiction 1 intends to induce jurisdiction 2 to raise an
eco-tax. Therefore it offers a take-it-or-leave-it offer which fulfills the following
individual-rational condition:
푈2(푋2(푡2, 푆2), 푌2(푡2, 푆2)) = 푈2(푋2(0, 0), 푌2((0, 0))), (7.9)
Jurisdiction 2 will accept jurisdiction 1’s offer if the its utility level before
the tax (LHS) has to be at least as high as its welfare after implementation
of the eco-tax (RHS). The utility level U of a jurisdiction is assumed to be
simply equal to the sum of the utility levels of its households and is described
by indirect utility functions as employed in (7.1). After taking into account the
first-order conditions of the households’ decision problem (7.2) and (7.3) and the
differentiation of the sum of all households’ budget constraints in jurisdiction 2,
which is
푝
(
∂푋2
∂푡2
+
∂푋2
∂퐼2
푑푆2
푑푡2
)
+
∂푌2
∂푡2
+
∂푌2
∂퐼2
푑푆2
푑푡2
=
푑푆2
푑푡2
, (7.10)
4Yet, mainly in developing countries the agricultural sector constitutes a main part of the
economy and these countries are unlikely to pay positive net transfers to the developing world.
”Poorer countries are probably more vulnerable to climate change than wealthier countries”
(Schelling (1995: 401)). And as the IPCC (1998: 8) stresses: ”Africa is the continent most
vulnerable to the impacts of projected changes because widespread poverty limits adaptation
capabilities.”
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we obtain after some mathematical manipulations:
푑푆2
푑푡2
= −
(
푡2
1 + 푡2
∂푋2
∂퐼2
)
∂푋2
∂푡2
> 0. (7.11)
Thereby 퐼2 represents the jurisdiction’s national income. By the individ-
ual rationality constraint (7.9) jurisdiction 1 must compensate jurisdiction 2 for
the loss of regional welfare induced by the eco-tax . Consequently the transfer
from jurisdiction 1 to jurisdiction 2 has to be the higher, the higher the tax in
jurisdiction 2 desired by jurisdiction 1.
7.3.2 Jurisdictions’ Choices
The government of jurisdiction 1 intends to maximize regional welfare. It raises
an eco-tax rate on home consumption and induces the implementation of an eco-
tax in the neighbouring jurisdiction 2 by take-it-or-leave-it contract as well. The
government of the transfer paying jurisdiction 1 maximizes the following indirect
utility function:
max
푡1,푡2
푈1(푋1(푡1, 푆2, 푋2), 푌1(푡1, 푆2, 푋2), 휙(푋1, 푋2)), (7.12)
where 휙 = 휙(푋1, 푋2) represents the total amount of environmental externalities
perceived in jurisdiction 1. Welfare maximization yields the tax rate t1 chosen
by the transfer-paying jurisdiction’s government:
푡1 = −
∂푈1
∂휙
∂휙
∂푋1
휆
> 0 (7.13)
The calculation of jurisdiction 1’s optimal choice of the tax rate t2 in jurisdiction
2 which it influences via its transfer payments yields:
푡2 =
⎛⎜⎝ 1 + 푡2 ∂푋2∂퐼2
1−
∂푈1
∂휙
∂휙
푋2
휆
∂푋2
∂퐼2
⎞⎟⎠(− ∂푈1∂휙 ∂휙∂푋2
휆
)
= −
∂푈1
∂휙
∂휙
∂푋2
휆
. (7.14)
By comparing equations (7.13) and (7.14) with the first-best optimal reference
solution derived in section 2 it becomes obvious that the choices of jurisdiction
1 and therefore the tax-transfer scheme yields a Pareto-efficient outcome.
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7.4 Reciprocal Externalities
Let us turn to the generalized set-up of our model with reciprocal spillover effects.
Here, each jurisdiction’s welfare is affected by pollution 휙 which again depends on
the consumption level in both countries. Unlike the unilateral problem in Section
3, both countries will have incentives to offer a contract to their neighbour in
order to influence the eco-tax policy of the opponent.
7.4.1 Relationship between Taxes and Transfers
Jurisdiction 1 makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to jurisdiction 2. In turn, it also
receives an offer by its opponent. In order to fulfill the individual rationality
condition no jurisdiction should be better off by unilaterally rejecting the offer
of its opponent. We claim that jurisdiction 2 will only accept to implement a tax
when its utility after the tax (LHS) remains at least equal to the state before
the implementation of a tax (RHS):
푈2(푋2(푡
∗
2, 푆1, 푆2, 푋1)푌2(푡
∗
2, 푆1, 푆2, 푋1)휙(푋1, 푋2(푡
∗
2, 푆1, 푆2, 푋1))) =
푈2(푋2(푡
∗
2, 푆1, 0, 푋1)푌2(푡
∗
2, 푆1, 0, 푋1)휙(푋1, 푋2(푡
∗
2, 푆1, 0, 푋1)))
(7.15)
where 푆2 represents the sum of transfers received from jurisdiction 1. 푋2
is the equilibrium amount of the polluting good consumed in jurisdiction 2 and
푌2 is the respective amount of the second private good. The LHS denotes the
welfare of jurisdiction 2 if it accepts jurisdiction 1’s offer (푆2, 푡
∗
2). In case of a
rejection of the offer it raises an individual rational tax 푡2. Total differentiation
yields (
∂푈2
∂푋2
+
∂푈2
∂휙
∂휙
∂푋2
+
∂푈2
∂푋1
∂휙
∂푋1
∂푋1
∂푋2
)(
∂푋2
∂푡∗2
+
∂푋2
∂퐼2
푑푆2
푑푡∗2
)
+
∂푈2
∂푌2
(
∂푌2
∂푡∗2
+
∂푌2
∂퐼2
푑푆2
푑푡∗2
)
= 0,
(7.16)
where 퐼2 is the net income in jurisdiction 2. When we take account of condi-
tions (7.2) and (7.3) and the differentiation of the sum of all households’ budget
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constraints we can also write:
(
푡2 +
∂푈2
∂휙
∂휙
∂푋2
휆
+
∂푈2
∂휙
∂휙
∂푋1
휆
∂푋1
∂푋2
)(
∂푋2
∂푡2
+
∂푋2
∂퐼2
푑푆2
푑푡2
)
+
∂푆2
∂푡2
= 0.
Rearranging yields:
∂푆2
∂푡2
= −
(
푡2 +
∂푈2
∂휙
∂휙
푋2
휆 +
∂푈2
∂휙
∂휙
푋1
휆
∂푋1
∂푋2
)
∂푋2
∂푡2
1 +
(
푡2 +
∂푈2
∂휙
∂휙
푋2
휆 +
∂푈2
∂휙
∂휙
푋1
휆
∂푋1
∂푋2
)
∂푋2
∂퐼2
. (7.17)
The amount of money which jurisdiction 1 must at least pay to jurisdiction
2 is uniquely determined by the choice of the tax rate 푡2. In particular, 푆2 is an
increasing function of 푡2 for all 푡2 < 푡
∗
2. Reciprocally, we can derive the marginal
impact of 푡1 on 푆1.
7.4.2 Transfer-paying Jurisdiction 1’s Maximization Problem
Jurisdictions 1 and 2, both intend to maximize national welfare. Counties 1
and 2 make a take-it-or-leave-it offer (푆2, 푡2) and (푆1, 푡1), respectively. In the
simultaneous move game jurisdiction 1 can correctly anticipate (푆1, 푡1) offered
by jurisdiction 2 and vice versa. In the equilibrium both countries will accept
the offers of their opponents respectively and we can restrict our analysis to the
following maximization problem:
max
푡2
푈1(푋1(푡1, 푆1, 푆2, 푋2), 푌1(푡1, 푆1, 푆2, 푋2), 휙(푋1, 푋2)). (7.18)
Maximization yields
∂푈1
∂푋1
(
∂푋1
∂퐼2
푑푆2
푑푡2
+
∂푋1
∂푋2
(
∂푋2
∂푡2
+
∂푋2
∂퐼2
푑푆2
푑푡2
))
+
∂푈1
∂푌1
(
∂푌1
∂퐼2
푑푆2
푑푡2
+
∂푌1
∂푋2
(
∂푋2
∂푡2
+
∂푋2
∂퐼2
푑푆2
푑푡2
))
+
∂푈1
∂휙
∂휙
∂푋1
(
∂푋1
∂퐼2
푑푆2
푑푡2
+
∂푋1
∂푋2
(
∂푋2
∂푡2
+
∂푋2
∂퐼2
푑푆2
푑푡2
))
+
∂푈1
∂휙
∂휙
∂푋1
(
∂푋2
∂푡2
+
∂푋2
∂퐼2
푑푆2
푑푡2
)
= 0.
(7.19)
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In order to derive jurisdiction 1’s optimal choice of 푡2, we insert (7.7) and (7.8)
aggregated over all households in jurisdiction 1 and the derivative of the budget
constraint for 푡2, which is 푝
∂푋1
∂푡2
+ ∂푌1∂푡2 = −∂푆2∂푡2 into (7.19). Then we obtain(
푡1
∂푋1
∂푋2
+
∂푈1
∂휙
∂휙
∂푋1
휆
∂푋1
∂푡1
+
∂푈1
∂휙
∂휙
∂푋1
휆
)(
∂푋2
∂푡2
+
∂푋2
퐼2
푑푆2
푑푡2
)
=
∂푆2
∂푡2
. (7.20)
Jurisdiction 2 in turn counterbids a contract to 1 so that we can write the
following system of equations:
∂푆2
∂푡2
[
1−
(
푡1
∂푋1
∂푋2
+
∂푈1
∂휙
∂휙
∂푋1
휆
∂푋1
∂푋2
+
∂푈1
∂휙
∂휙
∂푋2
휆
)
∂푋2
∂퐼2
]
=(
푡1
∂푋1
∂푋2
+
∂푈1
∂휙
∂휙
∂푋1
휆
∂푋1
∂푋2
+
∂푈1
∂휙
∂휙
∂푋2
휆
)
∂푋2
∂푡2
(7.21)
∂푆1
∂푡1
[
1−
(
푡2
∂푋2
∂푋1
+
∂푈2
∂휙
∂휙
∂푋2
휆
∂푋2
∂푋1
+
∂푈2
∂휙
∂휙
∂푋1
휆
)
∂푋1
∂퐼1
]
=(
푡2
∂푋2
∂푋1
+
∂푈2
∂휙
∂휙
∂푋2
휆
∂푋2
∂푋1
+
∂푈2
∂휙
∂휙
∂푋1
휆
)
∂푋1
∂푡1
(7.22)
Inserting equation (7.16) the equivalent marginal effect for jurisdiction 1 into
the system of equations (7.21) and (7.22) shows that the two countries with
reciprocal spillover-effects can coordinate to play a first-best optimal eco-tax
policy by a system of take-it-or-leave-it offers:
푡∗1 =
∂푈1
∂휙
∂휙
∂푋1
+ ∂푈2∂휙
∂휙
∂푋1
휆
푡∗2 =
∂푈2
∂휙
∂휙
∂푋2
+ ∂푈1∂휙
∂휙
∂푋2
휆
7.5 Price Mechanisms Versus the Kyoto Protocol
Contemporarily, in the climate protection debate several different schemes are
suggested to become successors of the current Kyoto scheme. Many proposals
are based on a quantity approach, i.e. the targets of these schemes are certain
levels for greenhouse gas abatement. In contrast, price approaches intend to
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raise the effective price of pollution, e.g. by levying carbon taxes world-wide. In
this chapter we focus on the analysis of the latter.
We examine a take-it-or-leave-it mechanism to combat global environmental
externalities. Countries offer a contract to neighboring countries to influence
these countries’ eco-tax policies. The contract includes the pledge to pay an
income transfer to the neighboring countries provided that these countries raise
their eco-tax levels up to a level desired by the transfer-offering countries.
Welfare losses which may go along with an increase of eco-tax rates are com-
pensated by the side-payments offered in the contracts. As a distinctive feature
of this study to the existing literature we propose a mechanism in which side-
payments are financed by the revenue raised by means of the eco-taxes. There-
fore there exists a double environmental dividend of these eco-taxes. On the one
hand global externalities are corrected by means of the Pigouvian tax within the
tax-raising jurisdiction and on the other hand the respective tax revenue can
be used for side-payments inducing other countries to further mitigate global
environmental pollution.
We show that in a simultaneous move game with two countries both players
will offer a take-it-or-leave-it contract that entails a side-payment which meets
the individual rationality constraint of the opponent player in combination with
the first-best optimal tax policy. The scheme does not require the coercive power
of a central global authority but carbon taxes are implemented voluntarily by
the individual countries.
From the perspective of implementation theory which has been mainly taken
up in the study the take-it-or-leave-it contract can be understood as a simple
method to illustrate the basic characteristics of an incentive-compatible transfer
scheme which combats the spillover problem. Principally, we explore mechanisms
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which are valid for a wide class of games of decentralized public good provision.
Hence, apart from climate protection it may applicable for many different federal
problems with interregional spillover effects.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
The basic objective of this study was to analyze the optimal design of interre-
gional transfer schemes in federal systems, which are characterized by informa-
tional asymmetries, heterogenous technological shocks across regions, strategic
competition for mobile resources and fiscal commons, modernization of public
facilities, as well as interregional environmental spillover effects. Intrinsically,
within a theoretical framework we model multistage Bayes-Nash games between
a central government which offers a federal transfer programm and heterogenous
local jurisdictions.
We demonstrated that local governments embedded in a federal setting do
not act in isolation but interact with neighboring regions: typically local gov-
ernments in federal states compete with one another for mobile resources and
for grants from the common pool of federal funds. Thus, they are linked trough
their treasuries and resource allocation, so that a policy change may have a con-
siderable impact on neighboring jurisdictions. Moreover we pointed out that
the central government who cannot observe local information types may nev-
ertheless update its Bayesian beliefs if it anticipates interregional competition.
Consequently, local policy becomes more accountable for the central government
so that informational constraints can be relaxed.
For a more profound analysis of the underlying incentive problem we laid em-
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phasis on the fact that the competition with specific variables may be based on
different processes and mechanisms. For example tax competition cannot only
be based on mobility of individuals, goods, factors or firms. Instead it can also
be founded on local governments’ entitlement to benefit from grants if a change
of their tax policy makes local governments eligible for additional transfer. In-
deed in chapter 3 we showed that local government competing for mobile tax
bases have a smaller scope of discretion for common pool fishing. In chapter 6
we revisited this incentive problem analyzing the complexity of mobility based
competition and competition for transfer if the central government intends to
equalize tax base differences. In a full information setting, tax base equalizing
grants entail a tax back effect that internalizes fiscal externalities and hence
reconstitutes the Rotten Kid Theorem: the competition for addition transfers
countervails the race-to-the-bottom. Expectedly rotten kids become again lazy
if enforcement policies are unobserved by the central government. Here, we de-
signed truthful second best optimal transfer mechanisms equalizing that makes
use of the tax back effect by offering transfer with equalization rates different
contingent on local types.
In chapter 4 we analyze the ex-post redistribution problem based on the time-
inconsistency of transfer schemes. Indeed, the central government’ s incapacity
to offer a well-defined transfer scheme ex-ante is often rooted in an asymmetric
information structure predominant in the federal state. Here the main concern
was to analyze the consequences of the ex-post redistribution problem from an
information-based perspective. The local government’s perspective to enlarge
the latitude of discretion for local fiscal policy allowing them to draw higher
informational rents from the common pool may provide considerable incentives
for local precautionary investments. Although fully insured by a federal redis-
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tribution mechanism, local governments are at least partly residual claimant of
their own policy. This provides incentives for long-term projects reducing the
likelihood of negative future shocks.
In the chapter 5 we showed that local policy performance becomes mean-
ingfully comparable for the central government by implementing a yardstick
competition mechanism. We claim that transfer should depend at least partly
on the policy measures and types of neighboring regions. Then the federal gov-
ernment can exploit the fact that self-interested jurisdictions do not internalize
the informational externalities on neighboring jurisdictions when they pursue
local policy measures. Likewise, local governments do not take into account
that their policy measures serve as a signal for correlated types of neighboring
jurisdictions. Therefore, the central government can learn more about local cir-
cumstances without offering information rents. In the second step we showed
that the yardstick competition mechanism may provide positive incentives for
local precautionary incentives with implications for the finding of the fourth
chapter.
By suggesting a decentralized approach to raise environmental public good
provision levels in chapter 7 we take account of the lack of a coercive global au-
thority that is able to enforce efficient international environmental regulations.
In our model individual regions voluntarily commence international negotiations
on public good provision, which are accompanied by side-payments. These side-
payments are financed by means of regional externality-correcting taxes. Side-
payments and national tax rates are designed in a mutually dependent way. The
decentralized scheme we recommended for approaching Pareto efficient Nash
equilibria is based on the ideas of Coasean negotiations and Pigouvian taxes.
Hence the frame of the model-theoretic analysis in this study widely differs
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from the standard principle-agent theory, which mainly focuses on the relation-
ship between a principal who delegates services to an agent. Furthermore we
demonstrated that interregional redistribution is more complex than interper-
sonal redistribution: different to anonymous and independent households local
governments are linked by their budgets, tax bases, resource alloction, and trans-
boundary environmental effects.
In this study we briefly referred to some of the relevant empirical literature
especially where empirical work can provide some evidence for the incentive prob-
lems based on informational asymmetries. Further it is hoped that the study at
least impart some sense of the interplay of theory and applied policy. The aim
was to characterize federal transfer scheme with allocative and redistributive
objectives on theoretical grounds and to give instructions to reasonably contem-
plate reforms of federal transfer. Throughout the study we have already named
some policy implications. Federal transfer programs typically play an important
role in many federal states. In general a share of more than 5 per cent of the
GDP is distributed in many federal states; see Costello (1993) Even though we
can only derive small changes of transfer policies these may have an substantial
impact on the federal economy. In the following we carry together a list of results
which may apart from theorist be relevant for policy makers:
∙ Assignment of taxing powers:
If local governments have the power to tax some mobile factors this might
be welfare enhancing as we have learned. From the information-based
perspective the optimal fiscal constitution of the federal state may assign
the power to tax to local governments to advocate tax competition in an
appropriate way and hence approximate the second best optimal solution.
∙ Assignment of spending powers:
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It has becomes obvious that local governments which are highly dependent
on federal aid may have a rather limited scope of discretion to choose local
policy measures. Hence, despite of full insurance against negative shocks
local governments may have incentives to invest in precautions long-term
measures if good performance goes along with a better actionability of local
governments in some policy fields. Due to policy reforms it should be put
on record that an appropriate assignment of government functions to local
authorities may alleviate the ex-post redistribution problem. Accordingly,
we suggest a division of responsibilities which make local governments at
least partly residual claimant of their policy.
∙ Transfers which depend on the policy measures of neighboring regions
The central government should offer transfers which do not only depend
on performance of a particular region but also on parameters of neighbor-
ing regions. In particular, the central government can filter out common
technological shocks by an appropriate yardstick competition. Recently, in
many federal states a better comparability of local public policy measure is
coming up to discussion. For example the Gemeindepru¨fungsanstalt-GPA,
an agency for municipal audit of the Land North Rhine-Westphalia has in-
troduced an index to evaluate public service innovation. The best practice
program can be accompanied by a transfer scheme which makes correlated
municipal policy more accountable.
∙ Tax base equalizing
We have shown that the Rotten Kid Theorem can be recovered if local gov-
ernments internalize the impact of their policy actions on neighboring re-
gions. Recent literature has pointed out that Tax base equalizing programs
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emerge to be relatively simple schemes in full information setting. Accord-
ingly, this study conveyed that the second best optimal truthful transfer
scheme can implementable by uncomplex tax base equalizing scheme with
type-dependent equalization rates.
∙ Self-financing interregional environmental policy
We proposed a mechanism in which side-payments are financed by the
revenue raised by means of the eco-taxes. Thus, there exists a double envi-
ronmental dividend of these eco-taxes. On the one hand global externalities
are corrected by means of the Pigouvian tax within the tax-raising juris-
diction and on the other hand the respective tax revenue can be used for
side-payments inducing other countries to further mitigate global environ-
mental pollution.
Chapter 9
Appendix
9.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We prove for 푛 = 2 that the tax rate 푡푖 is an increasing function with respect
to the technology parameter 휃푖 and hence high-ability jurisdictions raise higher
taxes on capital. The first order conditions of the optimization problem can be
expressed by a system of 푛 equations:⎡⎢⎢⎣퐹 1(휃1, 휃2, 푡1, 푡2)
퐹 2(휃1, 휃2, 푡1, 푡2)
⎤⎥⎥⎦ = 0
We consider a change of value of the technology parameter 휃푖 by 푑휃푖:⎡⎢⎢⎣∂퐹
1
∂푡1
∂퐹 1
∂푡2
∂퐹 2
∂푡1
∂퐹 2
∂푡2
⎤⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎣ ∂푡1∂휃1
∂푡2
∂휃1
⎤⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡⎢⎢⎣−∂퐹
1
∂휃1
−∂퐹 2
∂휃1
⎤⎥⎥⎦ (9.1)
We can derive from the first order condition in equation (8) that the following
applies:
∂퐹 푖
∂푡푖
< 0 and
∂퐹 푖
∂푡푗
> 0 (9.2)
∂퐹 1
∂푡1
> −∂퐹
1
∂푡2
and
∂퐹 2
∂푡2
> −∂퐹
2
∂푡1
(9.3)
∂퐹 푖
∂휃푖
>
∂퐹 푖
∂휃푗
≥ 0 (9.4)
It is worth mentioning that the derivatives from (9.2) to (9.4) all have a proper
meaning: The first (9.2) signifies the concavity of the welfare function and the
second term is the condition for strategically complementary tax policies among
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jurisdictions; see Bulow et al. (1985). (9.3) tells us that there is a unique Nash
equilibrium in the tax competition game (see Fudenburg and Tirole (1993)) and
(9.4) is equivalent to the so-called sorting condition (see Guesnerie and Laffont
(1984) and section 3 in this paper). Applying Cramer’s rule for equation (9.1)
therefore yields the following partial derivative:
∂푡1
∂휃1
=
1
∣퐽 ∣ det
⎡⎢⎢⎣−∂퐹
1
∂휃1
∂퐹 1
∂푡2
−∂퐹 2
∂휃1
∂퐹 2
∂푡2
⎤⎥⎥⎦ > 0, (9.5)
as ∣퐽 ∣ =
(
∂퐹 1
∂푡1
∂퐹 2
∂푡2
)
−
(
∂퐹 1
∂푡2
∂퐹 2
∂푡1
)
> 0 and
(
−∂퐹 1
∂휃1
∂퐹 2
∂푡2
)
−
(
∂퐹 1
∂푡2
−∂퐹 2
∂휃1
)
> 0 q.e.d.
9.2 Proof of Lemma 2:
Differentiating equation (9.13) with respect to 휃푖 yields
∂푏푖
∂휃푖
= − 1
휃푖
(
푏푖 +
∂푏푖
∂푡푖
∂푡푖
∂휃푖
)
Basically, there are two effects: Firstly there is a direct cost effect as the match-
ing grant must be measured in proportion to the marginal rate of transformation
(first term in parentheses). Secondly, there is an pecuniary effect as local gov-
ernments raise different tax rates depending on the technology type 휃푖, which
is the latter term in parentheses. The sign of the latter term is indefinite as it
depends on the balance of regional capital imports and exports. However, the
absolute value of the pecuniary effect is relatively small as long as we consider
federations with rising best response functions, so that ∂푏푖∂휃푖 has a negative value.
9.3 Proof of Theorem 1:
We show that total transfer payments are expressed by (3.16):
∙ The 휃퐿-jurisdictions have the most efficient provision technology and need
the highest compensating grants. Therefore the constraint (3.14) which
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assures 푈0 for each jurisdiction should be binding for type 휃푖 = 휃퐿.
퐸휃−푖 [푉 (푧푖{푡푖(휃퐿), 푡−푖(휃−푖), 휃퐿}) + 푥푖{푡푖(휃퐿), 푡(휃−푖)}+ 푠(휃퐿)∣휃퐿] = 푈0.
(9.6)
∙ Due to the direct mechanism jurisdictions announce a type which maxi-
mizes their local welfare, i.e. for which it applies:
휃˜푖 = arg max퐸휃−푖 [푉 (푥푖{푡푖(휃푖), 푡(휃−푖)}) + 푧푖{푡푖(휃푖), 푡−푖(휃−푖), 푠(휃푖), 휃푖}∣휃푖] .
For truthful mechanisms it applies that 휃˜푖 = 휃푖. Totally differentiating the
incentive-compatibility constraint (3.15) yields
∂푈푖(푡푖(휃푖), 푡(휃−푖), 휃푖)
∂휃푖
= 푘푖(푡푖(휃푖), 푡−푖(휃−푖))푡푖(휃푖). (9.7)
Note that the envelope theorem implies that:
∂푈푖(푡푖(휃푖), 푡(휃−푖), 휃푖)
∂휃푖
푑푡푖(휃푖)
푑휃푖
=
푑푠(휃푖)
푑휃푖
.
and that the sorting condition is fulfilled:
∂
∂휃푖
(
∂푈푖/∂푡푖
∂푈푖/∂푠푖
)
> 0
∙ Integration of (9.7) yields the local welfare including transfer payments:
퐸휃−푖
[
푉 (푓(푘푖)− (푟 + 푡푖)푘푖 + 푟푘¯) + 휃푖 (푘푖푡푖) ∣휃푖
]
=
퐸휃−푖
[
푈0 +
∫ 휃푖
휃퐿
푘푖푡푖푑휃
0
푖 .
] (9.8)
Note that the constant 푈0 is determined by equation (9.6). Therefore we
can determine the transfer scheme comprising a part to assure for utility
푈0 in all jurisdictions and information rents to induce truth-telling:
푠(휃푖) =
1
휃푖
퐸휃−푖 [푈
0 − 푉 (푓(푘푖)− (푟 + 푡푖)푘푖 + 푟푘¯) + 휃푖 (푘푖푡푖 + 푠푖(휃푖)) +∫ 휃푖
휃퐿
푘푖푡푖푑휃
0
푖 ∣휃푖] q.e.d.
(9.9)
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9.4 Interior solution:
For small distortions the rent extraction effect always exceeds the welfare loss,
so that there is an interior minimum. This is shown by the following argument:
Let’s assume that the efficient matching rate 푏푖 is reduced by 훿푏푖 for types in
the interval [휃푖, 휃푖 + 푑휃푖]. Then local governments competing for mobile capital
reduce their tax rates by ∂푡푖∂푏푖 훿푏푖. That makes it less attractive to misrepresent
types and gives rise to an expected reduction in the expected information rent
by
{(1− 푃 (휃푖))(푘푖 + 푡푖∂푘푖
∂푡푖
)} 훿푡푖
훿푏푖
푑휃푖. (9.10)
The federal government expects jurisdictions to be of a type higher than 휃푖 with
probability 1−푃 (휃푖). The expected loss in federal welfare, which goes along with
a marginal reduction of the matching rate 푏푖 is given by the following expression:
{휃푖
(
푘푖 +
∂푘푖
∂푡푖
)
+ 푉푥(푥푖)
(
∂푟
∂푡푖
(푘¯ − 푘푖)− 푘푖
)
+
∑
푗 ∕=푖
(
푉푥(푥푗)
∂푟
∂푡푖
(푘¯ − 푘푗) +
(
휃푗 − 1− 푃 (휃푗)
푝(휃푗)
)
푡푗
∂푘푗
∂푡푖
)
} 훿푡푖
훿푏푖
푝(휃푖)푑휃푖.
(9.11)
By the first order condition (9.11) a marginal distortion away from the first best
approximates zero while the rent extraction effect (9.10) is strictly positive.
9.5 Proof of Proposition 3
We show that a lower schedule of tax rates cannot provide higher incentives for
a ling-term policy by contradiction. Consider two schedules of tax rates 푡˜(휃푖)
and 푡ˆ(휃푖), with 푡˜(휃푖) < 푡ˆ(휃푖) for all 휃푖. Further we define the optimal investment
policy 푦˜ [푦ˆ] if local jurisdictions anticipate a schedule of tax rates 푦˜(휃푖) [푦ˆ(휃푖)].
By the weak axiom of revealed preferences a local government anticipating a
schedule of public good supply 푡˜(휃푖) [푡ˆ(휃푖)] cannot do better by choosing 푦ˆ [푦˜]:∫ 휃퐻
휃퐿
휃푖푡˜(휃푖)푘1푃 (휃푖∣푦˜)푑휃푖 + 훾푦˜ ≥
∫ 휃퐻
휃퐿
휃푖푡˜(휃푖)푘1푃 (휃푖∣푦ˆ)푑휃푖 + 훾푦ˆ, (9.12)
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∫ 휃퐻
휃퐿
휃푖푡ˆ(휃푖)푘2푃 (휃푖∣푦ˆ)푑휃푖 + 훾푦ˆ ≥
∫ 휃퐻
휃퐿
휃푖푡ˆ(휃푖)푘2푃 (휃푖∣푑˜)푑휃푖 + 훾푦˜. (9.13)
Adding up (9.12) and (9.13) yields
∫ 휃퐻
휃퐿
휃푖(푡ˆ(휃푖)− 푡˜(휃푖))(푃 (휃푖∣푦˜)− 푃 (휃푖∣푦ˆ))푑휃푖 ≥ 0. (9.14)
Suppose, for a moment that 푦˜ > 푦ˆ. But then 푃 (휃푖∣푦ˆ) is higher than 푃 (휃푖∣푦˜) for all
휃푖 below 2 because of first order stochastic dominance. This however contradicts
with the fact that equation (9.14) is positive or equal to zero. q.e.d.
9.6 Proof of Proposition 5
The lowest type is 훽푖 = 1 which calls for the highest compensating grants.
Therefore, the constraint (5.4) which assures 푈0 for each jurisdiction should be
binding for 훽푖 = 1.
퐹 (푙) + 휏푖(1)− 푧푖(1)
1
− 푦 + 푉 (푧푖(1)) = 푈0 (9.15)
Due to the direct mechanism jurisdictions announce a type which maximizes
their local welfare, i.e. for which
훽˜푖 = arg max퐹 (푙) + 휏(훽˜푖)− 푧(훽˜푖)
훽푖
− 푦 + 푉 (푧(훽˜푖)) applies.
For a truthful mechanism it applies that 훽˜푖 = 훽푖. Total differentiation of the
incentive-constraint yields:
∂푈푖(푧푖(훽), 훽푖)
∂훽푖
=
푧푖(훽)
훽2푖
. (9.16)
Note that the envelope theorem implies that:
∂푈푖(푧푖(훽), 훽푖)
∂푧푖(훽)
푑푧푖(훽)
푑훽푖
+
푑휏푖(훽)
푑훽푖
= 0
and that the sorting condition is fulfilled:
∂
∂훽푖
푀푅푇푥푧(훽푖) > 0.
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Integration of equation (9.16) yields the local welfare function including this
payment:
퐹 (푙) + 휏푖(훽)− 푧푖(훽)
훽푖
− 푦 + 푉 (푧푖(훽)) = 푈0 +
∫ 훽푖
1
푧푖(푏)
푏2푖
푑푏푖. (9.17)
Therefore, we can write the transfer scheme comprising a redistributive part that
concedes at least 푈0 to all jurisdictions an incentives for truth-telling:
휏푖(훽) = 푈
0 − 퐹 (푙) + 푦ˆ푖 + 푧푖(훽)
훽푖
− 푉 (푧푖(훽)) +
∫ 훽푖
1
푧푖(훽)
푏2푖
푑푏푖. q.e.d. (9.18)
9.7 Dominant strategy implementation
In the model the Bayesian allocation rule can be equivalently implemented in
dominant strategies. In particular this means that the central government can of-
fer a contract that implements the same local provision policy in dominant strate-
gies and equally can afford the same welfare guarantee 푈0 than with Bayesian
implementation. As in equation (5.6) the constraint for a dominant strategy
incentive compatible transfer scheme is
푉 (푧푖(훽))− 푧푖(훽)
훽푖
+ 휏푖(훽)− 푉 (푧(훽˜푖)) + 푧(훽˜푖)
훽푖
− 휏(훽˜푖) ≥ 0.
If the allocation rule is Bayesian incentive compatible the following inequality
would be fulfilled
퐸훽−푖
[
푉 (푧(훽푖, 훽−푖))− 푧(훽푖, 훽−푖)
훽푖
+ 휏(훽푖, 훽−푖)− 푉 (푧( ˜훽푖, 훽−푖)) + 푧(
˜훽푖, 훽−푖)
훽푖
− 휏(훽˜푖, 훽−푖)
]
≥ 0.
Formally, it can be shown that the scope for federal redistribution in the case
with dominant strategy implementation
푛퐸훽푖∣푦ˆ
[
퐹 (푙)− 푧푖(훽)
훽푖
− 푦ˆ푖 + 푉 (푧푖(훽))−
∫ 훽푖
1
푧(푏푖)
푏2푖
푑푏푖
]
is equal to the Bayesian implementation case
퐸훽푖∣푦ˆ
[
푛∑
푖=1
퐸훽−푖∣푦ˆ
[
퐹 (푙)− 푧푖(훽)
훽푖
− 푦ˆ푖 + 푉 (푧푖(훽))−
∫ 훽푖
1
푧(푏푖)
푏2푖
푑푏푖
]]
.
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Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1991) pointed out three requirements for equiva-
lent dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian allocation rules must be ful-
filled: Firstly, the local welfare functions depend on the vector of local policy de-
cision z only via a one-dimensional statistic ℎ푖 : z→ ℜ and 퐷푖(⋅, 훽푖) : 훽푖×ℜ → ℜ
such that 푈푖(푧, 훽푖) = 퐷푖(ℎ푖(z), 훽푖). Secondly, the single-crossing property must
be fulfilled so that ∂푈푖/(∂ℎ푖∂훽푖) > 0 and thirdly the monotonous hazard rate
property. The one dimensional condensation property is fulfilled because local
public good supply is financed via a non-distortive tax and there are no spill
over effects. Moreover by assumption of the single crossing property and the
monotonous hazard rate property hold. Therefore we can implement a local
policy with dominant strategy incentive compatibility without a loss of welfare.
9.8 Proof of Proposition 7 and 9
We show that a lower schedule of public good provision cannot provide higher
incentives for public good innovation by contraction. Consider two schedules
of public good supply 푧1(훽) and 푧2(훽), where 푧1(훽) < 푧2(훽) for all 훽. Further
we define the optimal innovation policy 푦1 [푦2] if local jurisdictions anticipate a
schedule of public good supply 푧1(훽푖) [푧2(훽푖)]. By the weak axiom of revealed
preferences a local government anticipating a schedule of public good supply
푧1(훽푖) [푧2(훽푖)] cannot do better by choosing 푦2 [푦1]:
−
∫ 2
1
푧1(훽푖)
훽2푖
푃 (훽푖∣푦1)푑훽푖 − 푦1 ≥ −
∫ 2
1
푧1(훽푖)
훽2푖
푃 (훽푖∣푦2)푑훽푖 − 푦2, (9.19)
−
∫ 2
1
푧2(훽푖)
훽2푖
푃 (훽푖∣푦2)푑훽푖 − 푦2 ≥ −
∫ 2
1
푧2(훽푖)
훽2푖
푃 (훽푖∣푦1)푑훽푖 − 푦1. (9.20)
Adding up (18) and (19) yields∫ 2
1
푧2(훽푖)− 푧1(훽푖)
훽2푖
(푃 (훽푖∣푦1)− 푃 (훽푖∣푦2))푑훽푖 ≥ 0. (9.21)
Suppose, for a moment that 푦1 > 푦2. But then 푃 (훽푖∣푦2) is higher than 푃 (훽푖∣푦1)
for all 훽푖 below 2 because of first order stochastic dominance. This however
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contradicts with the fact that equation (9.21) is positive or equal to zero. q.e.d.
9.9 Proof of Proposition 8
The schedule of public good supply is less distorted, if the central government
knows the common factor 휉 = 1. Comparing the hazard rates of the first order
conditions (5.9), (5.12) and (5.13) respectively, it applies that∫ 2
훽푖
푝(훽푖)푑훽푖
푝(훽푖)
=
∫ 2
훽푖
푔(훽푖 − 32)푑훽푖
푔(훽푖 − 32)
>
∫ 3
2
훽푖
푔(훽푖 − 1)푑훽푖
푔(훽푖 − 1) . q.e.d.
Abbreviations
∙ For the sake of clarity, the underlying variables in the model-theoretic
analysis are explained in each chapter. Hereafter I would like to specify
abbreviations, which have not been named in extenso:
LHS stands for left-hand-side
RHS stands for right-hand-side
s.t. stands for subject to
CES stands for constant return to scale
I-O stands for Industrial Organization
∙ In chapter 5 we signify the different stages of the game by 푡1, ..., 푡4. Ex-
pressing the timing of the game by 푡 is conventional in literature. However
in chapter 3, 4, and 6 the stages of the game are expressed by stage 1, ...
,stage 4 in order to avoid any confusion with the tax rate on capital.
∙ As readers made themselves familiar with the strategic variable of the
tax competition game 푡푖 throughout chapters 3 and 4 we retain 푡푖 as the
strategic variable in chapter 6 as well: here 푡푖 is defined as the effective
tax burden contingent on the enforcement activities chosen by local tax
authorities while in chapters 3 and 4 it signifies the statutory tax rate.
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